The Callidus Decision: CCAA Discretion and Litigation Funding
The Callidus decision is the Supreme Court's leading ruling on the powers of judges supervising CCAA restructurings. It confirmed a highly deferential standard of review, a power to bar a creditor from voting for an improper purpose, and approval of third-party litigation funding as interim financing.

Key takeaways
- 9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp., 2020 SCC 10: unanimous, reasons released 8 May 2020.
- Section 11 CCAA allows judges to bar a creditor from voting for an improper purpose.
- Litigation funding agreements can be approved as interim financing under s. 11.2 CCAA.
- Appropriateness, good faith and due diligence are baseline considerations for CCAA relief.
- Appeal courts owe supervising judges a high degree of deference.
What the Callidus decision held
The Callidus decision, 9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp., 2020 SCC 10, is the Supreme Court of Canada's leading statement on the discretion of a judge supervising a restructuring under the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA). The Court unanimously restored a supervising judge's orders that barred a secured creditor from voting on its own plan because it was acting for an improper purpose, and that approved a third-party litigation funding agreement as interim financing without a creditor vote.

The appeal was allowed from the bench on 23 January 2020, with written reasons by Chief Justice Wagner and Justice Moldaver released on 8 May 2020. For lenders, debtors, litigation funders and insolvency professionals, the Callidus decision matters in three ways: it sets a highly deferential standard of review for supervising judges, it recognizes a power to bar creditors from voting for an improper purpose, and it opens the door to funding litigation claims, often an insolvent company's last valuable asset, inside a CCAA proceeding. This note explains each point. It is general information, not legal advice.
The facts: Bluberi, Callidus and a lawsuit as the last asset
9354-9186 Québec inc., known as Bluberi, was insolvent and owed a large secured debt to its lender, Callidus Capital Corporation. In a CCAA sale process, Bluberi sold substantially all its assets to Callidus in exchange for a release of most of the debt, leaving a residual secured claim of CAD 3 million, but retained its right to sue Callidus. Bluberi alleged that Callidus had caused its financial difficulties. That claim became Bluberi's only significant asset.
Callidus then proposed a plan of arrangement under which some creditors would be paid in full and others in part, in exchange for releasing the claim against Callidus. Callidus chose not to vote its secured claim, and the unsecured creditors rejected the plan. Bluberi then sought approval of a litigation funding agreement under which a third-party funder would finance the lawsuit in exchange for a share of any settlement or award, secured by a CAD 20 million super-priority charge. Callidus responded with a new plan, essentially the same as the first, and asked to vote its secured claim, which would have carried the vote.
The supervising judge of the Superior Court of Québec refused to let Callidus vote, finding it was acting with an improper purpose, and approved the funding agreement as interim financing. The Court of Appeal of Quebec reversed. The Supreme Court restored the supervising judge's orders.
| Step | What happened |
|---|---|
| CCAA sale | Assets sold to Callidus; CAD 3 million residual secured claim; Bluberi keeps its claim against Callidus |
| First plan | Callidus does not vote; unsecured creditors reject the plan |
| Funding application | Bluberi seeks approval of a litigation funding agreement with a CAD 20 million priority charge |
| Second plan | Callidus seeks to vote its secured claim to carry a near-identical plan |
| Supervising judge | Bars Callidus from voting; approves the funding as interim financing |
| Supreme Court, 2020 SCC 10 | Unanimously restores the supervising judge's orders |
The supervising judge's discretion under the Callidus decision
Section 11 of the CCAA allows the court to make any order that it considers appropriate in the circumstances. The Court described this discretion as broad, but bounded by the CCAA's remedial objectives, including avoiding the social and economic losses of liquidation and maximizing creditor recovery. It also endorsed three baseline considerations that the applicant must demonstrate: that the order sought is appropriate in the circumstances, and that the applicant has been acting in good faith and with due diligence. Due diligence, the Court noted, discourages parties from sitting on their rights.
On appellate review, the Court held that a high degree of deference is owed to discretionary decisions of CCAA supervising judges. Appellate intervention is justified only where the judge erred in principle or exercised the discretion unreasonably. Supervising judges oversee the case from start to finish and are best placed to balance the competing interests, and the Case in Brief stresses that appeal courts should respect their decisions even if they would have decided differently.
Because appellate review is highly deferential, the hearing before the supervising judge is usually the decisive one. Parties should put their full evidentiary record and strategic position before the supervising judge at the first opportunity, rather than counting on an appeal.
Barring a creditor from voting for an improper purpose
The Court held that s. 11 gives supervising judges discretion to bar a creditor from voting where the creditor is acting for an improper purpose, meaning a purpose collateral to the purposes of insolvency legislation. The power should be exercised sparingly, but it exists. Here, Callidus had strategically declined to vote on its first plan and, after that plan failed, sought to vote on a near-identical second plan to override the unsecured creditors' rejection and extinguish the claim against itself. The supervising judge was entitled to conclude that this was an improper purpose.
The Court also rejected an argument based on s. 22(3) CCAA, which limits voting by creditors related to the debtor. The appellants had read the provision as addressing conflicts of interest between creditors and plan sponsors generally; the Court described that as a strained interpretation, as s. 22(3) does not speak to such conflicts. The improper purpose power rests on s. 11 itself.
Litigation funding as interim financing
Under s. 11.2 CCAA, the court may approve interim financing secured by a charge that can rank ahead of secured creditors, considering the factors in s. 11.2(4), including whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced. The Court held that third-party litigation funding agreements may be approved as interim financing in appropriate cases. It rejected the argument that the agreement was really a plan of arrangement requiring a creditor vote: plans of arrangement require at least some compromise of creditors' rights, and litigation funding agreements are not necessarily, or even generally, plans of arrangement.
The s. 11.2(4) factors need not be applied mechanically. The supervising judge reasonably found that the funding agreement would allow Bluberi to realize value from its only remaining asset for the benefit of its creditors, and that its terms were fair, including the funder's share of any recovery and the priority charge.
| Question | Answer in the Callidus decision |
|---|---|
| Can litigation funding be interim financing? | Yes, in appropriate cases, under s. 11.2 |
| Is creditor approval required? | Not unless the agreement compromises creditors' rights so as to amount to a plan |
| What does the court weigh? | The s. 11.2(4) factors, the CCAA's objectives and the baseline considerations |
| Can the funder's charge prime secured creditors? | Yes, if the court so orders |
Why the Callidus decision matters
For secured lenders. A large secured position does not guarantee control of a restructuring. A creditor that uses its vote for a collateral purpose, such as extinguishing claims against itself, can be excluded. Lenders that are also potential defendants should expect scrutiny of their conduct in the CCAA process.
For debtors and unsecured creditors. Claims against lenders, former directors, auditors or counterparties can be monetized through litigation funding, giving unsecured creditors a realistic path to recovery where other assets have been sold. See our note on litigation funding in Canada.
For funders. The decision provides a framework for court-approved funding with priority security, which reduces risk and supports pricing. Funders should expect courts to examine their returns, control rights and termination provisions for fairness.
For the wider law. The breadth of s. 11 recognized here was relied on a year later in Canada North Group, where the Supreme Court allowed court-ordered charges to rank ahead of the Crown's deemed trust. Together, the cases show a court that gives supervising judges real tools to make restructurings work.
What the Callidus decision does not decide
The ruling is sometimes read too broadly. It does not hold that every litigation funding agreement will be approved, or that funders are entitled to a priority charge. Approval depends on the fairness of the terms, the absence of a compromise of creditors' rights, the s. 11.2(4) factors and the baseline considerations, all assessed by the supervising judge on the record. An agreement giving a funder control of settlement decisions, an outsized return or broad termination rights may be refused or modified.
Nor does the Callidus decision create a general rule that secured creditors who are also defendants cannot vote. The improper purpose power is exceptional and fact-specific. What drew the supervising judge's concern was the sequence of Callidus's conduct: abstaining from the first vote, then seeking to vote on a near-identical plan to defeat the claim against it after the unsecured creditors had said no.
Finally, the decision arose in Quebec, but it interprets the federal CCAA and applies across Canada. Its reasoning therefore governs voting disputes, litigation funding applications and the exercise of the s. 11 power in CCAA proceedings in every province and territory, whether the case is heard on the Ontario Commercial List or in another superior court. Where a Quebec debtor is involved, the civil law characterization of security and claims under the Civil Code of Québec may still affect how charges and priorities operate in practice.
Practical steps
- Debtors: identify litigation claims early, assess their value and consider funding options before assets are sold.
- Funders: prepare evidence on the fairness of terms, the funder's return, its control over the litigation and the effect on creditors, keyed to the s. 11.2(4) factors.
- Secured creditors: document the commercial rationale for voting positions and plan proposals, particularly if you face claims from the debtor.
- Monitors: report on whether a funding agreement is fair and whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced.
- All parties: raise issues promptly; due diligence is a baseline consideration and delay can weigh against relief.
Illustration (hypothetical): after a CCAA sale, a debtor's only asset is a CAD 50 million claim against its former auditor. A funder offers to finance the case for a share of any recovery, secured by a priority charge. Applying the Callidus decision, the supervising judge can approve the agreement as interim financing without a creditor vote if it is fair, does not compromise creditors' claims and advances the CCAA's objectives.
How TRW & Co helps
We advise debtors, secured and unsecured creditors, litigation funders, monitors and purchasers in CCAA restructurings, including plan strategy and voting, interim financing, priority charges and the monetization of litigation claims. We assess and structure litigation funding agreements, prepare the evidentiary record supervising judges expect, and work with Canadian-licensed litigation counsel and licensed insolvency trustees on court applications. See our CCAA restructuring page and our note on DIP financing, or contact us.
Sources: Supreme Court of Canada, Case in Brief: 9354-9186 Québec inc. v. Callidus Capital Corp.; full reasons, 2020 SCC 10.
Frequently asked questions
Why was Callidus barred from voting?
The supervising judge found that Callidus was acting for an improper purpose. It had chosen not to vote on its first plan, and after the unsecured creditors rejected it, sought to vote its secured claim on a near-identical plan to override that result and extinguish Bluberi's lawsuit against it. The Supreme Court held s. 11 CCAA allows a judge to bar such a vote.
Is a litigation funding agreement a plan of arrangement?
Not necessarily. The Supreme Court held that plans of arrangement require at least some compromise of creditors' rights, and that litigation funding agreements are not necessarily, or even generally, plans. Where an agreement does not compromise creditors' claims, it can be approved as interim financing without a creditor vote.
What are the baseline considerations?
The applicant for a CCAA order must show that the order is appropriate in the circumstances and that it has acted in good faith and with due diligence. The Court noted that due diligence discourages parties from sitting on their rights, so delay in raising an issue can count against relief.
Can a litigation funder's charge rank ahead of secured lenders?
Yes. Under s. 11.2 CCAA the court may order that an interim financing charge rank in priority over secured creditors, after considering factors such as whether any creditor would be materially prejudiced. In Callidus, the funding agreement was supported by a CAD 20 million super-priority charge.
How hard is it to appeal a CCAA supervising judge's order?
Difficult. The Supreme Court held that a high degree of deference is owed, and that appellate courts may intervene only where the judge erred in principle or exercised the discretion unreasonably. Outside Yukon, leave to appeal is also required under s. 13 CCAA.
Sources
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.


