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Guide · Competition and Foreign Investment

Cartels and Criminal Enforcement in Canada

Cartels are the most serious offences under Canada's Competition Act, punishable by up to 14 years' imprisonment and unlimited fines. This page explains the conspiracy, bid-rigging, wage-fixing and no-poach offences, the Competition Bureau's investigative powers, the immunity and leniency programs, and the civil damages claims and class actions that follow criminal enforcement.

9 min read Updated
ENFR

Key takeaways

  • Price-fixing, market allocation and output restriction between competitors are per se criminal offences under s. 45.
  • Since 23 June 2023, wage-fixing and no-poach agreements between unaffiliated employers are also criminal.
  • Penalties for conspiracy and bid-rigging include up to 14 years' imprisonment and fines in the court's discretion.
  • The first party to report a cartel can obtain immunity; later cooperators can obtain leniency.
  • Victims can sue for damages under s. 36 within two years, usually through class actions.

How Canada treats cartels

Cartels, meaning agreements between competitors to fix prices, divide markets or limit supply, are criminal offences in Canada. Section 45 of the Competition Act makes it an offence for a person, with a competitor in respect of a product, to conspire, agree or arrange to fix, maintain, increase or control the price for the supply of the product; to allocate sales, territories, customers or markets; or to fix, maintain, control, prevent, lessen or eliminate production or supply. Section 47 separately prohibits bid-rigging. These are per se offences: the Crown does not need to prove that the agreement had any effect on competition.

Investigators reviewing seized documents in a criminal investigation of cartels in Canada
Canadian cartel enforcement combines criminal prosecution with civil damages claims by those who paid inflated prices.

The Competition Bureau investigates cartels and refers cases to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, which prosecutes in the criminal courts. Convictions can lead to imprisonment for individuals and substantial fines for companies, and they open the door to civil damages actions by purchasers. Canada also prosecutes international cartels that affect Canadian markets, often in coordination with the United States, the European Union and other jurisdictions, and has been active in sectors from auto parts and electronics to construction and food.

This page is part of our competition and foreign investment practice. For civil competitor collaborations, see abuse of dominance and civil provisions.

The cartel offences

OffenceProvisionWhat it coversMaximum penalty
Conspiracys. 45(1)Agreements between competitors to fix prices, allocate markets or customers, or restrict output14 years' imprisonment, a fine in the court's discretion, or both
Wage-fixing and no-poachs. 45(1.1)Agreements between unaffiliated employers to fix or control wages or terms of employment, or not to solicit or hire each other's employees14 years' imprisonment, a fine in the court's discretion, or both
Bid-riggings. 47Agreements not to bid, to withdraw bids, or to submit pre-arranged bids, without informing the person calling for tenders14 years' imprisonment, a fine in the court's discretion, or both
Foreign directivess. 46Canadian corporations implementing foreign directives to give effect to a foreign conspiracyFine in the court's discretion
Obstruction and destruction of recordsss. 64-65Impeding or obstructing investigations; destroying or altering recordsImprisonment and fines

The conspiracy offence applies to agreements between competitors, including potential competitors, and the court may infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence, with or without direct evidence of communication. An agreement must be proved beyond a reasonable doubt, but it need not be written or formal: a tacit understanding reached through a course of communications can be enough. Affiliated companies cannot conspire with each other for these purposes.

The ancillary restraints defence

Under s. 45(4), no one is convicted of the conspiracy or wage-fixing offences if they establish, on a balance of probabilities, that the restraint is ancillary to a broader or separate agreement that includes the same parties, is directly related to and reasonably necessary for giving effect to the objective of that broader agreement, and the broader agreement does not itself contravene the section. This defence protects legitimate collaborations, such as joint ventures, supply agreements and non-solicitation clauses in transaction documents, but it must be built into the structure of the arrangement. Restraints that go beyond what the legitimate objective requires lose its protection.

Individuals at risk

The cartel offences apply to individuals as well as companies. Sales managers, executives and employees who personally participate in an agreement can be charged, and directors and officers who direct, authorize, assent to or participate in an offence by the corporation can be liable as parties. Individuals are entitled to their own counsel, and in an investigation their interests may diverge from those of the company, particularly where immunity or leniency is sought. Companies should consider separate representation for key individuals early, and indemnification and insurance arrangements should be reviewed to see what they cover in a criminal investigation.

Bid-rigging

Bid-rigging under s. 47 covers agreements under which one or more parties agree not to bid or to withdraw a bid, and the submission of bids arrived at by agreement, in each case where the arrangement is not made known to the person calling for tenders at or before the time the bid is made. Disclosure to the purchaser is therefore a complete answer, which is why legitimate joint bids and subcontracting arrangements should be disclosed in the tender. Public procurement is the Bureau's main focus, and it works with procurement authorities to detect suspicious bidding patterns.

Wage-fixing and no-poach agreements

Since 23 June 2023, s. 45(1.1) has made it an offence for unaffiliated employers to agree to fix, maintain, decrease or control salaries, wages or terms and conditions of employment, or not to solicit or hire each other's employees. The offence applies to employers whether or not they compete in product markets, so it reaches arrangements between companies in different industries that compete for the same workers. It applies only to agreements made or reaffirmed after it came into force, but conduct that continues an older agreement can be caught.

Human resources practices need review in light of this offence. Informal understandings among local employers not to poach staff, salary benchmarking exercises that involve sharing current or future pay plans, and franchise agreements that prohibit franchisees from hiring each other's employees all carry risk. Legitimate non-solicitation clauses in mergers, outsourcing contracts or joint ventures can be defended as ancillary restraints if they are reasonable in scope and duration. The Bureau has published enforcement guidelines on these offences. See our insight on no-poach and wage-fixing agreements.

Investigations and the Bureau's powers

Cartel investigations often begin with an immunity application, a complaint, a whistleblower report or the Bureau's own intelligence, including its analysis of procurement data. The Bureau has significant investigative powers. It can obtain search warrants under s. 15 to search premises and seize records, including electronic data, and can coordinate searches with foreign authorities so that raids occur simultaneously in several countries. It can obtain court orders under s. 11 compelling production of records, written returns and oral examinations under oath. In criminal investigations, it can use wiretaps and other investigative techniques available under the Criminal Code.

Obstructing an investigation, or destroying or altering records, is a separate offence. Companies should have a dawn raid protocol: who greets investigators, which counsel to call, how to assert privilege over documents, and how to preserve evidence without interfering with the search. Employees should be told that they may consult counsel and should not discuss the investigation. Whistleblowers who report possible offences to the Commissioner are protected by confidentiality under s. 66.1, and employers may not retaliate against them. See our insight on search warrants and dawn raids.

Immunity and leniency programs

The Bureau's Immunity and Leniency Programs are central to cartel enforcement. The first party to disclose an offence not yet detected, or to provide evidence that leads to charges, may obtain immunity from prosecution through the Bureau's recommendation to the Public Prosecution Service of Canada, provided it terminates its participation, did not coerce others to participate and cooperates fully. Current and former directors, officers and employees who cooperate can be covered by the company's immunity.

Later cooperating parties may qualify for leniency, which involves a guilty plea with a reduced fine recommendation, the size of the reduction depending on the order and value of cooperation. Applicants obtain a "marker" to secure their place in line, then provide a proffer and evidence. Because many cartels are international, immunity decisions must be coordinated across jurisdictions, and applicants should consider the effect of their disclosures on civil litigation, including how documents provided to the Bureau may be used. See our insight on bid-rigging in public procurement.

Practical point

If an internal review uncovers possible cartel conduct, speed matters. Immunity is available only to the first applicant, and a marker can often be obtained by a call from counsel with limited initial information. Preserve evidence, retain outside counsel to conduct the investigation under privilege, and decide quickly whether to seek a marker in Canada and in other affected jurisdictions.

Sentencing and consequences

Fines for cartels in Canada are set by the court, usually on a joint submission following a guilty plea, and are often calculated by reference to the volume of commerce affected in Canada, with adjustments for aggravating and mitigating factors and cooperation. Individuals face fines and imprisonment, and courts have imposed custodial sentences in bid-rigging cases. Beyond criminal penalties, a conviction can lead to debarment or suspension from federal and provincial public procurement under integrity regimes, prohibition orders, reputational damage, and follow-on civil claims. For multinational groups, a Canadian plea can also affect proceedings abroad.

Civil damages and class actions

Under s. 36 of the Competition Act, any person who has suffered loss or damage as a result of conduct contrary to the criminal provisions can sue to recover damages, plus the costs of investigation and proceedings. Actions must be brought within two years of the day the conduct was engaged in or the day any criminal proceedings were finally disposed of, whichever is later, subject to the discoverability principle. A conviction is proof of the conduct in the civil action, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.

Cartel damages claims are usually brought as class actions in several provinces, often following US or European investigations. In Pro-Sys Consultants Ltd. v. Microsoft Corporation, 2013 SCC 57, the Supreme Court confirmed that indirect purchasers can claim, and in Pioneer Corp. v. Godfrey, 2019 SCC 42, it held that umbrella purchasers, who bought from non-conspirators at prices inflated by the cartel, can also claim, and that the discoverability rule applies to the limitation period in s. 36(4). Canadian class settlements in international cartel cases have been substantial. See class actions and our insight on Pioneer v. Godfrey.

Information exchange and trade associations

Many cartels begin with information exchange that gradually becomes coordination. Sharing current or future prices, margins, capacity plans or bidding intentions with competitors, directly or through trade associations, consultants or common suppliers, creates risk even without an explicit agreement, because courts can infer an agreement from circumstantial evidence.

Trade association meetings should have agendas, minutes and counsel review where sensitive topics arise, and attendees should leave any discussion that strays into pricing or allocation. Benchmarking exercises should use aggregated, historical data compiled by an independent third party. The civil competitor collaboration provision in s. 90.1 may apply to information exchanges that fall short of a criminal agreement but substantially lessen competition. See our insight on information sharing between competitors.

International cartels

Canada's cartel provisions apply to conspiracies formed abroad that affect Canadian markets, and the Bureau cooperates closely with foreign agencies under cooperation agreements and mutual legal assistance treaties. Foreign companies that sold into Canada during an international cartel should expect Canadian scrutiny and Canadian class actions. Canadian subsidiaries can also be liable under s. 46 for implementing a foreign directive that gives effect to a conspiracy, whether or not the Canadian directors knew of it.

Compliance and risk management

Effective compliance programmes are the best defence against cartels. The Bureau's guidance on corporate compliance programmes describes the elements it expects: senior management commitment, a risk-based assessment, written policies, training for employees exposed to risk, monitoring and auditing, reporting mechanisms, and discipline. High-risk activities include trade association meetings, communications with competitors about pricing or capacity, joint bidding, information exchanges through third parties, and, since 2023, HR conversations with other employers. Algorithmic pricing tools that use competitors' non-public data raise new risks, and the Bureau has signalled interest in them.

Compliance also means being able to show what the company did. Records of training attendance, certifications by sales and HR staff, approvals of trade association participation, and reviews of joint bidding and teaming arrangements all help demonstrate that a programme is real. Where a problem is found, a prompt, documented response, including consideration of an immunity or leniency application, is what regulators expect from a company with a credible programme.

Illustration: two regional construction firms agree that one will submit a deliberately high bid for a municipal contract, in exchange for the other doing the same on a later project. Neither tells the municipality. This is bid-rigging under s. 47, regardless of whether the winning price was reasonable. If one firm reports the arrangement to the Bureau first and cooperates fully, it may obtain immunity; the other faces prosecution, debarment from public contracts under procurement integrity regimes, and damages claims by the municipality.

How TRW & Co helps with cartels and criminal enforcement

TRW & Co advises companies and individuals on cartels and criminal enforcement under the Competition Act. We conduct privileged internal investigations, advise on immunity and leniency applications in Canada and their coordination abroad, respond to search warrants and s. 11 orders, and represent clients in dealings with the Bureau. We also design compliance programmes, review collaborations, joint bids and HR practices for cartel risk, and advise on related civil damages claims. We are an independent firm and work with Canadian-licensed counsel for criminal and civil proceedings. Contact us if you face an investigation. This page is general information, not legal advice.

Frequently asked questions

Is price-fixing a crime in Canada?

Yes. Under s. 45 of the Competition Act, agreements between competitors to fix prices, allocate markets or customers, or restrict output are criminal offences, punishable by up to 14 years' imprisonment, a fine in the court's discretion, or both. The Crown need not prove that the agreement affected competition.

Are no-poach agreements illegal in Canada?

Since 23 June 2023, agreements between unaffiliated employers not to solicit or hire each other's employees, or to fix or control wages or terms of employment, are criminal offences under s. 45(1.1). Restraints that are ancillary to and reasonably necessary for a legitimate broader agreement can be defended under s. 45(4).

How does the Competition Bureau's immunity program work?

The first party to disclose an undetected offence, or provide evidence leading to charges, can receive immunity from prosecution if it stops participating, did not coerce others and cooperates fully. Later cooperators may obtain leniency in the form of reduced fine recommendations on a guilty plea. A marker secures an applicant's place in line.

Can customers sue a cartel in Canada?

Yes. Under s. 36 of the Competition Act, anyone who suffered loss from criminal conduct can sue for damages and investigation costs within two years, subject to discoverability. Claims are usually class actions; the Supreme Court has allowed indirect purchasers and umbrella purchasers to claim.

What should a company do during a Competition Bureau search?

Follow a dawn raid protocol: cooperate with investigators, call counsel immediately, review the warrant's scope, identify privileged material, avoid destroying or altering records, and instruct employees not to discuss the investigation. Obstructing an investigation is a separate offence.

Sources

  1. Competition Act, ss. 36, 45, 47, 66.1
  2. Competition Bureau: Immunity and Leniency Programs
  3. Competition Act amendment history (Justice Laws)

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.