CBCA Restructurings: Solvent Plans of Arrangement for Debt
CBCA restructurings let companies exchange bonds and notes for new securities or cash through a court-approved plan of arrangement, without a formal insolvency filing. This note covers the solvency requirement and co-applicant structures, interim orders and stays, voting classes, the BCE fairness test, third-party releases and when the CCAA is the better tool.

Key takeaways
- Section 192(1)(f) CBCA covers exchanges of securities, including notes, for new securities or cash.
- Only a corporation that is not insolvent may apply; solvent co-applicants are often used.
- Interim orders set meetings, voting classes and sometimes a limited stay.
- BCE, 2008 SCC 69: statutory compliance, good faith, and a fair and reasonable arrangement.
- The CCAA is better where trade debt, contracts or priming DIP financing must be addressed.
Why CBCA restructurings are used for debt
CBCA restructurings use the plan of arrangement provision in s. 192 of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) to change a company's capital structure without a formal insolvency filing. Originally designed for mergers, amalgamations and other fundamental changes, s. 192 defines "arrangement" broadly enough to include an exchange of a corporation's securities for other securities, money or property (s. 192(1)(f)). Courts have accepted that bonds and notes are securities for this purpose, so a corporation can propose to exchange its notes for new notes, equity or cash, obtain approval by a vote of noteholders and then bind all holders, including those who voted against, by a court order.

The process is faster and less stigmatizing than the Companies' Creditors Arrangement Act (CCAA), leaves trade creditors untouched and keeps day-to-day operations outside court supervision. Customers, suppliers and employees usually see no change, which protects enterprise value, and there is no monitor whose fees and reporting add to the cost. The trade-off is that the toolkit is narrower: the corporation cannot disclaim contracts, prime existing lenders with interim financing or compromise trade debt.
This note explains how CBCA restructurings work: the solvency requirement, interim orders and stays, voting classes, the fairness hearing, third-party releases and when a CCAA filing is the better tool.
The solvency requirement
Section 192(3) allows a corporation "that is not insolvent" to apply for court approval of an arrangement where it is not practicable to effect the fundamental change under another CBCA provision. A corporation is insolvent for this purpose if it is unable to pay its liabilities as they become due, or if the realizable value of its assets is less than the aggregate of its liabilities and stated capital of all classes (s. 192(2)). Many companies that need to restructure their debt fail one of these tests.
Practitioners have addressed the problem by including a solvent co-applicant in the arrangement. A newly incorporated or existing solvent CBCA corporation in the group applies with the distressed issuer, and the court considers the arrangement as a whole. Courts have accepted this approach in a series of debt restructurings, provided the arrangement is not simply a device to avoid insolvency legislation and the other requirements are met. The Director under the CBCA must receive notice of every application and may appear (s. 192(5)), so issuers should expect the Director's policy positions on arrangements to be part of the analysis.
Interim orders, stays and voting classes
The court's power to make "any interim or final order it thinks fit" (s. 192(4)) gives CBCA restructurings much of their flexibility. A typical interim order:
- directs the calling and conduct of a meeting of noteholders (and, where affected, shareholders);
- sets the voting classes and the approval threshold, commonly two-thirds of the votes cast in each class;
- approves the information circular and notice procedures, including how beneficial holders vote through intermediaries;
- may grant dissent rights to shareholders under s. 190 where their shares are affected; and
- may include a limited stay of proceedings preventing noteholders or other counterparties from accelerating debt or exercising remedies based on the restructuring or related defaults while the arrangement is pending.
Classification is critical. Holders whose legal rights are sufficiently similar can vote together; holders with different rights or treatment may need separate classes. Courts look closely at classes that appear designed to swamp a dissenting minority, and at consent or early-tender fees that give some holders better treatment in exchange for supporting the deal.
| Feature | CBCA s. 192 arrangement | CCAA plan |
|---|---|---|
| Eligibility | Applicant must not be insolvent (solvent co-applicant often used) | Insolvent debtor company with claims over CAD 5 million |
| Affected parties | Usually only securityholders (notes, shares) | Any creditors; trade claims may be compromised |
| Stay | Discretionary, usually narrow | Broad statutory stay |
| Voting | As set by interim order, commonly two-thirds per class | Majority in number and two-thirds in value per class |
| Interim financing and priming charges | Not available as in the CCAA | Available (s. 11.2) |
| Disclaimer of contracts | Not available | Available (s. 32) |
| Court officer | None required | Monitor required |
The fairness hearing and the BCE test
After the vote, the corporation returns to court for a final order. The leading test comes from BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69: the applicant must show that the statutory procedures have been complied with, that the application is put forward in good faith, and that the arrangement is fair and reasonable. To be fair and reasonable, the arrangement must have a valid business purpose, and objections of those whose rights are being arranged must be resolved in a fair and balanced way. The level of securityholder approval is a strong indicator of fairness, but the court also considers the proportionality of the impact on affected groups, the alternatives available, the access of holders to dissent and appraisal remedies, and any expert or independent committee evidence.
In CBCA restructurings of debt, valid business purpose is usually shown by evidence that the existing capital structure is unsustainable and that the arrangement avoids a value-destroying insolvency filing. Fairness evidence often includes a financial adviser's opinion, a comparison with expected recoveries in a CCAA or liquidation, and the support of an ad hoc committee of holders.
Build the fairness record from the start: an independent special committee, a financial adviser's analysis of alternatives, clear disclosure of any consent fees and a voting process that reaches beneficial holders. Courts approving CBCA restructurings rely heavily on that record when dissenting holders object.
Support agreements, consent fees and holder engagement
Most CBCA restructurings start with a restructuring support agreement between the issuer and an ad hoc group of significant holders. The agreement commits supporting holders to vote in favour, sets milestones for the interim order, meeting and final order, and describes the economic terms. In exchange, supporting holders often receive a consent or early-support fee, or the right to participate in a new-money offering backstopped by the group.
These incentives are legitimate but must be handled carefully. If only some holders can receive a fee or a backstop allocation, dissenting holders may argue that the vote was bought and that supporting holders should vote in a separate class. Courts look at whether the incentive was offered to all holders on the same terms, whether it compensates real value (such as a backstop commitment or early support that made the deal possible), whether it was disclosed in the circular, and whether the arrangement would have passed without the votes of those receiving special benefits. Offering the fee to every holder who supports the plan by a deadline is a common way to reduce the risk.
Reaching beneficial holders is a practical challenge. Notes are usually held through depositories and intermediaries, so the interim order should set out a realistic voting and proxy process, with an information agent and enough time for votes to flow through the chain.
Tax and securities considerations
Exchanging debt for equity or new debt has tax consequences. The issuer must consider the debt forgiveness rules in the Income Tax Act, which can reduce tax attributes when debt is settled for less than its principal, and the effect of an acquisition of control on losses if new equity changes control. Holders need to understand the tax treatment of the exchange and of any fees. Securities law issues include prospectus exemptions for new securities issued under the arrangement, resale restrictions, stock exchange approvals for listing new shares and early warning reporting for holders who cross ownership thresholds. Where notes or shares are held in the United States, US securities law exemptions for court-approved exchanges are usually relied on, which is one reason a court order is valuable.
Third-party releases
Arrangements often include releases of directors, officers, advisers, indenture trustees and supporting holders for claims connected with the notes and the restructuring. Courts have approved such releases in CBCA restructurings when they are rationally connected to the restructuring, necessary for it to succeed, supported by consideration from the released parties, fair to affected holders and properly disclosed before the vote. Releases of claims unrelated to the restructuring, or of fraud and wilful misconduct, are not appropriate. Because the CBCA does not expressly authorize third-party releases, the evidence supporting them must be strong.
When the CCAA is a better fit than CBCA restructurings
CBCA restructurings work best where the problem is confined to funded debt held by sophisticated holders, the business is otherwise healthy, trade creditors can be paid in full and the company has enough liquidity to complete the process. The CCAA is usually better where:
- the company is plainly insolvent and has no credible solvent co-applicant structure;
- trade creditors, leases or other contracts need to be compromised, disclaimed or assigned;
- the company needs interim financing with a priming charge;
- a broad stay is required to stop enforcement by secured creditors or litigants;
- a sale of the business, rather than a recapitalization, is the likely outcome; or
- significant pension, environmental or employee claims must be addressed in a single court-supervised process.
Some restructurings begin under the CBCA and convert to the CCAA if support fails or liquidity runs out, and the reverse also occurs: a CCAA plan may be implemented in part through corporate law steps. Planning for both paths from the outset avoids wasted time, and a support agreement that anticipates a switch to the CCAA, including how votes and consents carry over, gives the issuer more leverage with holdouts.
Timeline and execution of CBCA restructurings
A typical CBCA restructuring runs in three phases: negotiation of a support agreement with key holders, the interim order and meeting (usually several weeks to allow circulation of the information circular and voting through intermediaries), and the final order followed by implementation. Securities law disclosure, stock exchange requirements, cross-border recognition where notes are governed by New York law and tax analysis of the exchange (including debt forgiveness rules) must be coordinated. Notes governed by foreign law may require recognition of the Canadian order abroad, for example under Chapter 15 of the US Bankruptcy Code. See our note on cross-border insolvency.
How TRW & Co helps
We advise issuers, special committees, ad hoc noteholder groups and investors on CBCA restructurings and other solvent arrangements. Our work includes structuring the arrangement and solvent co-applicant, support agreements and consent fees, interim and final order materials, fairness evidence and releases, and coordination with securities, tax and cross-border advisers. Where court appearances require Canadian-licensed counsel, we work with them. See our pages on debt capital markets and CCAA restructuring, and our note on leveraged finance covenants. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a recapitalization, contact us.
Frequently asked questions
Can an insolvent company use a CBCA plan of arrangement?
Section 192(3) requires the applicant to be a corporation that is not insolvent. In practice, debt restructurings often include a solvent co-applicant from the same group, and courts have accepted this where the arrangement is genuine and the other requirements are met. If the company is plainly insolvent with no viable structure, the CCAA is usually more appropriate.
What approval threshold applies to noteholders?
The court sets it in the interim order. Two-thirds of votes cast in each class is the usual threshold, by analogy with special resolutions, and classes are defined by similarity of legal rights. Courts scrutinize classification designed to override a dissenting minority.
What is the BCE fairness test?
In BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, the Supreme Court held that the applicant must show compliance with statutory procedures, good faith and that the arrangement is fair and reasonable. Fair and reasonable means a valid business purpose and a fair and balanced resolution of objections by those whose rights are arranged.
Can a CBCA arrangement release directors and advisers?
Courts have approved third-party releases in CBCA arrangements where they are connected to and necessary for the restructuring, supported by consideration, fair to affected holders and fully disclosed before the vote. Releases of unrelated claims or of fraud are not appropriate.
Sources
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.


