Guide · Corporate, M&A and Private Equity
Corporate Governance and Boards in Canada
Corporate governance in Canada rests on directors' statutory duties, shareholder rights under corporate statutes and, for listed issuers, securities-regulator disclosure rules. This page explains what directors owe and to whom, how boards should be organized, which registers and disclosures apply, and how activism and shareholder proposals work in practice.
Key takeaways
- Directors owe a fiduciary duty to the corporation and a duty of care measured by a reasonably prudent person (s. 122 CBCA).
- The CBCA lets directors consider shareholders, employees, retirees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment.
- Uncontested CBCA director elections at distributing corporations require a majority of votes cast for each nominee.
- CBCA corporations must keep and file a register of individuals with significant control (25% threshold).
- Holders of 5% of voting shares can requisition a meeting; activists also use proposals and proxy contests.
Corporate governance in Canada: the essentials
Corporate governance in Canada is the set of rules and practices that determine how a corporation is directed and controlled: who makes decisions, what duties they owe, how shareholders hold them to account, and what must be disclosed. The legal foundation is the corporate statute under which the company is incorporated, usually the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) or a provincial equivalent. For listed companies, securities regulators add disclosure and audit committee rules, and stock exchanges add listing requirements. Courts complete the picture through the oppression remedy, derivative actions and the case law on directors' duties.

Canada's approach differs from that of the United States in several respects. Directors' duties are owed to the corporation rather than to shareholders as a class, and the Supreme Court has expressly allowed boards to weigh the interests of other stakeholders. Securities regulators favour disclosure over mandatory structures, through a "comply or explain" model for many governance practices. And shareholders have relatively strong statutory tools, including the right to requisition meetings and to put proposals before the annual meeting.
This page is part of our corporate, M&A and private equity practice. Governance issues in transactions, such as special committees, are also discussed on our public M&A page.
Directors' duties under Canadian law
The statutory duties
Section 122(1) of the CBCA requires every director and officer, in exercising their powers and discharging their duties, to act honestly and in good faith with a view to the best interests of the corporation (the fiduciary duty), and to exercise the care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise in comparable circumstances (the duty of care). Provincial statutes contain equivalent provisions. No provision in a contract, the articles, the by-laws or a resolution can relieve a director of the duty to act in accordance with the statute.
Peoples and BCE
Two Supreme Court decisions define the modern law. In Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68, the Court held that the fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation, not to creditors or any other group, even when the corporation is near insolvency. It also held that the duty of care is objective, assessed against what a reasonably prudent person would do in comparable circumstances, and that courts will not second-guess reasonable business decisions made through an appropriate process.
In BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, the Court confirmed that the best interests of the corporation are not simply the interests of shareholders. Directors may consider the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors, consumers, governments and the environment, and when conflicts arise they must treat affected stakeholders fairly, consistent with the corporation's duties as a responsible corporate citizen. Parliament codified this in s. 122(1.1) CBCA, which lists shareholders, employees, retirees and pensioners, creditors, consumers, governments, the environment and the long-term interests of the corporation as factors directors may consider.
The business judgment rule
Canadian courts defer to business decisions that fall within a range of reasonable alternatives, provided the directors acted on an informed basis, in good faith and without conflict. The rule protects the decision, not the process: a board that cannot show what it considered, what advice it obtained and why it decided as it did will find less deference. Minutes, board materials and advisers' reports are therefore central to corporate governance in Canada.
Conflicts of interest
A director or officer who is a party to, or has a material interest in, a material contract or transaction with the corporation must disclose the nature and extent of the interest in writing or have it entered in the minutes (s. 120 CBCA). An interested director generally may not vote on the matter, subject to limited exceptions such as contracts relating to their own remuneration or indemnity. Compliance with these rules, together with approval by the disinterested directors or the shareholders and a finding that the contract was reasonable and fair, protects the transaction from being set aside.
Boards should keep a standing register of directors' interests and revisit it before each significant decision.
Duties when the corporation is in financial difficulty
When a corporation approaches insolvency, directors continue to owe their duty to the corporation, not to creditors, as Peoples confirmed. In practice, however, the interests of creditors weigh more heavily in the assessment of what is in the corporation's best interests, and creditors may use the oppression remedy to challenge decisions that unfairly disregard their interests. Directors in that situation should increase the frequency of meetings, obtain independent financial and legal advice, monitor cash flow and statutory remittances closely, and consider formal restructuring options under the insolvency statutes before value is lost. Our insight on directors' duties near insolvency explains the risks.
Statutory liabilities of directors
Beyond fiduciary duties, Canadian statutes impose personal liability on directors for specific corporate obligations. These exposures surprise many foreign parents whose nominees sit on Canadian subsidiary boards.
| Exposure | Source | Typical defence |
|---|---|---|
| Unpaid employee wages | Corporate statutes (e.g., s. 119 CBCA) and employment standards statutes | Limited to wages for a set period; claims must follow procedural steps |
| Unremitted source deductions | Income Tax Act, Canada Pension Plan, Employment Insurance Act | Due diligence to prevent the failure |
| Unremitted GST/HST | Excise Tax Act | Due diligence to prevent the failure |
| Environmental offences | Federal and provincial environmental statutes | Taking all reasonable care to ensure compliance |
| Secondary market misrepresentation | Provincial securities acts (e.g., Part XXIII.1 of the Ontario Securities Act) | Reasonable investigation; liability caps |
| Improper dividends and redemptions | Corporate statutes (e.g., s. 118 CBCA) | Good-faith reliance on financial statements and reports |
The due diligence defence for tax remittances requires directors to show they took positive steps to prevent the failure, not merely to cure it afterwards. Directors are generally protected by corporate indemnities, which statutes permit subject to good-faith conditions, and by directors' and officers' insurance. Both should be reviewed before accepting a board seat. Our insight on directors' statutory exposures covers each regime.
Board structure and committees
Composition and residency
CBCA corporations must have at least 25% resident Canadian directors, or at least one if the board has fewer than four members (s. 105(3)). A majority is required in prescribed sectors or where Canadian ownership rules apply. Ontario, British Columbia and several other provinces have no residency requirement for corporations incorporated under their statutes. Distributing corporations under the CBCA must have at least three directors, at least two of whom are not officers or employees of the corporation or its affiliates.
Audit and other committees
Reporting issuers must have an audit committee meeting the independence and financial literacy requirements of National Instrument 52-110, with exemptions for venture issuers. National Instrument 58-101 requires listed issuers to disclose their governance practices against the guidelines in National Policy 58-201, which recommend a majority of independent directors, an independent chair or lead director, written position descriptions, and nominating and compensation committees composed of independent directors. These are guidelines rather than mandatory rules, but departures must be explained.
Private and subsidiary boards
Private companies and wholly owned subsidiaries are not subject to securities-law governance rules, but their directors owe the same statutory duties. A common weakness is a subsidiary board that rubber-stamps group decisions without considering the Canadian corporation's own interests and liabilities. Good corporate governance for subsidiaries includes regular meetings, a written delegation of authority, Canadian-specific compliance reporting and a clear record of how directors considered local interests.
Disclosure, registers and shareholder rights
Majority voting and diversity disclosure
Since 2022, CBCA distributing corporations must hold separate votes for each director, and in an uncontested election a nominee is elected only if they receive a majority of the votes cast for and against them (s. 106(3.4)), subject to limited exceptions.
Prescribed CBCA corporations must also place before shareholders at each annual meeting information about diversity among directors and senior management (s. 172.1), covering women, Indigenous peoples, persons with disabilities and members of visible minorities. Securities regulators have separate diversity disclosure requirements for listed issuers; in April 2025 the Canadian Securities Administrators paused work on proposed amendments to those requirements. A CBCA amendment requiring prescribed corporations to develop an approach to executive remuneration and hold a non-binding say-on-pay vote was enacted in 2019 but, as of the consolidation current to 19 October 2026, is listed among amendments not in force.
Individuals with significant control
Every CBCA private corporation must keep a register of individuals with significant control, meaning broadly any individual who holds 25% or more of the votes or of the fair market value of the shares, directly or indirectly, or who has control in fact (s. 21.1). Since 22 January 2024, corporations must file this information with Corporations Canada with their annual return and within 15 days after any change to the register, and some of it is publicly searchable.
Directors and officers who knowingly authorize non-compliance face fines of up to CAD 200,000 on summary conviction. Ontario, British Columbia and other provinces have their own register requirements for corporations incorporated under their statutes, and Quebec has separate disclosure rules administered by its enterprise registrar.
Shareholder proposals and requisitions
Eligible shareholders of a CBCA corporation can submit proposals for inclusion in the management proxy circular (s. 137), subject to ownership thresholds and exclusions. Holders of at least 5% of the voting shares can requisition a meeting (s. 143); if the directors fail to call it within 21 days, the requisitioning shareholders may call it themselves. These tools, together with the oppression remedy and derivative actions, give shareholders significant leverage.
Shareholder activism and proxy contests
Canada has an active market in shareholder activism. Activists build stakes, subject to the 10% early-warning threshold under National Instrument 62-104, then press for board changes, strategic reviews, capital returns or sales. Their main tools are private engagement, public campaigns, shareholder proposals, requisitioned meetings and proxy contests to replace some or all of the board. Since the CSA's proxy solicitation exemptions allow public broadcast solicitations without a circular in many cases, activists can campaign widely at relatively low cost.
Boards defend through engagement, advance notice by-laws that require nominations to be made within set windows, settlement agreements that add activist nominees, and, in extreme cases, litigation over the validity of requisitions or the conduct of meetings. Universal proxies, which allow shareholders to choose among management and dissident nominees on a single form, have become more common. Canadian courts have stressed that directors' defensive steps must be taken in the best interests of the corporation and not to entrench themselves.
Review advance notice by-laws, the shareholder register and the board's own vulnerability before an activist appears. A board that already understands its shareholder base, has a credible strategy and can explain its capital allocation is better placed than one that first examines these questions after a requisition arrives.
Emerging corporate governance risks
Corporate governance agendas in Canada now regularly include risks that did not feature a decade ago. Boards are expected to understand and oversee cyber risk, including incident response and regulatory notification; the use of artificial intelligence by the business and its suppliers; climate-related risks, which must be disclosed when material even though the CSA paused its proposed mandatory climate disclosure rule in April 2025; supply chain exposure to forced labour, which larger entities must report on annually by 31 May; and trade risks arising from tariffs and sanctions.
Federally regulated financial institutions face more prescriptive expectations from the Office of the Superintendent of Financial Institutions, including climate risk management and disclosure under Guideline B-15 and, from 1 May 2027, model risk management including AI models under Guideline E-23. For other companies, the question is what a reasonably prudent director would do, which increasingly includes asking for regular reporting on these topics. Our pages on cybersecurity and continuous disclosure discuss specific obligations.
A practical corporate governance calendar
Many boards find it useful to translate these expectations into an annual calendar. A typical calendar for a Canadian company includes approval of the annual financial statements and the annual return, including the significant-control filing; an annual review of delegations of authority and signing limits; a review of statutory remittances and the related certificates from management; a privacy and cyber report; a review of material litigation and regulatory matters; and, for listed issuers, approval of the management information circular and the governance and diversity disclosure it contains. Reviewing directors' and officers' insurance and indemnity agreements at least once a year completes the cycle and gives each director comfort that their personal exposure is managed.
How TRW & Co helps with corporate governance
TRW & Co advises boards, board committees, individual directors and shareholders on corporate governance in Canada. We prepare board mandates, committee charters and delegations of authority, advise on directors' duties in transactions and in financial difficulty, maintain significant-control registers and filings, and help subsidiaries of foreign groups build Canadian governance frameworks. We advise on shareholder proposals, requisitions, proxy contests and settlement agreements, for both companies and investors. We are an independent firm and work with Canadian-licensed counsel where required. Contact us to discuss your board's needs. This page is general information, not legal advice.
Frequently asked questions
To whom do directors owe duties in Canada?
To the corporation. In Peoples (2004 SCC 68) and BCE (2008 SCC 69), the Supreme Court held that the fiduciary duty is owed to the corporation, and that directors may consider the interests of shareholders, employees, creditors and other stakeholders in deciding what is in its best interests. Stakeholders who are treated unfairly may seek relief through the oppression remedy.
Do CBCA corporations need Canadian resident directors?
Yes. At least 25% of directors must be resident Canadians, or at least one director if the board has fewer than four members, under s. 105(3) CBCA. A majority is required in certain prescribed sectors. Several provinces, including Ontario and British Columbia, have no residency requirement for corporations incorporated under their own statutes.
What is the register of individuals with significant control?
It is a register that CBCA private corporations must keep of individuals who hold 25% or more of the votes or value of the shares, directly or indirectly, or who have control in fact. Since 22 January 2024, the information must be filed with Corporations Canada with the annual return and within 15 days after any change.
Can shareholders force a meeting of a Canadian corporation?
Under s. 143 CBCA, holders of at least 5% of the voting shares can requisition the directors to call a meeting for stated business. If the directors do not call the meeting within 21 days, subject to limited exceptions, the requisitioning shareholders may call it themselves and the corporation may have to reimburse their reasonable expenses.
Is say-on-pay mandatory in Canada?
Not yet under the CBCA. Amendments enacted in 2019 would require prescribed corporations to develop an approach to remuneration and hold a non-binding shareholder vote, but the consolidated CBCA current to 19 October 2026 lists them as not in force. Many large listed issuers hold advisory say-on-pay votes voluntarily.
Sources
- Canada Business Corporations Act, ss. 21.1, 105, 106, 122, 137, 143, 172.1
- Peoples Department Stores Inc. (Trustee of) v. Wise, 2004 SCC 68
- BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69
- Corporations Canada: Individuals with significant control
- CSA: Update on climate-related and diversity-related disclosure projects (23 April 2025)
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.