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Banking, Finance & Fintech

Payment Fraud Loss Allocation Under Canadian Law

Payment fraud losses are allocated very differently for cheques, cards and electronic transfers. Statute protects customers against forged cheques and unauthorized card use, but scams that customers authorize have been left largely to contracts. New Bank Act duties enacted in 2026 begin to change that, without imposing mandatory reimbursement.

Treasury team reviewing a suspicious wire transfer as part of a payment fraud response

Key takeaways

  • A forged or unauthorized signature on a cheque is wholly inoperative under BEA s. 48(1).
  • Drawers must give written notice of a forged endorsement within one year of learning of it.
  • In Teva v. TD Canada Trust, 2017 SCC 51, the Supreme Court restored judgment for the defrauded drawer.
  • Bank credit card liability for unauthorized use is capped at CAD 50 absent gross negligence.
  • 2026 Bank Act amendments cover scams authorized under deception but are not yet in force.

Who bears payment fraud losses in Canada?

Canadian law allocates payment fraud losses through a mix of statute, contract and common law, and the answer depends heavily on the payment method. For cheques, the federal Bills of Exchange Act (BEA) gives the starting rules: a forged signature is "wholly inoperative", so a bank that pays on one generally cannot charge its customer. For cards, the Bank Act caps a cardholder's liability for unauthorized use. For electronic transfers, account agreements do most of the work, and customers who were tricked into authorizing a payment themselves have, until now, had little statutory protection. That is starting to change: amendments enacted in 2026 will require banks to adopt policies on consumer-targeted fraud, including scams that customers authorize under deception.

Treasury team reviewing a suspicious wire transfer as part of a payment fraud response
Payment fraud losses are allocated differently for cheques, cards and electronic transfers, and account agreements often decide the result.

The stakes are large. In a June 2026 release, the Department of Finance said Canadians lost more than CAD 704 million to fraud in 2025, with reported losses since 2022 above CAD 2.4 billion, and that only a small share of scams are reported. Businesses face the same schemes at larger scale: business email compromise, fake supplier banking details, insider cheque fraud and account takeover.

This note explains the rules by payment type, the role of account agreements, the leading Supreme Court decision on cheque fraud and the new federal approach to authorized push payment scams.

Cheques and the Bills of Exchange Act

Cheque fraud allocation is the most developed area. The key provisions are:

  • Forged or unauthorized signatures (s. 48(1)). A forged or unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative, and no right to enforce payment can be acquired through it, unless the party against whom it is enforced is "precluded" from setting up the forgery. Preclusion usually requires conduct by the customer, such as a representation, or a contractual term.
  • Forged endorsements and the one-year notice (s. 48(3)). Where a cheque payable to order is paid on a forged endorsement, the drawer loses its right to recover from the drawee bank unless it gives written notice of the forgery within one year after acquiring notice of it.
  • Recovery between banks (s. 49). A bank that pays in good faith on a forged or unauthorized endorsement can recover from the person to whom it paid, provided notice is given within a reasonable time.
  • Fictitious or non-existing payees (s. 20(5)). Where the payee is fictitious or non-existing, the bill may be treated as payable to bearer, which can shift the loss back to the drawer.

Teva Canada Ltd. v. TD Canada Trust, 2017 SCC 51

The Supreme Court of Canada applied these rules in Teva, decided on 27 October 2017. An employee without authority to issue cheques caused Teva to issue 63 cheques totalling about CAD 5.48 million to payees that were either invented or real customers, and deposited them into accounts opened by accomplices. Teva sued the collecting banks in conversion.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario had dismissed the claim, in part by recognizing a negligence-based defence. A majority of the Supreme Court allowed Teva's appeal and restored the trial judgment in its favour. The decision confirms that the fictitious payee defence is narrow, that the drawer's intention matters, and that collecting banks bear real risk when they deposit cheques into accounts of people who are not the named payee. Four judges dissented, which shows how finely balanced these cases can be (SCC case record).

Cards, debit and pre-authorized payments

For credit cards issued by banks, s. 627.33 of the Bank Act caps a borrower's liability for unauthorized use of the card, its account information or personal authentication information at CAD 50, unless the borrower has demonstrated gross negligence (or, in Quebec, gross fault) in safeguarding them. Once the borrower reports the card lost, stolen or at risk, there is no liability for later unauthorized use. Card network rules and issuer zero-liability policies often go further.

Debit cards and pre-authorized debits are governed mainly by industry codes and payment-system rules rather than statute. Those rules generally protect customers from unauthorized transactions but expect them to protect PINs and to report problems promptly, and they give payors a limited window to dispute pre-authorized debits that were not authorized or did not match the agreement. Businesses that collect by pre-authorized debit should keep proper authorizations, because an unsupported debit is usually reversed at the collector's expense.

Account agreements and verification clauses

For business accounts, the account agreement usually decides who bears payment fraud losses. Canadian banks commonly include clauses that require the customer to review statements and report errors or unauthorized items within a short period, failing which the statement is deemed correct. Courts generally enforce clear verification clauses between banks and commercial customers, which means a business that does not reconcile accounts promptly may lose its claim even where the bank paid on a forged instrument.

Agreements also allocate risk for electronic channels: security procedures for online banking and wires, the customer's duty to protect credentials, dual-authorization requirements and limits on the bank's liability for following instructions that pass the agreed security procedure. If the customer chose weaker controls than the bank offered, the agreement may place the loss on the customer.

Practical point

Treat the cash-management agreement as a risk document, not boilerplate. Negotiate realistic review periods, require positive pay or payee-name matching where available, adopt dual approval for new payees and changed bank details, and reconcile accounts at least as often as the verification clause demands.

Authorized push payment scams and mistaken transfers

The hardest cases involve payments the customer authorized after being deceived: a fraudster impersonates a supplier, a bank employee or a government official and persuades the customer to send funds. Because the customer authorized the transfer, the statutory forgery and card rules do not apply, and account agreements usually place the loss on the customer. Recovery then depends on tracing funds and suing the recipient, the recipient's bank in limited circumstances, or the fraudster.

Restitution law helps where money can be identified: a person who receives funds paid by mistake or obtained by fraud may be ordered to return them, and courts can grant urgent freezing and disclosure orders against recipient accounts. Speed is decisive, because funds in a mule account usually move within hours. In Quebec, the Civil Code rules on receipt of a payment not due and on extra-contractual liability serve similar functions.

Payment typeMain ruleWho usually bears the loss
Cheque with forged drawer signatureBEA s. 48(1): signature wholly inoperativePaying bank, unless customer is precluded or a valid clause applies
Cheque paid on forged endorsementBEA ss. 48(3), 49Collecting bank in many cases; drawer must give notice within one year
Bank credit card used without authorityBank Act s. 627.33Issuer, beyond CAD 50, absent gross negligence
Business wire or online transfer (unauthorized)Account agreement and security proceduresDepends on agreed procedures and customer controls
Payment authorized under deceptionContract and restitution; 2026 Bank Act duties not yet in forceCustomer, subject to bank's remedy policies once in force

Business email compromise: supplier, buyer or bank?

A common commercial scenario involves two innocent businesses. A fraudster gains access to a supplier's email, sends the buyer an invoice with new bank details, and the buyer pays the fraudster. The supplier is still unpaid and asks the buyer to pay again; the buyer says it has already paid. Canadian courts resolve these disputes mainly through contract and agency principles: who was entitled to give payment instructions, whether the buyer's payment discharged the debt, and whether either party's negligence caused the loss.

The result often turns on facts that the parties could have controlled. Did the contract specify how bank details could be changed? Did the buyer verify a change by telephone using a known number? Was the supplier's email account protected with multi-factor authentication, and did it warn customers once it knew of a breach? A buyer that paid without checking an unusual change is exposed; a supplier whose compromised system produced the fraudulent invoice may share responsibility. Banks are rarely liable in these cases, because the payment was authorized by their customer and executed as instructed.

The best protection is contractual. Supply agreements and purchase orders should state that banking details can only be changed by a signed notice verified through a call-back procedure, and that payments made to accounts changed without that procedure do not discharge the buyer. Both sides should also review crime and cyber insurance, since social engineering cover is often sold as a separate, sub-limited extension.

New federal rules on payment fraud

The Budget 2025 Implementation Act, No. 1 (S.C. 2026, c. 3) amended the Bank Act to define "consumer-targeted fraud" as including transactions that are unauthorized or authorized as a result of coercion or deception. When in force, banks will have to obtain express consent before enabling prescribed account capabilities such as wire transfers, let customers disable them and adjust limits, notify customers of changes, and maintain policies setting out how they decide whether a transaction is suspicious, whether to suspend it, whether a customer is a fraud victim and what remedy is available. Banks will also report fraud data to FCAC each year.

The Department of Finance pre-published draft regulations in June 2026 to fill in these duties. The release does not commit banks to reimburse scam victims, so Canada has not adopted a mandatory reimbursement model. Instead, the law requires each bank to decide and disclose its own criteria, which FCAC will supervise. That leaves the reimbursement debate open, and business customers remain largely governed by their agreements. Our note on the financial consumer protection framework covers the broader conduct regime.

Reducing payment fraud exposure: a checklist

  1. Verify any change in supplier banking details by calling a known number, never one in the request.
  2. Use dual authorization for new payees, large wires and changes to limits.
  3. Reconcile accounts daily or weekly, and at least within the verification period in your agreement.
  4. Use positive pay and payee-name checks for cheques and electronic payments where available.
  5. Limit who can requisition and issue cheques, and separate those roles.
  6. Prepare a response plan: who calls the bank, who instructs counsel to seek freezing orders, and who preserves evidence.
  7. Review cyber and crime insurance for social engineering coverage and its conditions.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise banks, payment service providers, fintechs and corporate treasury teams on payment fraud risk. We review and negotiate account and cash-management agreements, design fraud policies for the 2026 Bank Act amendments, and act on recovery steps, including tracing, freezing and disclosure orders with Canadian litigation counsel. We also help payment providers align fraud controls with the Retail Payment Activities Act. See our pages on fintech and payments and commercial litigation. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a payment fraud matter, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

Is a bank liable if it pays a cheque with a forged signature?

Usually yes. Under section 48(1) of the Bills of Exchange Act a forged or unauthorized signature is wholly inoperative, so the bank cannot debit the customer on the strength of it, unless the customer is precluded from relying on the forgery, for example by its own representation, or a valid verification clause in the account agreement shifts the loss.

What did the Supreme Court decide in Teva v. TD Canada Trust?

In 2017 SCC 51 a majority allowed Teva's appeal and restored the trial judgment holding the collecting banks liable in conversion for cheques an unauthorized employee had caused Teva to issue. The case confirms that the fictitious payee defence is narrow and that collecting banks carry real risk when depositing cheques to people other than the named payee.

Will Canadian banks have to reimburse scam victims?

Not automatically. The 2026 Bank Act amendments, not yet in force, require banks to adopt policies on consumer-targeted fraud, including criteria for deciding whether a victim receives a remedy, and to report fraud data to FCAC. The June 2026 draft regulations did not mandate reimbursement, so outcomes will depend on each bank's policies and supervision.

How can a business recover funds sent to a fraudster?

Act immediately. Notify both banks, preserve evidence and ask counsel about urgent court orders to freeze recipient accounts and obtain disclosure of where funds moved. Restitution claims can recover identifiable funds from recipients. Delay matters because funds in mule accounts are usually moved within hours.

Sources

  1. Bills of Exchange Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. B-4
  2. Bank Act, S.C. 1991, c. 46 (s. 627.33 and 2026 amendments not in force)
  3. Supreme Court of Canada case 36918: Teva Canada Limited v. TD Canada Trust
  4. Department of Finance: pre-published regulations to prevent fraud (June 2026)

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.