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Guide · Competition and Foreign Investment

Abuse of Dominance and Civil Reviewable Practices

Abuse of dominance and the other civil reviewable practices allow the Competition Tribunal to stop conduct that harms competition without being criminal. After the 2022 to 2025 amendments, the tests are broader, the penalties far higher, and private parties can bring cases themselves. This page explains each provision, the penalties, and how businesses with strong market positions should manage the risk.

9 min read Updated
ENFR

Key takeaways

  • Section 79 now covers anti-competitive practices and conduct that substantially lessens competition where the firm has a plausible competitive interest.
  • Abuse of dominance AMPs: the greater of CAD 25 million (CAD 35 million repeat) and three times the benefit, or 3% of worldwide revenues.
  • Section 90.1 competitor collaboration AMPs: the greater of CAD 10 million (CAD 15 million repeat) and three times the benefit, or 3%.
  • Private parties can seek leave to bring applications under ss. 75, 76, 77, 79 and 90.1.
  • The Tribunal may consider network effects, non-price competition and consumer privacy.

What abuse of dominance means in Canada

Abuse of dominance is the Competition Act's main tool against harmful conduct by firms with market power. Unlike cartels, which are criminal, abuse of dominance and the other reviewable practices are civil matters decided by the Competition Tribunal, a specialized body of Federal Court judges and lay members. Remedies available to the Tribunal include prohibition orders, orders requiring action to restore competition, and, for some provisions, administrative monetary penalties (AMPs). The provisions apply to firms of any nationality whose conduct affects markets in Canada.

Market dominance analysis and platform data used in an abuse of dominance case in Canada
Since 2024, Canada's civil competition provisions reach more conduct and carry penalties linked to worldwide revenues.

The civil provisions were reshaped by three rounds of amendments to the Competition Act. In 2022, AMPs for abuse of dominance were increased and linked to worldwide revenues. In 2024, Bill C-59 rewrote the abuse of dominance test, extended s. 90.1 to some agreements between non-competitors and added AMPs, and expanded private access to the Tribunal, with those changes coming into force in stages through 20 June 2025. The result is a regime that is closer to European competition law in reach and penalties, while retaining Canadian features such as the Tribunal process.

This page is part of our competition and foreign investment practice. For criminal agreements, see cartels and criminal enforcement.

The abuse of dominance test after 2024

Under s. 79(1), as amended, the Tribunal may make an order if it finds that one or more persons substantially or completely control a class or species of business throughout Canada or any area of Canada (that is, they are dominant), and either:

  • they have engaged in or are engaging in a practice of anti-competitive acts; or
  • they have engaged in or are engaging in conduct that has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market in which they have a plausible competitive interest, unless the effect results from superior competitive performance.

The second limb, added in 2024, means that conduct can be challenged based on its effects alone, without proof of an anti-competitive purpose. The first limb continues to capture practices of anti-competitive acts, which s. 78 defines through a non-exhaustive list, including margin squeezes, exclusionary pricing, requiring suppliers to sell only to particular customers, pre-emption of scarce facilities, and, since 2022 and 2024, selective or discriminatory responses to actual or potential competitors and conduct that impedes entry or expansion. An anti-competitive act is generally one intended to have a predatory, exclusionary or disciplinary negative effect on a competitor, or to impair competition.

When assessing effects, the Tribunal may consider barriers to entry, including network effects; the effect on price or non-price competition, including quality, choice or consumer privacy; the nature and extent of change and innovation; and any other relevant factor. Superior competitive performance, such as offering better products or lower prices, remains a defence for the effects-based limb.

Penalties and remedies for abuse of dominance

ProvisionConductMaximum AMPPrivate access
s. 79Abuse of dominanceGreater of CAD 25 million (CAD 35 million for subsequent orders) and 3 times the benefit, or 3% of annual worldwide gross revenues if the benefit cannot be determinedYes, with leave
s. 90.1Agreements between competitors (and certain non-competitors) that substantially lessen competitionGreater of CAD 10 million (CAD 15 million subsequent) and 3 times the benefit, or 3% of worldwide revenuesYes, with leave
s. 75Refusal to dealOrders; no general AMPYes, with leave
s. 76Price maintenanceOrdersYes, with leave
s. 77Exclusive dealing, tied selling, market restrictionOrdersYes, with leave

The Tribunal can prohibit the conduct, order the dominant firm to take actions reasonable and necessary to overcome the effects of the conduct, including divestitures, and impose AMPs under s. 79(3.1). Since 2024, where a private applicant succeeds, the Tribunal can also order the respondent to pay an amount not exceeding the value of the benefit derived from the conduct, to be distributed among the applicant and others affected.

AMPs are intended to promote compliance, not to punish, but at these levels they create substantial exposure for large firms. In setting the amount, the Tribunal considers factors such as the effect on competition, the gross revenue from affected sales, any actual or anticipated profits, the respondent's financial position, its history of compliance, and any other relevant factor. See our insight on administrative monetary penalties.

Digital platforms and data

The 2022 and 2024 amendments were designed in part with digital markets in mind. The references to network effects, non-price competition and consumer privacy in the abuse of dominance factors, and the inclusion of selective or discriminatory responses to competitors among anti-competitive acts, give the Tribunal tools to assess conduct such as self-preferencing, restrictions on interoperability, data access policies and exclusionary terms imposed on business users. Platform operators with significant Canadian user bases should review these practices in light of the effects-based test and the possibility of private applications by business users. See our insight on digital platforms and competition law.

How the Bureau investigates

Abuse of dominance investigations typically begin with complaints from competitors or customers, and proceed through information requests and, often, court orders under s. 11 compelling documents, data and testimony. The Bureau's enforcement guidelines explain how it assesses dominance, anti-competitive acts and effects, and it may resolve cases through consent agreements registered with the Tribunal. Investigations can take a year or more, and firms under investigation should manage document preservation, privilege and communications carefully from the outset.

Competitor collaborations under section 90.1

Section 90.1 allows the Tribunal to make an order where an existing or proposed agreement or arrangement between competitors prevents or lessens, or is likely to prevent or lessen, competition substantially in a market. It complements the criminal conspiracy provision by addressing collaborations that are not hardcore cartels but may still harm competition, such as joint purchasing, joint production, information-sharing, and some joint ventures and strategic alliances.

Since 2024, s. 90.1 also applies to agreements between persons who are not competitors where a significant purpose of the agreement, or part of it, is to prevent or lessen competition in any market; this reaches, for example, restrictive covenants in commercial real estate that prevent the use of property by competitors of the landlord's tenant.

In assessing an agreement, the Tribunal considers factors similar to those in merger review, and an efficiencies exception is available where the agreement is likely to bring about gains in efficiency that are greater than and offset the effects on competition and would not likely be attained otherwise. The Bureau's competitor collaboration guidelines explain how it distinguishes collaborations it will treat criminally from those it will assess civilly. See our insights on property controls and information sharing between competitors.

Other reviewable practices

Refusal to deal (s. 75)

The Tribunal may order a supplier to accept a customer on usual trade terms where the customer is substantially affected in its business, or precluded from carrying it on, because it cannot obtain adequate supplies of a product on usual terms due to insufficient competition among suppliers, the customer is willing and able to meet the terms, the product is in ample supply, and the refusal is having or is likely to have an adverse effect on competition in a market.

Price maintenance (s. 76)

Price maintenance covers a supplier influencing upward or discouraging the reduction of a customer's resale price by agreement, threat or promise, refusing to supply because of a customer's low pricing policy, or inducing a supplier to refuse to supply a third party because of its pricing, where the conduct has had, is having or is likely to have an adverse effect on competition. Suggested retail prices are permitted if it is made clear that the customer is free to sell at a lower price. Minimum advertised price policies and online marketplace pricing rules should be reviewed with this provision in mind, because enforcement through threats to cut supply can bring them within s. 76.

Exclusive dealing, tied selling and market restriction (s. 77)

The Tribunal may make orders against exclusive dealing, tied selling and market restriction practised by a major supplier, or widespread in a market, where they are likely to lessen competition substantially. Distribution agreements with exclusivity, territorial or bundling terms should be assessed against these provisions, particularly where the supplier has a strong market position or where similar terms are widespread across the industry, because the cumulative effect of many similar agreements can foreclose rivals. See our insight on distribution agreements in Canada.

Assessing dominance

Dominance means substantial or complete control of a class or species of business in Canada or an area of Canada, which in practice means market power: the ability to profitably maintain prices above competitive levels, or reduce quality, choice or innovation, for a sustained period. The analysis starts with market definition and shares, but the Bureau and Tribunal also consider barriers to entry and expansion, countervailing power of customers, the dynamics of the market and, for joint dominance, whether several firms act in a coordinated way.

Shares below 50% are generally unlikely to indicate single-firm dominance, while higher shares call for closer scrutiny, but there is no bright-line threshold and the 2024 amendments emphasize effects over formal tests.

Defences and justifications

Firms accused of abuse of dominance typically argue that they are not dominant, that their conduct has a legitimate business justification, such as efficiency, quality control or protection of investments, that the conduct is not likely to substantially lessen competition, or, for the effects-based limb, that any effect results from superior competitive performance. Contemporaneous documents explaining why a practice was adopted are often decisive. Exercising intellectual property rights alone is not an anti-competitive act, but conduct that goes beyond the mere exercise of those rights can be.

Private access to the Competition Tribunal

Historically, only the Commissioner could bring abuse of dominance cases. Under s. 103.1, as expanded by the 2024 amendments with effect from 20 June 2025, private parties can seek leave from the Tribunal to bring applications under ss. 75, 76, 77, 79 and 90.1, and under s. 74.1 for certain deceptive marketing matters.

For ss. 75, 77, 79 and 90.1, the Tribunal may grant leave if it has reason to believe the applicant is directly and substantially affected in the whole or part of its business by the conduct, or if it is satisfied that it is in the public interest to do so. The Commissioner must be notified of each application and can intervene in the proceeding or, in some circumstances, object that the matter is already under investigation.

Private access changes the risk profile for dominant firms and collaborators. Competitors, customers and suppliers can now initiate proceedings, seek the new monetary remedy, and use the Tribunal's procedures for discovery. Defending a leave application involves early engagement with the evidence, because the leave threshold, while not trivial, does not require the applicant to prove its case. See our insight on private access to the Competition Tribunal.

Practical point

Firms with large market shares in any Canadian market should audit practices that the 2024 amendments brought into sharper focus: exclusivity and loyalty terms, most-favoured-nation clauses, self-preferencing on platforms, restrictive property covenants, and responses to new entrants. Document the pro-competitive rationale for each practice, because under the effects-based test the business justification will be central to any defence.

Managing abuse of dominance risk

Abuse of dominance risk is concentrated in firms with high shares in well-defined markets, firms controlling essential inputs or platforms, and firms whose customers have few alternatives. The Bureau has signalled particular interest in digital markets, grocery and retail, real estate, financial services and health care, and has used market studies and its formal market study powers to examine sectors. Compliance programmes for such firms should include an assessment of dominance in each market, review of pricing and contracting practices, approval processes for exclusionary terms, guidance on responding to competitors, and training for sales and business development teams.

Illustration: a dominant regional grocery operator sells a property to a developer subject to a covenant prohibiting its use for a grocery store. Under s. 90.1, as amended, the covenant may be challenged as an agreement between non-competitors a significant purpose of which is to lessen competition, and under s. 79 as part of a practice of anti-competitive acts if the operator uses such covenants systematically to impede entry. A competitor seeking to open a store on the site could now seek leave to bring its own application.

How TRW & Co helps with abuse of dominance

TRW & Co advises companies on abuse of dominance and the other civil reviewable practices. We assess market positions and conduct, review distribution, pricing, loyalty and platform practices, structure competitor collaborations and joint ventures, and design compliance programmes. We represent clients in Bureau investigations and market studies, and advise applicants and respondents on private access leave applications before the Competition Tribunal. We are an independent firm and work with Canadian-licensed counsel for Tribunal proceedings. Contact us to discuss your practices. This page is general information, not legal advice.

Frequently asked questions

What is the abuse of dominance test in Canada after 2024?

The Tribunal may make an order where a dominant firm or group has engaged in a practice of anti-competitive acts, or in conduct that has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of substantially preventing or lessening competition in a market where it has a plausible competitive interest, unless the effect results from superior competitive performance.

How large are abuse of dominance penalties?

Under s. 79(3.1), administrative monetary penalties can reach the greater of CAD 25 million (CAD 35 million for subsequent orders) and three times the value of the benefit derived, or, if that cannot be determined, 3% of the firm's annual worldwide gross revenues.

Can a competitor bring an abuse of dominance case?

Yes, with leave of the Competition Tribunal. Since the 2024 amendments took effect, private parties can apply under s. 103.1 for leave to bring applications under ss. 75, 76, 77, 79 and 90.1, if the Tribunal believes they are directly and substantially affected or that the application is in the public interest.

Does section 90.1 apply to agreements between non-competitors?

Since 2024, yes, where a significant purpose of the agreement or part of it is to prevent or lessen competition in any market. This captures, for example, restrictive property covenants that keep competitors of a tenant out of nearby premises.

Is suggesting resale prices illegal in Canada?

No. Suppliers may suggest resale prices if they make clear that the customer is not obliged to follow them and may sell for less. Price maintenance under s. 76 involves influencing resale prices upward, discouraging reductions or refusing to supply because of low pricing, where the conduct has an adverse effect on competition.

Sources

  1. Competition Act, ss. 75-79, 90.1, 103.1
  2. Competition Act amendment history (Justice Laws)
  3. Competition Tribunal

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.