Skip to content
Technology, Privacy & AI

Ransomware Payments: Legal Considerations

Ransomware payments are not generally prohibited in Canada, but they raise sanctions and terrorist financing risks, insurance policy conditions, privilege questions, privacy breach obligations and governance duties. Organizations should screen threat actors, involve insurers, report to authorities, protect forensic work and document a board-level decision.

Locked computer screen demanding payment, illustrating legal considerations for ransomware payments

Key takeaways

  • Paying a ransom is not generally illegal, but paying a sanctioned person is.
  • Sanctions regulations prohibit dealing with listed persons and providing them financial services.
  • Cyber policies often require insurer consent before an extortion payment.
  • The Cyber Centre recommends reporting to police, the Anti-Fraud Centre and the Cyber Centre.
  • Paying does not remove breach notification obligations.
  • Approval authority and the decision record should be defined in advance.

Ransomware payments: a legal decision as much as a business one

Ransomware payments are among the hardest decisions an organization can face. Systems are encrypted, operations are down, data may have been stolen and threat actors set short deadlines. Paying is not generally illegal in Canada, but it is never a purely commercial choice. Sanctions and terrorist financing laws, insurance policy conditions, privacy breach obligations, privilege, directors' duties and reputational risk all bear on whether, how and when a payment can be made.

Locked computer screen demanding payment, illustrating legal considerations for ransomware payments
A ransom decision draws on sanctions screening, insurer consent, breach obligations and board oversight.

The Canadian Centre for Cyber Security's ransomware playbook identifies ransomware as the top cybercrime threat facing Canada's critical infrastructure and recommends that victims report incidents to local police, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre and the Cyber Centre. This insight sets out the legal considerations that should be addressed before any payment. It is general information, not legal advice.

Canada does not have a general prohibition on ransomware payments by private organizations, and there is no general legal requirement to report a payment. However, a payment can be unlawful in particular circumstances, most importantly where the recipient is a sanctioned person or a terrorist group. Because threat actors are usually anonymous and payment is made in cryptocurrency, establishing who will receive the funds is difficult, which is why structured screening and documentation are central to any decision.

Sanctions screening of threat actors

Canadian sanctions regulations generally prohibit persons in Canada and Canadians abroad from dealing in property of listed persons, facilitating related transactions, or making goods or financial services available to them. The Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, for example, prohibit dealing in property owned, held or controlled by or on behalf of a listed person and providing financial or related services to such a person. Some ransomware groups are associated with sanctioned jurisdictions or individuals, and foreign authorities have sanctioned specific cybercriminal actors and cryptocurrency addresses.

Before considering ransomware payments, organizations should work with their incident response firm and counsel to gather threat intelligence on the group, its known affiliates, its wallet addresses and any links to sanctioned persons or jurisdictions. Screening should cover Canadian lists and, where there is a foreign nexus such as a US parent, US dollar payments or US persons involved, foreign sanctions regimes as well. The analysis, its sources and its conclusions should be documented.

Terrorist financing and proceeds of crime

Under section 83.03 of the Criminal Code, it is an offence to provide or make available property or financial services, directly or indirectly, wilfully and without lawful justification or excuse, intending or knowing that they will be used for terrorist activity or to benefit a terrorist group. Ransomware groups are rarely listed terrorist entities, but the possibility should be assessed. Payments are typically made through cryptocurrency service providers, which have their own anti-money laundering obligations and may decline or report transactions. See our insight on sanctions compliance programs.

IssueKey questionWho leads
SanctionsIs the threat actor or wallet linked to a listed person or sanctioned jurisdiction?Counsel with threat intelligence providers
Terrorist financingIs there any indication the funds will benefit a terrorist group?Counsel
InsuranceDoes the policy require insurer consent, use of panel vendors or specific notice?Risk management and broker
Law enforcementHas the incident been reported, and is police engagement useful?Counsel and security
PrivacyWas personal information accessed or exfiltrated, triggering notification?Privacy officer and counsel
PrivilegeAre forensic work and advice structured to maximize privilege?Counsel
GovernanceWho has authority to approve, and has the board been informed?CEO, general counsel and board

Cyber insurance policies often cover extortion payments, but usually subject to conditions: prompt notice, the insurer's prior written consent, use of approved incident response vendors and negotiators, cooperation, and exclusions for payments that would breach sanctions or other laws. Making a payment without satisfying these conditions can jeopardize coverage for the payment and for other incident costs. Organizations should notify insurers immediately, involve the broker, and keep the insurer informed of negotiations and the sanctions analysis.

Practical point

Read your cyber policy before an incident, not during one. Know who must be notified, how consent is obtained, which vendors are pre-approved and whether there are sublimits for extortion, business interruption and notification costs. Put the insurer's hotline in your incident response plan.

Law enforcement reporting

There is no general legal obligation for private organizations in Canada to report ransomware to the police, but the Cyber Centre recommends reporting to local police, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre and the Cyber Centre. Reporting can provide access to intelligence about the threat actor, decryption tools and information about whether paying is likely to result in data deletion or decryption. Some insurers expect it, and regulators view it favourably.

Sector-specific obligations may also apply: under the new Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act, once in force, designated operators will have to report cyber security incidents affecting critical cyber systems to the Communications Security Establishment within a prescribed period not exceeding 72 hours. See our insight on the critical cyber systems framework.

Privilege over forensic work

Forensic investigations generate detailed findings about how the attack happened, what security weaknesses existed and what data was affected. These reports can become central evidence in later class actions and regulatory investigations. To maximize the prospect of privilege, organizations typically have counsel retain the forensic firm for the purpose of providing legal advice, limit distribution of drafts and final reports, and separate privileged analysis from operational remediation documents that will be widely shared. Privilege is never guaranteed, and Canadian courts examine the dominant purpose of documents, so communications should be drafted on the assumption they may be disclosed.

Breach notification obligations

Modern ransomware attacks often involve data theft before encryption, so-called double extortion. If personal information was accessed or exfiltrated, privacy breach obligations apply whether or not a ransom is paid. Under the Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, organizations must report breaches creating a real risk of significant harm to the Commissioner, notify affected individuals and keep records of all breaches. Quebec, Alberta and health privacy laws impose their own requirements.

Paying does not eliminate the risk of harm. A threat actor's promise to delete stolen data cannot be verified, and regulators have generally not accepted payment as a reason to avoid notification. Organizations should not delay notification while negotiating, and should coordinate notices across every jurisdiction where affected individuals live; see our privacy and data protection page. See also our insight on breach notification.

Board approval of ransomware payments

Ransomware payments involve legal risk, significant funds, reputational consequences and potential disclosure obligations. Directors' duties of care call for an informed, documented decision process. The incident response plan should define who has authority to approve a payment and at what thresholds, when the board or a committee must be consulted, and what information decision-makers need. The record should show the options considered, including restoring from backups, the sanctions and legal analysis, insurer input, the likelihood that payment will achieve its objectives and the consequences of not paying.

Factors in deciding on ransomware payments

  • Whether systems can be restored from backups and how long it would take.
  • Risks to health, safety or critical services from continued disruption.
  • The threat actor's reputation for providing working decryptors or deleting data.
  • Legal risks, including sanctions exposure.
  • Insurance coverage and conditions.
  • The ethical concern that payments fund further crime and invite repeat attacks.
  • Stakeholder, customer and regulator expectations.

Negotiation and payment mechanics

Where payment is under consideration, negotiations are usually handled by specialist negotiators retained through counsel or the insurer. Negotiators can buy time for restoration, test the threat actor's claims by requesting proof of decryption or of the data held, and often reduce the amount demanded. The organization should decide in advance what information may be shared with the threat actor and avoid statements that could later be used against it.

Ransomware payments are almost always demanded in cryptocurrency. Acquiring and transferring it requires an intermediary, usually a regulated virtual currency dealer or the negotiator's payment facility, which will conduct its own know-your-client and sanctions checks. Wallet addresses supplied by the threat actor should be screened before payment, and the transaction should be recorded in full, including blockchain identifiers, so that the organization can answer later questions from insurers, auditors, regulators or law enforcement.

When a vendor is attacked

Many organizations experience ransomware indirectly, when a service provider that holds their data or runs their systems is attacked. The decision whether to pay usually rests with the vendor, but the customer may remain responsible for its own breach notifications and for protecting its customers. Contracts should require prompt notice of incidents, cooperation with investigations, information about any data exfiltration, and an explanation of any payment decision affecting the customer's data. Customers should also review whether their own systems or credentials were exposed through the vendor connection.

Public company disclosure

For reporting issuers, a ransomware incident can be a material change requiring timely disclosure, and cybersecurity risks are commonly addressed in continuous disclosure documents. Insider trading policies should be applied to those aware of the incident before it is public. Public statements about an incident and any payment must be accurate and consistent with what is said to regulators and in litigation. Communications to employees, customers and suppliers should be coordinated through a single approved channel, because inconsistent accounts of what happened, or whether a ransom was paid, are frequently quoted back in regulatory inquiries and class action pleadings.

After a payment

If a payment is made, the organization should keep complete records of the decision, the sanctions analysis, the transaction and the communications with the threat actor. Decryptors should be tested in isolated environments, and systems should be rebuilt with the security weaknesses remediated, since paying organizations are often targeted again. Ongoing dark web monitoring can help detect whether stolen data is leaked despite the threat actor's promises. A post-incident review should also capture lessons learned for the incident response plan and the ransom decision protocol.

Preparing before an attack

The best time to think about ransomware payments is before an incident. Organizations should include a ransom decision protocol in the incident response plan, pre-arrange counsel, forensic and negotiation support, confirm insurance terms, rehearse the decision in tabletop exercises with senior management and the board, and invest in offline backups that make payment less likely to be necessary. See our cybersecurity practice.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise organizations through ransomware incidents and the decisions around ransomware payments. Our work includes sanctions and legal risk analysis, coordination with insurers and incident response firms, privilege structures, breach notification, board advice and preparation of ransom decision protocols. Contact us to discuss incident readiness or an active matter.

Frequently asked questions

Is it illegal to pay a ransom in Canada?

Not as a general rule. It may be unlawful where the recipient is a sanctioned person or the funds would benefit terrorist activity, so screening and documentation are essential.

Do we have to report a ransomware attack to police?

There is no general legal obligation for private organizations, but the Cyber Centre recommends reporting to local police, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre and the Cyber Centre. Designated operators under the Critical Cyber Systems Protection Act will have reporting duties once it is in force.

Does paying avoid privacy breach notification?

No. If personal information was accessed or stolen, the real risk of significant harm assessment still applies, and promises by threat actors to delete data cannot be verified.

Will our cyber insurance cover the payment?

Possibly, but policies commonly require prompt notice, prior insurer consent, approved vendors and compliance with sanctions laws. Failing to meet conditions can jeopardize coverage.

Who should approve a ransom payment?

Authority should be set in the incident response plan, typically senior executives with board or committee involvement, supported by documented legal, sanctions and insurance analysis.

Sources

  1. Canadian Centre for Cyber Security: Ransomware playbook (ITSM.00.099)
  2. Special Economic Measures (Russia) Regulations, SOR/2014-58 (Justice Laws)
  3. Criminal Code, s. 83.03 (Justice Laws)
  4. Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act (Justice Laws)

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.