Administrative Monetary Penalties Under the Competition Act
Administrative monetary penalties under the Competition Act now scale with a company’s worldwide revenues and the benefit it derived. This note sets out the maximums for deceptive marketing, abuse of dominance and competitor agreements, how penalties are calculated, the due diligence defence, criminal fines, and what recent cases such as Cineplex show.

Key takeaways
- Deceptive marketing AMPs reach the greater of CAD 10M (15M repeat) and 3x benefit or 3% of revenues.
- Abuse of dominance AMPs start from CAD 25M (35M repeat) with the same benefit and revenue alternatives.
- Criminal fines for cartels, wage-fixing and bid-rigging are uncapped, with up to 14 years in prison.
- Statutory factors and a "not to punish" purpose guide how penalties are set.
- Due diligence is a complete defence to deceptive marketing AMPs under s. 74.1(3).
- The Tribunal fined Cineplex over CAD 38.9M for drip pricing; the appeal was dismissed in 2026.
Administrative monetary penalties: the short answer
Administrative monetary penalties (AMPs) under the Competition Act are civil penalties that the Competition Tribunal or a court can impose for reviewable conduct such as abuse of dominance, deceptive marketing and anti-competitive agreements between competitors. Since the 2022 and 2024 amendments, the maximums are tied to the size of the business. For a corporation engaged in deceptive marketing or a civil competitor agreement, the cap is the greater of CAD 10 million (CAD 15 million for a subsequent order) and three times the benefit derived, or 3% of annual worldwide gross revenues if the benefit cannot reasonably be determined. For abuse of dominance, the fixed amount is CAD 25 million (CAD 35 million for a subsequent order). Criminal fines for cartels and bid-rigging are now uncapped.

The change is not theoretical. In September 2024 the Competition Tribunal ordered Cineplex to pay more than CAD 38.9 million for drip pricing, a figure the Bureau described as a record and which equalled the online booking fees collected from consumers between June 2022 and December 2023. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed Cineplex's appeal, with costs, on 21 January 2026. Boards and general counsel should now assume that Canadian competition penalties can reach levels comparable to those in the European Union and the United States.
Maximum penalties by provision
| Provision | Who may order | Maximum for a corporation |
|---|---|---|
| Deceptive marketing (ss. 74.01-74.06), s. 74.1(1)(c) | Court or Tribunal | Greater of CAD 10M (CAD 15M subsequent) and 3x benefit, or 3% of worldwide revenues if benefit not determinable |
| Abuse of dominance, s. 79(3.1) | Tribunal | Greater of CAD 25M (CAD 35M subsequent) and 3x benefit, or 3% of worldwide revenues |
| Civil competitor agreements, s. 90.1(1.3) | Tribunal | Greater of CAD 10M (CAD 15M subsequent) and 3x benefit, or 3% of worldwide revenues |
| Reprisal against whistleblowers or cooperators, s. 107.3 | Court | CAD 10M (CAD 15M subsequent); CAD 750,000 (CAD 1M) for individuals |
| Closing before the merger waiting period ends, s. 123.1(1)(d) | Court | Up to CAD 10,000 per day of non-compliance |
For individuals, the deceptive marketing cap is the greater of CAD 750,000 (CAD 1 million for a subsequent order) and three times the benefit (s. 74.1(1)(c)(i)). A "subsequent order" is defined by reference to earlier orders under the same provision and, for some deceptive marketing provisions, earlier criminal convictions (s. 74.1(6)).
Criminal fines
Criminal penalties sit alongside AMPs and are not capped. A party to a price-fixing, market-allocation, output-restriction, wage-fixing or no-poach agreement under s. 45 is liable on conviction to imprisonment for up to 14 years, a fine in the court's discretion, or both; the former CAD 25 million cap was removed by amendments in force on 23 June 2023. Bid-rigging under s. 47 carries the same maximum. Knowingly or recklessly misleading the public under s. 52 is punishable on indictment by a discretionary fine and up to 14 years' imprisonment, or on summary conviction by a fine of up to CAD 200,000 and one year. See our note on bid-rigging.
How administrative monetary penalties are calculated
The statutory maximum is a ceiling, not a starting point. Each provision lists factors that the Tribunal or court must take into account. For deceptive marketing, s. 74.1(5) requires consideration of:
- the reach of the conduct within the relevant geographic market;
- the frequency and duration of the conduct;
- the vulnerability of the persons likely to be affected;
- the materiality of any representation;
- the likelihood of self-correction in the market;
- the effect on competition;
- the gross revenue from sales affected;
- the financial position of the person;
- the person's compliance history;
- any restitution ordered or paid; and
- any other relevant factor.
For abuse of dominance, s. 79(3.2) lists the effect on competition, the gross revenue from affected sales, actual or anticipated profits, the financial position of the person, any amount payable to persons harmed under s. 79(4.1), compliance history and other relevant factors. Section 90.1(1.4) lists similar factors for competitor agreements.
Two structural features shape outcomes. First, each regime states that the purpose of the order is to promote compliance, "not to punish" (for example, ss. 74.1(4) and 79(3.3)). That language reflects the constitutional line drawn in Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41, where the Supreme Court held that administrative penalties are not "offences" attracting criminal procedural protections unless they impose true penal consequences. Second, the "three times the benefit" and "3% of worldwide revenues" alternatives mean that, for large firms, the fixed dollar amount is rarely the binding constraint.
The due diligence defence and mitigation
For deceptive marketing, s. 74.1(3) provides that no AMP, corrective notice or restitution order may be made if the person establishes that it exercised due diligence to prevent the conduct. This is the single most important reason to maintain a documented marketing compliance programme. The defence does not apply to prohibition orders, and it requires evidence that systems were designed and actually operated to prevent the conduct, not just that a policy existed.
For abuse of dominance and competitor agreements, there is no equivalent statutory defence, but compliance history and remedial steps are mitigating factors. The Bureau's Corporate Compliance Programs bulletin explains what it regards as credible: senior management involvement, risk-based policies, training, monitoring and auditing, reporting mechanisms and discipline. A credible programme can affect both whether the Bureau proceeds and what penalty it seeks.
Measure the benefit before the Bureau does. Penalty exposure now depends on revenues affected and benefit derived. When a problem is identified, ask finance to quantify affected sales and margins under privilege, so that the business can make informed decisions about remediation, refunds and settlement strategy.
Consent agreements and private access
Most administrative monetary penalties are agreed rather than litigated. The Commissioner and the respondent can register a consent agreement with the Tribunal, which then has the force of an order. Consent agreements typically combine a prohibition, a corrective notice, a compliance programme, a penalty and a contribution to the Bureau's investigation costs. Negotiating leverage depends on the strength of the evidence, the quantification of benefit and the credibility of remedial steps already taken.
Since June 2025, private parties granted leave by the Tribunal under s. 103.1 can bring applications for deceptive marketing, abuse of dominance and civil competitor agreements, among others. In abuse of dominance cases, the Tribunal may order a respondent to pay an amount, not exceeding the value of the benefit derived, to the applicant and others affected (s. 79(4.1)), and that payment is a factor in setting any AMP. Companies therefore face the prospect of both private monetary relief and public penalties for the same conduct. See our note on private access to the Competition Tribunal.
Recent enforcement and trends in administrative monetary penalties
Drip pricing has been the most visible source of large administrative monetary penalties. The Cineplex decision of 23 September 2024 found that a mandatory CAD 1.50 online booking fee made advertised ticket prices unattainable, imposed a penalty above CAD 38.9 million, and prohibited similar conduct for ten years. The Bureau has since filed further drip pricing and misleading-discount applications, including one against DoorDash in June 2025. The express drip pricing provision in s. 74.01(1.1) and s. 52(1.3) makes these cases easier to bring. Our note on drip pricing compliance explains the rules.
Other trends to watch include environmental claims, where the burden of substantiation lies on the advertiser; algorithmic and personalized pricing; online reviews and influencer content; and abuse of dominance in digital markets, where the higher AMP caps and the "plausible competitive interest" standard in s. 79 increase exposure. Repeat offenders face the higher "subsequent order" caps, so the first consent agreement has long-term consequences. Consent agreements are public and registered with the Tribunal, and they typically include compliance and reporting obligations lasting several years. A company that settles one deceptive marketing matter should therefore treat the agreement's compliance terms as a programme covering its whole business, because a later finding under the same provision would expose it to the higher cap.
Illustration: a hypothetical online retailer with CAD 2 billion in worldwide revenue advertises discounts against inflated "regular" prices for 18 months. The benefit is hard to isolate, so the 3% alternative caps the penalty at CAD 60 million, well above the CAD 10 million floor. Evidence that the retailer had a pricing compliance policy, trained staff and corrected the practice quickly when it was discovered would be central to the due diligence defence and, if that failed, to mitigation.
What boards and general counsel should do
The scale of administrative monetary penalties has turned competition compliance into a board-level risk. Directors do not need to master the case law, but they should be satisfied that management has identified where the business is exposed and has proportionate controls in place. A practical governance agenda includes:
- Risk mapping. Identify the business lines most exposed: consumer pricing and promotions, environmental and performance claims, dealings with competitors through trade associations or joint ventures, dominant positions in niche markets, and employee hiring practices that could raise wage-fixing or no-poach issues.
- Policy and approval controls. Require legal review of advertising claims, price representations, discount programmes and competitor collaborations before launch.
- Training and certification. Train marketing, sales, pricing and HR teams annually, with practical examples, and keep records of completion.
- Monitoring. Audit live campaigns and pricing pages, review reviews and influencer content, and check trade association minutes.
- Escalation and response. Set a clear path for employees to raise concerns and for legal to assess immunity, self-reporting, refunds and corrective notices quickly.
- Reporting to the board. Include competition risk in periodic legal and compliance reports, with metrics such as campaigns reviewed, issues found and remediation.
Insurance deserves attention too. Many directors' and officers' and general liability policies exclude fines and penalties, or cover them only where insurable by law. Companies should confirm what their policies say about administrative monetary penalties, investigation costs and private claims before a problem arises, not after.
How TRW & Co helps
We advise companies facing administrative monetary penalties and criminal exposure under the Competition Act. We assess penalty exposure, quantify affected revenue and benefit under privilege, build compliance programmes that support a due diligence defence, and negotiate consent agreements with the Competition Bureau. Where cases are litigated before the Tribunal or courts, or brought by private applicants, we work with Canadian counsel on strategy and evidence. We act alongside our deceptive marketing and civil provisions teams. This note is general information, not legal advice. To discuss your exposure, contact us.
Frequently asked questions
What is the maximum AMP for deceptive marketing in Canada?
For a corporation, the greater of CAD 10 million (CAD 15 million for a subsequent order) and three times the benefit derived from the deceptive conduct, or 3% of annual worldwide gross revenues if the benefit cannot reasonably be determined. For individuals, the greater of CAD 750,000 (CAD 1 million) and three times the benefit.
Are Competition Act AMPs criminal penalties?
No. They are civil, and each provision states that the purpose of the order is to promote compliance, not to punish. The Supreme Court’s test in Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41, distinguishes administrative penalties from true penal consequences. Criminal fines apply separately to offences such as price-fixing, bid-rigging and knowingly misleading advertising.
Can a compliance programme reduce penalties?
Yes. For deceptive marketing, proof of due diligence to prevent the conduct is a complete defence to AMPs, corrective notices and restitution. For other provisions, compliance history is an express factor, and the Bureau’s compliance bulletin explains how credible programmes affect its enforcement decisions.
What is the penalty for closing a merger before the waiting period ends?
Under s. 123.1, a court may order a person who completes a notifiable transaction before the waiting period ends, without good and sufficient cause, to pay an AMP of up to CAD 10,000 for each day of non-compliance, and may also order dissolution or divestiture.
Sources
- Competition Act, ss. 45, 47, 52, 74.1, 79, 90.1, 107.3, 123.1
- Competition Bureau: Competition Bureau wins deceptive marketing case against Cineplex (23 Sep 2024)
- Competition Bureau: Statement on appeal court ruling in Cineplex case (23 Jan 2026)
- Guindon v. Canada, 2015 SCC 41
- Competition Bureau: Corporate Compliance Programs bulletin
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.


