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Guide · Corporate, M&A and Private Equity

Public M&A and Take-Over Bids in Canada

Take-over bids in Canada follow a harmonized regime under National Instrument 62-104, while most friendly deals use a court-approved plan of arrangement. This page explains both routes, the minority protections in MI 61-101, what target boards may do to defend, and how stakes are disclosed before a deal.

9 min read Updated
ENFR

Key takeaways

  • A take-over bid arises at 20% or more of a class of voting or equity securities, counting existing holdings.
  • Bids stay open 105 days unless the target shortens the period, to no less than 35 days.
  • A mandatory minimum tender of more than 50% of securities held by others applies, then a 10-day extension.
  • MI 61-101 can require a formal valuation and majority-of-the-minority approval for insider and related-party deals.
  • Early-warning disclosure starts at 10% ownership, with further reports at each 2% change.

How take-over bids and public M&A work

Take-over bids and plans of arrangement are the two main ways to acquire a Canadian public company. A take-over bid is an offer made directly to the target's securityholders, who decide individually whether to tender. A plan of arrangement is a corporate transaction negotiated with the target's board, approved by a shareholder vote and then by a court. Friendly deals overwhelmingly use arrangements because they deliver 100% ownership in one step and allow complex structuring. Unsolicited, or hostile, approaches must use a bid, because the target board will not call a meeting to approve an arrangement it does not support.

Trading screen and shareholder circular representing take-over bids for a Canadian listed company
Public acquisitions in Canada are governed by provincial securities law, corporate statutes and stock exchange rules together.

Securities law in Canada is provincial, but take-over bids are governed by a harmonized instrument, National Instrument 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids, adopted in every province and territory (in Ontario, the core bid rules are also found in Part XX of the Securities Act). Multilateral Instrument 61-101 adds protections for minority holders in conflict transactions. National Policy 62-202 sets out the regulators' approach to defensive tactics. Stock exchange rules, particularly those of the TSX and TSX Venture Exchange, apply to share issuances and security-based compensation in connection with deals.

For the broader context of Canadian deal-making, see our overview of corporate, M&A and private equity, and for private transactions see mergers and acquisitions in Canada.

The take-over bid regime under NI 62-104

When the rules apply

An offer to acquire outstanding voting or equity securities of a class is a take-over bid if, together with securities already held by the offeror and its joint actors, the offeror would own 20% or more of the class. Securities convertible within 60 days count toward the total. Once a person crosses that line through an offer, the formal bid rules apply unless an exemption is available, such as the exemptions for normal-course purchases on a published market, private agreements with not more than five sellers at a price not exceeding 115% of market, and non-reporting issuers.

Core bid requirements

Since 9 May 2016, all non-exempt take-over bids in Canada have been subject to three structural rules designed to give target boards time to respond and shareholders a collective say:

  • Deposit period. A bid must remain open for at least 105 days. The target board can issue a deposit period news release shortening it to no less than 35 days, and if the target enters into an alternative transaction such as a friendly arrangement, all outstanding bids may be shortened to 35 days.
  • Minimum tender. No securities can be taken up unless more than 50% of the outstanding securities of the class, excluding those held by the bidder and its joint actors, have been tendered and not withdrawn.
  • Mandatory extension. Once the minimum tender is met and the bidder takes up securities, the bid must be extended for at least 10 more days so that remaining holders can tender.

Other rules ensure equal treatment. All holders of the class must receive identical consideration, collateral benefits to particular holders are prohibited subject to narrow exceptions for employment arrangements, and partial bids must be taken up pro rata. The bidder must have adequate financing arrangements in place before launching a bid that includes cash, and must send a bid circular containing prescribed disclosure. The target board must send a directors' circular within 15 days with its recommendation or a statement that it is not making one.

Completing the acquisition

A bid rarely delivers 100% ownership. Under s. 206 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), if within 120 days the bid is accepted by holders of at least 90% of the shares to which the bid relates, excluding the bidder's own, the bidder can compulsorily acquire the rest on the same terms. Below 90%, the bidder usually completes a second-step business combination, such as an amalgamation, which requires a shareholder vote and, under MI 61-101, minority approval, although shares tendered to the bid may often be counted in that minority vote if prescribed conditions are met.

Restrictions after the bid and issuer bids

The regime also polices what happens around a bid. During the 20 business days after a take-over bid expires, the bidder may not acquire further securities of the class except through a transaction generally available to all holders on identical terms. This prevents a bidder from paying a premium to a few holdouts after the bid closes. Issuer bids, where a company buys back its own securities, are subject to parallel rules in NI 62-104, with an important exemption for normal course issuer bids made through a stock exchange within the limits set by exchange rules.

Cross-border bids

Many Canadian targets have significant US shareholder bases, and many bidders are US companies. Bids for Canadian issuers that are foreign private issuers in the US can often be made in compliance with Canadian rules under the US multijurisdictional disclosure system, subject to its eligibility conditions. Where securities are offered as consideration, the bidder must consider registration or an exemption in the US, which is one reason friendly share-exchange deals tend to use arrangements. Canadian bids for US-listed issuers must also comply with US tender offer rules, which can differ on matters such as withdrawal rights and the minimum offer period.

Plans of arrangement

A plan of arrangement under s. 192 CBCA or a provincial equivalent is the default structure for negotiated public M&A. The target applies for an interim order setting the meeting procedure and the required approval, usually two-thirds of the votes cast, and grants dissent rights. After the vote, the court holds a fairness hearing at which securityholders and other affected parties can object. In BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, the Supreme Court held that the corporation must show that the statutory procedures were followed, that the application is put forward in good faith, and that the arrangement is fair and reasonable, which requires a valid business purpose and a fair and balanced resolution of objections.

Arrangements offer several advantages over take-over bids. They deliver all of the target's shares at closing on a single vote. They can include steps that a bid cannot, such as distributing a spin-out company, exchanging options and warrants, or reorganizing a capital structure. Securities issued to US holders under a court-approved arrangement can rely on the exemption from registration in s. 3(a)(10) of the US Securities Act of 1933. The trade-off is that the board controls timing and the meeting date, which makes the route unavailable for hostile approaches.

Minority protections under MI 61-101

Multilateral Instrument 61-101, in force in Ontario, Quebec and several other provinces, regulates four kinds of transactions in which insiders may have a conflict: insider bids, issuer bids, business combinations and related party transactions. Its main protections are enhanced disclosure, a formal valuation prepared by an independent valuator, and approval by a majority of the votes cast by minority holders, excluding the interested parties.

TransactionFormal valuationMinority approvalCommon exemptions
Insider bidGenerally required, of the target's securitiesNot required as such; the bid's minimum tender protects holdersNo prior valuation-sensitive information; auction; liquid market
Business combination (e.g., squeeze-out)Required if an interested party acquires the issuerRequiredSecond step following a bid, if conditions are met
Related party transactionRequired for some typesRequiredValue no more than 25% of market capitalization; issuer not listed on specified markets

The 25% of market capitalization exemption is the most frequently used: where neither the fair market value of the subject matter nor the consideration, insofar as it involves interested parties, exceeds 25% of the issuer's market capitalization, the formal valuation and minority approval requirements do not apply. Special committees of independent directors are recommended by the companion policy and, in practice, are expected in any significant conflict transaction.

Running a special committee

A special committee is most effective when it is formed early, has a clear written mandate, and is free to say no. Its mandate should authorize it to consider alternatives, negotiate on the issuer's behalf, retain its own legal and financial advisers and, where MI 61-101 requires it, select and supervise the independent valuator. Members should be independent of the interested party, considering not only formal relationships but also business and personal ties. Careful minutes of each meeting, recording the information considered and the reasons for decisions, are the best evidence that the process was fair if the transaction is later challenged in an oppression claim or at a fairness hearing.

Defensive tactics and deal protection

Canadian regulators take a shareholder-choice approach to defensive tactics. Under National Policy 62-202, securities commissions may intervene, using their public-interest jurisdiction, where a target's actions would deny or severely limit the ability of shareholders to respond to a bid. Before 2016, shareholder rights plans ("poison pills") were mainly used to buy time and regulators usually cease-traded them once shareholders had had a reasonable period to consider the bid and alternatives. The 105-day minimum deposit period now gives boards that time by statute, so rights plans are used mainly to deal with creeping acquisitions and lock-up agreements that might otherwise defeat the bid regime.

Target boards have other tools. They can seek a white knight, negotiate a superior proposal, issue a deposit period news release favouring a preferred transaction, or argue that a private placement serves a bona fide financing need. Placements made in the face of a bid draw close regulatory scrutiny. In friendly deals, acquirers negotiate deal protection: non-solicitation covenants with fiduciary-out exceptions, matching rights, break fees and lock-up agreements with major holders. Canadian courts and regulators accept these mechanisms within reasonable bounds, considering whether they preclude a superior offer.

Practical point

Lock-up agreements are powerful but have limits. A lock-up with a holder of a significant block can deter competing bidders, but if the locked-up holder is a joint actor of the bidder, its shares may be excluded from the minimum tender calculation and from any minority vote under MI 61-101. Structure lock-ups so that holders remain free to vote or tender independently except for the specific commitment.

Early warning reporting and stakebuilding

Bidders often build a position before announcing a deal. Under Part 5 of NI 62-104, a person who acquires beneficial ownership of, or control or direction over, 10% or more of a class of voting or equity securities of a reporting issuer must issue a news release promptly, and no later than the opening of trading on the next business day, and file an early-warning report within two business days. Further reports are required for each additional 2% acquired or disposed of, and when holdings fall below 10%. A moratorium prevents further purchases until one business day after the report is filed.

Eligible institutional investors, such as pension funds and mutual funds that are not seeking control, may use the alternative monthly reporting system in National Instrument 62-103, with reports due by the tenth day of the month after the relevant threshold is crossed. Stakebuilding also engages insider trading rules: a bidder in possession of undisclosed material information about the target, including its own intention to bid, may be restricted from trading. The pre-bid integration rule requires that holders who sold to the bidder in the 90 days before the bid receive no better terms than holders under the bid.

Timeline for take-over bids and arrangements

The comparative timelines help explain why take-over bids are mainly hostile tools. A friendly arrangement can usually close in three to four months, driven by the time needed to prepare the information circular, obtain the interim order, hold the meeting and obtain the final order, as well as regulatory approvals. A hostile bid must remain open at least 105 days unless shortened, and contested situations involve regulatory hearings on defensive tactics and litigation over disclosure. Competition Act and Investment Canada Act approvals apply to both and may extend the timetable. For details, see our pages on merger review and the Investment Canada Act.

Illustration: a bidder launches an unsolicited cash offer on 1 March. The target board forms a special committee, issues a directors' circular rejecting the bid, and runs a process that produces a friendly arrangement with a third party in late April. Because the target has entered into an alternative transaction, the hostile bid's deposit period may be shortened to 35 days. The original bidder must decide quickly whether to raise its price, because shareholders will now compare two concrete proposals on similar timelines.

How TRW & Co helps with take-over bids

TRW & Co advises bidders, target boards, special committees and significant shareholders on take-over bids, plans of arrangement and related-party transactions involving Canadian listed companies. We prepare stakebuilding and early-warning strategies, structure bids and arrangement agreements, negotiate deal protection, and advise boards on process, conflicts and responses to unsolicited approaches. We coordinate Competition Act and Investment Canada Act workstreams and the US securities aspects of cross-border deals. We are an independent firm and work with Canadian-licensed counsel for court applications and regulatory hearings. Contact us to discuss a public transaction. This page is general information, not legal advice.

Frequently asked questions

What percentage triggers a take-over bid in Canada?

An offer to acquire voting or equity securities that would bring the offeror, together with its joint actors and securities already held, to 20% or more of the outstanding securities of a class is a take-over bid under NI 62-104. Unless an exemption applies, the offeror must then comply with the formal bid rules, including the 105-day deposit period and the minimum tender condition.

Can a target board block a take-over bid?

Not indefinitely. Regulators follow a shareholder-choice approach under National Policy 62-202 and may intervene against tactics that deny shareholders the ability to respond. The 105-day deposit period gives boards time to seek alternatives, and they may shorten it in favour of a preferred deal, but shareholders ultimately decide by tendering or not tendering.

Why do friendly Canadian deals use plans of arrangement?

An arrangement delivers 100% of the target in one step on a single shareholder vote, usually two-thirds of votes cast, and allows complex steps such as spin-outs and option exchanges. A court reviews fairness, and the court approval lets securities issued to US holders rely on the s. 3(a)(10) exemption from US registration.

When is a formal valuation required under MI 61-101?

A formal valuation is generally required for insider bids, for business combinations in which an interested party acquires the issuer, and for certain related party transactions. Exemptions apply, notably where the transaction's value, insofar as it involves interested parties, does not exceed 25% of the issuer's market capitalization, and in some cases where the issuer is not listed on specified senior markets.

What are the early-warning thresholds in Canada?

Acquiring 10% or more of a class of voting or equity securities of a reporting issuer triggers a news release by the opening of trading on the next business day and a report within two business days. Further reports are required for each 2% change. Eligible institutional investors may use the monthly reporting system in NI 62-103.

Sources

  1. OSC: Unofficial consolidation of NI 62-104 Take-Over Bids and Issuer Bids
  2. OSC: Unofficial consolidation of MI 61-101
  3. Canada Business Corporations Act, ss. 192 and 206
  4. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69
  5. OSC: Mergers and acquisitions

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.