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Competition & Foreign Investment

Merger Remedies and Divestitures in Canada

Merger remedies in Canada are almost always negotiated consent agreements registered with the Competition Tribunal. Since 2024, remedies must restore or preserve the competition that would have existed without the merger. This note explains the standard, the Bureau's preference for structural remedies, upfront buyers and fix-it-first deals, hold-separate obligations and practical steps.

Divestiture package map prepared to negotiate merger remedies with Canada's Competition Bureau

Key takeaways

  • Registered consent agreements have the same force as Tribunal orders (s. 105).
  • Remedies must now restore competition to the level that would have prevailed but for the merger.
  • The Bureau prefers structural remedies; behavioural terms are usually supplementary.
  • Upfront buyers, fix-it-first solutions and crown jewel provisions reduce divestiture risk.
  • Hold-separate obligations and monitors preserve the business pending sale.

How merger remedies work in Canada

Merger remedies resolve the Competition Bureau's concerns about a transaction without blocking it. In Canada, almost all remedies are negotiated: the merging parties and the Commissioner of Competition sign a consent agreement, which is registered with the Competition Tribunal and then has the same force and effect as a Tribunal order (s. 105 of the Competition Act). Contested remedies ordered by the Tribunal after litigation are rare. The typical remedy is a divestiture of a business, assets or shares to an approved buyer, backed by hold-separate obligations, a monitor and, if the parties fail to sell, a trustee with power to sell on their behalf.

Divestiture package map prepared to negotiate merger remedies with Canada's Competition Bureau
Merger remedies in Canada are usually negotiated consent agreements requiring divestiture to an approved buyer, with hold-separate and trustee provisions.

The 2024 amendments raised the bar. The Tribunal's remedial power for a completed merger is now expressly to "restore competition to the level that would have prevailed but for the merger" (s. 92(1)(e)), and for a proposed merger to "preserve the level of competition that would prevail but for the merger" (s. 92(1)(f)). The Bureau's guide to the amendments explains that previously, remedies only had to reduce the harm so that it was no longer substantial. Combined with the structural presumptions, this gives the Bureau stronger leverage to insist on broader merger remedies in negotiation.

The "restore competition" standard

Under the former standard, the remedy only had to eliminate the substantial prevention or lessening of competition; some residual harm was acceptable. Under the amended s. 92, the target is the competitive level that would have existed without the merger. In practice, this pushes remedies toward:

  • divestiture packages that fully replicate the competitive constraint the target or acquirer provided, not just enough to bring shares below a threshold;
  • standalone businesses rather than collections of assets, because a viable, autonomous business is more likely to restore pre-merger competition;
  • stronger buyer requirements, so that the purchaser has the capability and incentive to compete effectively; and
  • closer scrutiny of transitional arrangements, such as supply agreements between the merged firm and the divestiture buyer, which can leave the buyer dependent on its rival.

The Tribunal may order dissolution of a completed merger, disposal of assets or shares, or, with the consent of the person and the Commissioner, any other action (s. 92(1)(e)). For proposed mergers, it may prohibit the merger or part of it, or prohibit specified conduct (s. 92(1)(f)). Behavioural obligations beyond prohibitions require consent, which is one reason most remedies are negotiated.

Structural versus behavioural merger remedies

The Bureau's Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada (2006) states that structural remedies are typically more effective than behavioural remedies, because anti-competitive effects arise from a structural change to the market. Behavioural remedies can prevent the merged firm from responding efficiently to market changes, restrain pro-competitive conduct and require ongoing monitoring. The Bureau therefore prefers divestitures and accepts behavioural terms mainly as supplements, for example to support a divestiture buyer during a transition, or where a structural remedy is not feasible, such as in some vertical mergers involving access to an input.

Remedy elementPurposeTypical terms
Divestiture of business or assetsRestore the lost competitorDefined package; approved buyer; initial sale period
Hold-separate obligationsPreserve the divestiture business pending saleSeparate management; no information flow; maintain viability
MonitorOversee complianceReports to the Bureau; access to records
Trustee saleSell if parties fail in the initial periodTrustee sells at no minimum price
Crown jewel provisionIncrease likelihood of a successful saleAdditional assets added if initial package does not sell
Transitional supply or servicesSupport buyer's viabilityLimited term; arm's-length terms

Upfront buyers and fix-it-first solutions

Divestiture risk is the central concern in remedy negotiations: will the package actually sell to a buyer that can compete? The Bureau addresses that risk in several ways. A consent agreement may require the parties to identify a buyer acceptable to the Bureau before closing the main transaction (an upfront buyer), or the parties may restructure the transaction before review is complete so that the overlapping business is sold to a buyer as part of the deal (a fix-it-first solution).

Where a sale will occur after closing, the agreement sets an initial sale period, followed by a trustee sale period if the parties fail. The Bulletin explains that additional "crown jewel" assets may be required to reduce uncertainty, and that the approval of any buyer is a matter for the Bureau alone.

For parties, the choice is a trade-off between timing and certainty. An upfront buyer or fix-it-first solution can secure clearance faster and with less risk of a trustee sale, but it requires early negotiation with potential buyers while the main deal is still under review.

Practical point

If a deal has clear overlaps, start identifying credible divestiture buyers before filing. The Bureau will ask who can buy the package and whether that buyer will be a vigorous competitor; parties that already have an answer, and a package designed around it, negotiate from a much stronger position.

Buyer approval and divestiture packages

The Bureau's approval of a divestiture buyer is often the most demanding part of the process. The Bulletin stresses that the capabilities and resources of prospective buyers are especially critical where the package consists of less than an autonomous business. The Bureau typically examines the buyer's independence from the merging parties, its financial resources, its experience in the industry, its business plan for the acquired assets, and whether it would itself raise competition concerns. A buyer that plans to run the business as a cash cow, or that depends heavily on the merged firm for supply, is unlikely to be approved. Financial buyers can succeed, but they usually need to show an experienced management team and a credible plan to invest in and grow the business.

Package design follows from the same logic. A package should include everything the business needs to compete: facilities, customer contracts, brands, intellectual property, key employees, supply arrangements and, where necessary, shared services. Carving out a few locations or product lines without the support functions that made them competitive often fails. Parties sometimes resist including valuable assets, but the alternative may be a crown jewel provision that adds even more if the initial sale fails, or a trustee sale at no minimum price.

Employees are a recurring issue. The divestiture business needs the people who know the customers and operations, so consent agreements often restrict the merged firm from soliciting or rehiring key staff of the divested business for a period and require cooperation in transferring them.

Remedies in vertical, digital and labour-market cases

Vertical mergers, where one party supplies an input to the other or to its rivals, raise different concerns: foreclosure of rivals' access to inputs or customers. Divestiture can still work, but access remedies are more common, such as commitments to supply rivals on non-discriminatory terms, firewalls protecting rivals' confidential information, or interoperability commitments. Because these terms require monitoring and can be hard to enforce, the Bureau generally insists on clear, measurable obligations and independent monitoring.

In digital markets, data and network effects can make structural remedies difficult to design, and the amended s. 93 factors, including network effects, entrenchment and non-price effects such as consumer privacy, give the Bureau a basis to look beyond price. Remedies may involve data access or portability commitments, or divestiture of a product line together with its data and technical support. Where a merger reduces competition for workers, remedies may need to address local labour markets directly, for example through divestiture of facilities in affected regions.

Timing and cross-border coordination

Remedy negotiations take time. Parties should expect the Bureau to market test proposed remedies with customers and competitors, to probe the viability of the package and to negotiate detailed terms. Outside dates in the purchase agreement should allow for this. In global deals, the Canadian remedy should be coordinated with remedies required in the United States, the European Union and elsewhere; authorities often cooperate, with the parties' waivers, to avoid inconsistent requirements, and a single global buyer for an overlapping business can satisfy several agencies at once.

Hold-separate obligations and monitoring

While a divestiture is pending, the parties must preserve the business to be sold. Hold-separate obligations typically require separate management, maintenance of assets and staff, continued investment and marketing, and firewalls preventing the merged firm from accessing competitively sensitive information about the divestiture business. A monitor appointed under the consent agreement reports to the Bureau on compliance. Breaches can be enforced as if the agreement were a Tribunal order, including through contempt proceedings, and the 2024 amendments added a civil mechanism to enforce compliance with consent agreements, according to the Bureau's guide to the June 2024 amendments.

Lessons from contested cases

Contested merger litigation before the Tribunal has been infrequent, but it has shaped remedies practice. Several lessons are consistent across cases: the Bureau must prove its markets and theory of harm with evidence, not assumptions; remedies offered late in litigation are scrutinized for whether they fully address the harm; divestiture buyers must be shown to have the capability to compete; and courts and the Tribunal expect clear, enforceable terms. With the efficiencies defence repealed and structural presumptions in force, parties in future contested cases will have less room to argue that a partial remedy is enough.

For most deals, that makes a negotiated outcome even more attractive, and it rewards parties who put a complete, credible package on the table early rather than offering merger remedies in stages and waiting to see what the Bureau will accept.

Negotiating merger remedies: practical steps

  1. Map overlaps early and design a divestiture package that is a viable, standalone business.
  2. Line up potential buyers and consider whether an upfront buyer or fix-it-first approach is needed.
  3. Prepare evidence on the buyer's capability, financing and incentives.
  4. Plan transitional arrangements that support the buyer without creating dependency.
  5. Negotiate hold-separate terms that are operationally realistic.
  6. Align the Canadian remedy with remedies in other jurisdictions reviewing the same deal, and agree waivers that let agencies share information.
  7. Budget for the monitor, trustee and transition costs that a consent agreement will impose.
  8. Reflect remedy risk in the purchase agreement, including efforts covenants, divestiture caps and outside dates.

Our notes on structural presumptions and cross-border merger filings cover related issues.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise merging parties, divestiture buyers and investors on merger remedies in Canada. Our work includes remedy design, consent agreement negotiation with the Competition Bureau, hold-separate and monitor arrangements, divestiture sale processes and buyer approval, and coordination with remedies in other jurisdictions. See our pages on merger review and mergers and acquisitions. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a remedy, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

What is a consent agreement in Canadian merger review?

It is an agreement between the Commissioner of Competition and the merging parties, based on terms the Tribunal could order, that is filed with the Competition Tribunal for registration. Once registered, it has the same force and effect as a Tribunal order under s. 105 of the Competition Act, and can be enforced accordingly.

What changed for merger remedies in 2024?

The amended s. 92 now directs remedies for completed mergers to restore competition to the level that would have prevailed but for the merger, and for proposed mergers to preserve that level. Previously, remedies only had to reduce the harm so that it was no longer substantial. This supports broader divestitures.

Does the Bureau accept behavioural remedies?

Sometimes, but it prefers structural remedies. The Bureau's remedies bulletin explains that structural remedies are typically more effective because behavioural terms can restrict efficient responses to market changes and require ongoing monitoring. Behavioural terms are most often used to support a divestiture or in some vertical cases.

What is a fix-it-first remedy?

It is a solution in which the parties restructure the deal before the review ends so that the problematic overlap is sold to a suitable buyer as part of the transaction. It can shorten the review and reduce divestiture risk, but requires early buyer negotiations while the main deal is pending.

Sources

  1. Competition Act, ss. 92 and 105
  2. Competition Bureau: Information Bulletin on Merger Remedies in Canada
  3. Competition Bureau: Guide to the June 2024 amendments

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.