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Competition & Foreign Investment

Gun Jumping and Information Exchange Before Closing

Gun jumping covers closing a notifiable deal before clearance and coordinating with a competitor before closing. Canadian law can impose daily penalties and dissolution orders for early closing, and criminal or civil liability for coordination. This note explains the risks, the interim covenants and information exchange that cross the line, and safe integration planning.

Clean team protocol and data room access log used to avoid gun jumping in a Canadian merger

Key takeaways

  • Notifiable deals cannot close before the s. 123 waiting period expires or is waived.
  • Early closing can bring dissolution orders and AMPs of up to CAD 10,000 per day (s. 123.1).
  • Interim covenants over pricing, bids or wages can transfer control and amount to coordination.
  • Clean teams and clean-room protocols manage competitively sensitive information.
  • Coordination between competitors can engage criminal s. 45 or civil s. 90.1 liability.

What gun jumping means in Canada

Gun jumping is conduct by merging parties that anticipates the closing of a deal before they are legally allowed to close or before they actually own the target. In Canada, it covers two distinct risks. The first is procedural: completing a notifiable transaction before the waiting period under s. 123 of the Competition Act has expired or been waived. The second is substantive: coordinating competitive behaviour, or exchanging competitively sensitive information, between parties that remain independent competitors until closing, which can engage the criminal conspiracy offence in s. 45 or the civil provision on anti-competitive agreements in s. 90.1. Both can arise in any deal between competitors, whether or not the deal is ultimately approved.

Clean team protocol and data room access log used to avoid gun jumping in a Canadian merger
Gun jumping risk in Canada arises from closing before clearance and from coordination or information exchange between competitors before closing.

This note explains the statutory consequences of gun jumping, the interim covenants that can cross the line, how to manage information exchange with clean teams and clean-room protocols, how to plan integration lawfully and the penalties that apply.

Closing before clearance

For notifiable transactions, s. 123 prohibits completion until the initial 30-day waiting period after a complete notification has expired (or, if the Bureau issues a supplementary information request, until 30 days after compliance), unless the Commissioner waives it or issues an advance ruling certificate. According to the Bureau, parties that request an ARC instead of notifying may not close without also receiving a waiver. Since the June 2024 amendments, parties are also prevented from closing where the Commissioner has applied to the Competition Tribunal for an injunction and the application is pending.

If parties complete a transaction before the waiting period ends, or without notifying, the court may, on the Commissioner's application, order the information to be supplied, prohibit implementation, order the merger dissolved or assets or shares disposed of, and impose an administrative monetary penalty of up to CAD 10,000 for each day of non-compliance (s. 123.1). Failure to notify without good and sufficient cause is also an offence punishable by a fine of up to CAD 50,000 (s. 65(2)).

"Completion" is not limited to formal closing. Transferring beneficial ownership, control or the economic risk of the target before clearance, for example by giving the buyer operational control or paying the purchase price in a way that shifts risk, can amount to completion in substance. The anti-avoidance rule in s. 113.1 also applies to transactions structured to avoid notification.

Interim covenants that can cross the line

Purchase agreements legitimately include interim operating covenants to protect the value of the target between signing and closing: the seller agrees to run the business in the ordinary course and not to take extraordinary steps without the buyer's consent. Problems arise when consent rights extend to ordinary competitive decisions. Covenants that give the buyer a say over the target's prices, customer bids, discounts, marketing, hiring and wages, or capacity decisions can transfer control early and, between competitors, can amount to coordination.

Interim covenantGenerally acceptableHigher risk
Operate in ordinary courseYes-
Consent for material asset sales, new debt, capital expenditures above thresholdsYes, if thresholds are reasonableVery low thresholds that capture daily decisions
Consent for pricing, bids or customer terms-Yes: transfers competitive control
Consent for hiring, wages or employee terms in the ordinary course-Yes, and may engage s. 45(1.1) for unaffiliated employers
Joint customer communications before closingLimited, factual announcementsJoint selling or allocation of customers

Information exchange between merging parties

Buyers need information to value the target, plan integration and seek financing, but merging parties that compete must avoid using due diligence as a channel for coordination. The risk is greatest for current and future pricing, margins, customer-specific terms, bids, costs, capacity plans, strategic plans and wages. Exchanging this information while the parties remain competitors can support an inference of agreement under s. 45 or contribute to an anti-competitive agreement under s. 90.1, and if the deal fails, the information remains in the buyer's hands.

The Bureau's Competitor Collaboration Guidelines explain how it assesses agreements and information sharing between competitors, including safeguards that reduce risk. Applied to mergers, the usual safeguards are:

  • Clean teams: a small group of individuals, often outside advisers and employees without pricing or sales responsibilities, who review competitively sensitive information under a written protocol.
  • Clean-room protocols: rules on what information can be shared, in what form (aggregated, historical, anonymized), who can see it and how it is recorded.
  • Aggregation and redaction: sharing data at a level that supports valuation without revealing customer-specific or forward-looking details.
  • Return or destruction: obligations to return or destroy information if the deal does not close.
Practical point

Write the clean-team protocol before the data room opens, name the members, and keep a log of what competitively sensitive material was accessed. If the Bureau later asks how information was handled, a contemporaneous protocol and log are far more persuasive than after-the-fact assurances.

Integration planning without gun jumping

Integration planning before closing is lawful and often necessary, but implementation must wait. Parties may plan organizational structures, systems migration and supply arrangements, and may communicate with employees and customers about the announced transaction. They must not begin operating as a combined business: no joint pricing, no allocation of customers, no coordinated bidding, no shared sales teams and no instructions from the buyer to the target's staff on competitive matters. Where integration planning requires competitively sensitive information, it should go through the clean team, and decisions that depend on it should be prepared for implementation after closing rather than executed beforehand.

Joint communications deserve care. Announcing the transaction and explaining that the businesses will continue to operate independently until closing is appropriate. Telling customers to direct orders to one party, or to expect harmonized prices, is not.

Supply relationships between the parties need particular attention. Where the buyer already supplies or buys from the target, ordinary commercial dealings can continue on existing terms, but renegotiating those terms in light of the pending deal, or using the relationship to steer the target's competitive conduct, can look like early integration. Keeping the commercial relationship and the deal team separate, and documenting that any changes are made on ordinary commercial grounds, reduces the risk. The same discipline applies to joint bids or tenders in which both parties are already participating when the deal is signed: each should continue to bid independently unless and until the transaction closes.

Cross-border deals and gun jumping

Global transactions often need clearance in several jurisdictions, and each has its own waiting period and its own approach to gun jumping. A deal cleared in the United States may still be waiting for Canadian clearance, and the parties cannot close the Canadian part, or the deal as a whole if it cannot be separated, until the Canadian waiting period has ended or been waived. Carve-out arrangements, in which parties close the global deal while holding the Canadian business separate, are sometimes discussed, but they carry real risk under the Canadian notification rules and should be approached only with careful advice and, ideally, the Bureau's agreement.

Integration teams in global deals often sit outside Canada and may not appreciate the Canadian rules. Training should reach everyone who will deal with the Canadian business before closing, including headquarters functions that set prices, allocate accounts or manage procurement for the combined group. Global instructions such as "align pricing across regions" or "freeze hiring of each other's staff" can create Canadian exposure if they are acted on before closing.

When the deal fails

Some transactions do not close: the Bureau challenges them, financing falls through or a better bid emerges. That is when gun jumping problems surface. The parties remain competitors, and any information the buyer obtained, or any coordination that began, is now between independent rivals. Agreements should require the return or destruction of competitively sensitive information, restrict its use, and limit the buyer's ability to hire key target employees for a period. Parties should also document that any interim coordination ended with the deal. If the Bureau later investigates, it will look closely at how the parties behaved after the deal collapsed, including whether prices or bids moved in parallel.

Employees, wages and no-poach terms in deals

Deal teams frequently want to coordinate on employees before closing: retention offers, compensation harmonization and restrictions on poaching each other's staff. Because s. 45(1.1) makes it a criminal offence for unaffiliated employers to agree to fix wages or terms of employment, or not to solicit or hire each other's employees, these arrangements need care. Non-solicitation terms that are ancillary to a legitimate transaction and reasonably necessary to give effect to it can fall within the ancillary restraints defence in s. 45(4), but broad, open-ended or one-sided restrictions should be avoided. Compensation harmonization should be planned for implementation after closing. Our note on no-poach and wage-fixing agreements explains the offence.

Penalties and exposure

The consequences of gun jumping can be severe. Procedural breaches can lead to daily AMPs of up to CAD 10,000 and orders to dissolve the transaction (s. 123.1). Substantive coordination between competitors can expose the parties and individuals to prosecution under s. 45, with penalties of up to 14 years' imprisonment and fines in the discretion of the court (s. 45(2)). Civil orders under s. 90.1 can include administrative monetary penalties of up to the greater of CAD 10 million (CAD 15 million for subsequent orders) and three times the benefit derived, or 3% of annual worldwide gross revenues if the benefit cannot be determined (s. 90.1(1.3)). Private parties granted leave may also seek orders under s. 90.1.

Gun jumping checklist

  1. Confirm whether the deal is notifiable and build the waiting period into the timetable.
  2. Draft interim covenants that protect value without controlling competitive decisions.
  3. Set up clean teams and clean-room protocols before sharing sensitive data.
  4. Train deal and integration teams on what they may and may not do before closing.
  5. Review customer, supplier and employee communications for coordination risk.
  6. Do not transfer control, risk or the purchase price before clearance.
  7. Plan for return or destruction of information if the deal fails.
  8. Keep ordinary supply relationships and bids between the parties independent until closing.

See also our notes on information sharing between competitors and pre-merger notification thresholds.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise buyers, sellers and investors on gun jumping risk in Canadian and cross-border transactions. Our work includes interim covenant drafting, clean-team and clean-room protocols, integration planning guidance and training, waiting period management and responses to Bureau inquiries. See our pages on merger review and cartels and criminal enforcement. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a transaction, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

What counts as gun jumping in Canada?

Two things: completing a notifiable transaction before the Competition Act waiting period ends or is waived, including transferring control or risk early, and coordinating competitive conduct or exchanging competitively sensitive information with a competitor before closing, which can engage s. 45 or s. 90.1.

What penalties apply to closing early?

Under s. 123.1, the court may order information to be supplied, prohibit completion, dissolve the merger or order disposals, and impose an administrative monetary penalty of up to CAD 10,000 for each day of non-compliance. Failing to notify is also an offence with a fine of up to CAD 50,000 under s. 65(2).

Can merging competitors share pricing information during due diligence?

Only with safeguards. Current and future pricing, margins, customer terms and bids should be reviewed by a clean team under a written protocol, ideally in aggregated or historical form, and kept from people with pricing responsibilities. Information must be returned or destroyed if the deal fails.

Is integration planning allowed before closing?

Yes, planning is allowed, but implementation must wait. Parties can prepare structures and systems and announce the deal, but must not set joint prices, allocate customers, share sales teams or have the buyer direct the target's competitive decisions before closing.

Sources

  1. Competition Act, ss. 45, 65, 90.1, 113.1, 123, 123.1
  2. Competition Bureau: Competitor Collaboration Guidelines
  3. Competition Bureau: Overview of the merger review process

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.