Transfers at Undervalue and Preferences in Canadian Insolvency
Transfers at undervalue and preferences let trustees and monitors reverse transactions made before an insolvency. The BIA sets look-back periods of three months to five years depending on the relationship, the CCAA imports the same rules, and provincial statutes add further remedies. This note explains the tests and how counterparties can reduce clawback exposure.

Key takeaways
- Preferences to arm's-length creditors are reviewable for 3 months; to related parties for 12 months.
- Transfers at undervalue to related parties can be reviewed up to five years before the bankruptcy event.
- CCAA s. 36.1 applies BIA ss. 95–101 to restructurings, with the monitor acting as trustee.
- Provincial statutes and Quebec's Paulian action provide parallel remedies.
- Contemporaneous valuation evidence is the best defence against undervalue claims.
How Canadian law claws back transfers at undervalue and preferences
When a company fails, its trustee or monitor looks backwards. Payments, transfers and security granted in the months or years before the filing can be reversed if they unfairly favoured one creditor or moved value out of reach of creditors generally. Federal law provides two main tools: the preference provision in s. 95 and the provision on transfers at undervalue in s. 96 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA). The Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA) imports both into restructurings through s. 36.1, with the monitor in place of the trustee and the CCAA filing date in place of the bankruptcy date. Provincial fraudulent conveyance and preference statutes add parallel remedies that creditors can use with or without a formal insolvency.

For counterparties to distressed companies, these rules create clawback exposure long after a deal closes. For directors and shareholders, they create personal risk where value moved to insiders. This note sets out the statutory tests, the look-back periods, the provincial alternatives, the policy debate on reform and practical ways to reduce exposure.
Preferences under BIA s. 95
A preference occurs when an insolvent person makes a payment, transfer, charge or other transaction that prefers one creditor over others. Section 95 distinguishes between arm's-length and non-arm's-length creditors:
- Arm's-length creditors (s. 95(1)(a)). The transaction is void as against the trustee if made within three months before the initial bankruptcy event and made "with a view to giving that creditor a preference". If it has the effect of a preference, that intent is presumed, even if made under pressure, and evidence of pressure is not admissible to rebut it (s. 95(2)).
- Non-arm's-length creditors (s. 95(1)(b)). The look-back extends to 12 months, and the test is effect-based: the transaction is void if it "has the effect of giving that creditor a preference", without any need to prove intent.
The debtor must have been insolvent when the transaction occurred. Exceptions apply to margin deposits with clearing houses and to transfers of financial collateral under eligible financial contracts (s. 95(2.1)). Ordinary course payments to arm's-length suppliers on normal terms can usually rebut the presumption of intent, because the debtor's dominant purpose was to keep the business running rather than to prefer the supplier.
Transfers at undervalue under BIA s. 96
The BIA defines a transfer at undervalue as a disposition of property or provision of services for which the debtor received no consideration, or consideration "conspicuously less" than the fair market value of what it gave (s. 2). Section 96 lets the court declare such a transfer void against the trustee, or order the counterparty or anyone "privy" to it to pay the estate the difference in value. The tests depend on the relationship:
| Counterparty | Look-back period | Additional conditions |
|---|---|---|
| Arm's length | 1 year before initial bankruptcy event | Debtor insolvent or rendered insolvent, and intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor |
| Non-arm's length | 1 year before initial bankruptcy event | No further condition |
| Non-arm's length | Years 2 to 5 before initial bankruptcy event | Debtor insolvent or rendered insolvent, or intended to defraud, defeat or delay a creditor |
| Preference to arm's-length creditor (s. 95) | 3 months | Insolvent; intent presumed where effect of preference |
| Preference to non-arm's-length creditor (s. 95) | 12 months | Insolvent; effect-based |
In proceedings under s. 96, the trustee states its opinion of the fair market value and of the consideration actually given or received, and those values are presumed correct absent evidence to the contrary (s. 96(2)). A "person who is privy" is a non-arm's-length party to the transferee who receives, or causes another to receive, a benefit because of the transfer (s. 96(3)). Courts have read these provisions as giving judges discretion over remedies, so not every transfer that meets the tests is fully reversed.
Transfers at undervalue frequently arise in corporate groups: intercompany asset transfers, upstream guarantees without benefit, dividends disguised as management fees, and sales of assets to shareholders before a filing. Because the non-arm's-length look-back reaches five years, transactions that seemed routine at the time can be examined years later.
Proving insolvency, value and intent
Most clawback litigation turns on three questions of fact. The first is whether the debtor was insolvent at the time of the transaction. The BIA defines an "insolvent person" by reference to three alternative tests: inability to meet obligations as they generally become due, having ceased paying current obligations in the ordinary course, or having property that would not be sufficient to pay all obligations if disposed of at a fairly conducted sale. Trustees usually reconstruct the balance sheet and cash position at the transaction date, and defendants respond with evidence of available credit, going-concern value and the company's own forecasts at the time.
The second question is value. For transfers at undervalue, the gap must be "conspicuous", which courts have treated as a significant, readily apparent difference rather than a modest one. Because the trustee's valuation is presumed correct unless rebutted, defendants need their own evidence, ideally created at the time of the transaction rather than commissioned years later for litigation.
The third question is intent, which matters for arm's-length preferences and for arm's-length transfers at undervalue. Intent is rarely admitted, so courts infer it from "badges of fraud": transfers to family members or insiders, secrecy, transfers of most of the debtor's assets, transfers made while litigation or collection was pending, inadequate consideration and the debtor's continued use of the property after the transfer. A credible business reason, documented at the time, is the strongest answer.
Remedies and defences
If a preference is proved, the transaction is void as against the trustee, so the creditor must return the payment or give up the security, and then prove its claim in the estate like other creditors. If a transfer at undervalue is proved, the court may declare it void or order payment of the difference in value by the transferee or a privy party. Courts have treated the remedy under s. 96 as discretionary, which allows them to consider good faith, the transferee's own position and whether full reversal would produce an unfair windfall.
Defences include showing that the debtor was solvent, that the transaction was in the ordinary course on normal terms, that the creditor was not preferred because it held prior security over the same assets, that the consideration was fair, or that the counterparty dealt at arm's length and the debtor lacked the required intent. Limitation periods also matter in practice: trustees must bring claims within the time allowed by applicable law, and delays after the trustee learns of a transaction can defeat a claim.
Provincial fraudulent conveyance and preference statutes
Each common-law province has a fraudulent conveyance statute and most have a preferences statute. In Ontario, the Fraudulent Conveyances Act allows creditors to set aside conveyances made with intent to defeat, hinder, delay or defraud creditors, and the Assignments and Preferences Act voids transfers and payments made by an insolvent person with intent to defeat or prejudice creditors or to give a creditor an unjust preference (s. 4). Quebec relies on the Civil Code's Paulian action, which allows a creditor to have a juridical act made in fraud of its rights declared unenforceable against it.
These provincial remedies have important advantages: they are available to individual creditors without a bankruptcy, some have no fixed look-back period and they can be combined with other claims such as oppression. The trustee in bankruptcy can also use them, and where the trustee declines to act, s. 38 of the BIA lets a creditor obtain court authorization to take the proceeding in its own name for its own benefit. In practice, trustees often plead the federal and provincial remedies together.
The reform debate
Practitioners and policymakers have long debated whether the federal regime strikes the right balance. Points of contention include whether intent should remain an element of the arm's-length tests, how courts should measure "conspicuously less" than fair market value, how far the five-year look-back for related parties should reach, how much discretion courts have to decline relief, and how the federal and provincial regimes should interact.
Until Parliament legislates further, counterparties should assume that courts will look at substance rather than labels, and that transactions with insiders will be examined closely. Group reorganizations carried out shortly before a filing, even for tax or operational reasons, should be documented with the same care as a third-party sale, because the trustee will review them with the benefit of hindsight.
When contracting with a financially stressed counterparty, document the business rationale and the fair value of each side's consideration at the time. A contemporaneous valuation or fairness analysis is the most effective evidence against a later claim that the transaction was a transfer at undervalue.
Reducing clawback exposure for transfers at undervalue
Counterparties dealing with distressed companies can reduce the risk that transfers at undervalue or preference claims will unwind their deals:
- Price at fair value and keep evidence: appraisals, competing offers, fairness opinions or market data.
- Avoid security for old debt. New security given for existing unsecured debt is a classic preference; tie security to genuinely new advances.
- Trade on normal terms. Suppliers receiving payment in the ordinary course on usual terms are better placed to rebut the presumption of intent.
- Be especially wary of insider transactions. Related-party deals face the 12-month preference and five-year undervalue look-backs; use independent committees and market checks.
- Use court approval where possible. Transactions approved in a CCAA, BIA proposal or receivership, with notice to stakeholders, are far harder to attack later.
- Diligence solvency. Ask for recent financial statements and consider solvency certificates when acquiring assets from a company under pressure, and keep the diligence file for at least the length of the relevant look-back period.
Directors should note that dividends, redemptions and excessive compensation paid in the year before bankruptcy can also lead to personal liability under s. 101 of the BIA. Our note on directors' duties in the zone of insolvency explains that exposure, and our page on BIA proposals and bankruptcy covers the wider process.
How TRW & Co helps
We advise trustees' and monitors' counsel teams, creditors, purchasers and directors on preferences, transfers at undervalue and provincial fraudulent conveyance claims. Our work includes pre-transaction risk reviews, structuring of intra-group transfers and insider financings, defence and prosecution of clawback claims, and negotiated settlements in CCAA and bankruptcy proceedings. We work with Canadian litigation counsel and licensed insolvency trustees where those roles are required. See also our page on commercial litigation. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a clawback risk, contact us.
Frequently asked questions
What is a transfer at undervalue under the BIA?
It is a disposition of property or provision of services for which the debtor received no consideration, or consideration conspicuously less than the fair market value of what it gave. Section 96 lets the court void the transfer or order the counterparty, or a non-arm's-length person privy to it, to pay the difference to the estate.
How far back can a trustee look?
For preferences, three months for arm's-length creditors and 12 months for non-arm's-length creditors. For transfers at undervalue, one year for arm's-length parties (with insolvency and intent to defeat creditors) and up to five years for non-arm's-length parties, with insolvency or intent required for years two to five.
Do these rules apply in CCAA proceedings?
Yes. Section 36.1 of the CCAA applies ss. 38 and 95 to 101 of the BIA to a compromise or arrangement unless the plan provides otherwise. References to the date of bankruptcy are read as the day CCAA proceedings commence, and references to the trustee are read as the monitor.
Can a creditor attack a transfer without a bankruptcy?
Yes. Provincial fraudulent conveyance and preference statutes, such as Ontario's Fraudulent Conveyances Act and Assignments and Preferences Act, and Quebec's Paulian action under the Civil Code, are available to creditors without a formal insolvency, often alongside oppression claims.
Sources
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.


