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Corporate & M&A

Special Committees in Canadian Conflict Transactions

Special committees of independent directors are how Canadian boards manage insider bids, going-private deals, management buyouts and related-party transactions. This guide covers when a committee is needed, independence, mandates, advisers and the process regulators expect under MI 61-101 and Staff Notice 61-302.

Special committees of independent directors meeting with advisers to review a conflict transaction

Key takeaways

  • MI 61-101 mandates an independent committee only for insider bids, but staff advise one for all material conflict transactions.
  • Independence turns on s. 7.1 of MI 61-101 and on practical relationships with the interested party.
  • Mandates should include power to negotiate, consider alternatives and hire independent advisers.
  • A fairness opinion does not replace the committee's own judgment; disclose adviser fee structures.
  • Form the committee early and keep a careful record of its process and reasons.

When special committees are needed

Special committees of independent directors are the main governance tool Canadian boards use when a transaction involves a conflict of interest: a controlling shareholder buying out the minority, an insider bid, a related-party asset sale or a management buyout. The committee isolates the decision from directors who are conflicted, negotiates (or supervises negotiation) on behalf of the corporation and its minority shareholders, and creates a record that the process was fair.

Special committees of independent directors meeting with advisers to review a conflict transaction
Special committees of independent directors negotiate conflict transactions and build the record regulators and courts will review.

Under Multilateral Instrument 61-101 Protection of Minority Security Holders in Special Transactions (MI 61-101), an independent committee is mandatory only for insider bids, where it must select the valuator, supervise the formal valuation and use its best efforts to have it delivered on time (s. 2.3(2)). But securities regulators expect more. In Multilateral CSA Staff Notice 61-302 (27 July 2017), staff in Ontario and Quebec said that while a special committee is mandated only for insider bids, they consider one advisable for all "material conflict of interest transactions", meaning insider bids, issuer bids, business combinations and related party transactions that raise substantive concerns for minority holders.

Common triggers for a special committee

TransactionWhy a committeeMI 61-101 features
Insider bidBidder is an insider with information advantagesIndependent committee mandatory; formal valuation unless exempt
Going-private business combinationControlling holder acquires the minorityFormal valuation if interested party acquires the issuer; minority approval
Management buyoutManagers are on both sides; access to informationCollateral benefits analysis; votes of management may be excluded
Related party transactionAsset purchase, sale or financing with a related partyValuation and minority approval unless exemptions apply, including the 25% of market capitalization exemptions
Contested situationsBoard members aligned with one sideCommittee manages process and communications

Outside securities law, corporate law reaches the same point. Directors owe their fiduciary duty to the corporation, and in BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69, the Supreme Court emphasized that directors must treat affected stakeholders fairly. Conflicted directors who participate in approving a transaction in which they have an interest expose the decision to an oppression claim and to disclosure and voting requirements under the governing statute. A properly constituted committee is the most practical way to show that the decision was made by people without a stake in the outcome.

Independence of committee members

Section 7.1 of MI 61-101 makes independence a question of fact but sets out situations in which a director is not independent, including where the director:

  • is an interested party in the transaction;
  • is, or was in the prior 12 months, an employee, associated entity or issuer insider of an interested party (other than solely as a director of the issuer);
  • is, or was in the prior 12 months, an adviser to an interested party in connection with the transaction;
  • has a material financial interest in an interested party; or
  • would reasonably be expected to receive a benefit from the transaction that is not available pro rata to other holders.

Committee members must not receive any payment or benefit contingent on completion of the transaction (s. 7.1(3)). Committee fees should be fixed, payable whatever the outcome. Boards should also look beyond the formal tests to personal and business relationships with the controlling shareholder, which regulators and courts may consider when assessing whether the committee was truly independent in practice.

Drafting the mandate of special committees

CSA staff have expressed concern about mandates that are narrowly drawn. In Staff Notice 61-302, they said they generally expect a mandate to allow the committee to:

  1. negotiate, or supervise the negotiation of, the proposed transaction, rather than simply review it;
  2. consider alternatives, including the status quo or other value-enhancing transactions;
  3. make a recommendation or, if it does not, give detailed reasons why not; and
  4. hire its own independent legal and financial advisers without involvement of interested parties.

Staff warned that a mandate limited to considering a proposal developed by management with a related party, or only to deciding whether to put a transaction to a vote, may raise concerns. Staff also quoted the Ontario Securities Commission's decision in Re Magna International Inc. (2011), 34 OSCB 1290, that negotiation is "a key aspect of the process" that the committee should conduct or oversee. The mandate should be adopted by board resolution early, before the material terms are settled, and should give the committee power to say no.

Practical point

Form the committee as soon as a credible conflict proposal emerges. Staff Notice 61-302 records occasions where committees were formed after a deal had been substantially negotiated, or acted passively. A committee convened late inherits terms it did not shape, which makes its later recommendation harder to defend.

Advisers, valuations and fairness opinions

A committee should retain its own legal counsel and, in most material transactions, its own financial adviser. Where MI 61-101 requires a formal valuation, the valuator must be independent of all interested parties, and for business combinations the board or an independent committee determines who the valuator will be and supervises the valuation (s. 4.3(3)). For insider bids, only the independent committee can do so.

Fairness opinions are not required by MI 61-101, but committees commonly obtain them. Staff Notice 61-302 cautions that a committee "cannot substitute the results of a fairness opinion for its own judgment" and expects disclosure of how the financial adviser is paid, including whether the fee is fixed, contingent on delivery of the opinion, or contingent on completion. Many committees now prefer a fixed-fee fairness opinion, or a second opinion from an adviser with no success fee, to address perceived conflicts.

The committee should also identify prior valuations of the issuer made in the 24 months before the circular, and bona fide prior offers received in the 24 months before the transaction was agreed, both of which MI 61-101 requires to be disclosed for business combinations, and consider earlier financial work product prepared for the interested party or for management.

Running a defensible process

Staff Notice 61-302 lists indicia of a well-run process: a robust mandate, independent advisers, supervision or direct conduct of negotiations, accurate record keeping, and non-coercive conduct by interested parties. In practice, special committees should:

  • meet frequently, often without management present, and keep minutes that record the information considered, the alternatives discussed and the reasons for decisions;
  • control the flow of confidential information to the interested party and to any financing sources;
  • test price and terms through counter-proposals, rather than accepting the first offer;
  • consider whether a majority-of-the-minority vote condition should be required even where an exemption is available;
  • evaluate collateral benefits to management and, where relevant, make the 5% determination that can take a benefit outside the definition of "collateral benefit" for business combinations; and
  • prepare the disclosure document with care, because staff review the description of the committee's process and reasoning closely.

Illustration (hypothetical): A 60% shareholder of a TSX-listed company proposes to acquire the remaining shares at a 20% premium. The board forms a three-member committee the next day, adopts a mandate that includes power to consider alternatives and reject the proposal, and retains independent counsel and a valuator. After two counter-proposals the price rises, a majority-of-the-minority condition is included, and the circular explains each step. If a minority holder later complains to a securities commission or a court, that record is the company's best evidence.

Management buyouts and private equity sponsors

Management buyouts present a distinctive conflict. Senior managers have the best information about the business, influence over forecasts and data room content, and a personal interest in buying at a low price. When they partner with a private equity sponsor, they may also negotiate rollover equity, new employment terms and incentive plans with the buyer while still running the company for the sellers.

Special committees in management buyouts typically address these risks by:

  • requiring management to seek committee approval before discussing equity or employment terms with any bidder;
  • controlling the forecasts used by advisers and bidders, and confirming that the same projections are given to all participants;
  • considering whether to run a market check, either before signing or through a go-shop, so that the management-backed bid is tested;
  • analysing whether management's rollover and new arrangements are collateral benefits, which may require their votes to be excluded from minority approval; and
  • ensuring management cooperates with competing bidders on equal terms.

Where management will hold a meaningful stake in the acquirer, managers may become interested parties or joint actors, with consequences for the formal valuation requirement and for the votes counted toward minority approval. Those questions should be analysed before the terms are agreed, not when the circular is being drafted.

What the circular must show

MI 61-101 requires enhanced disclosure for business combinations, including a description of the background to the transaction, any formal valuation or a summary of it, prior valuations and bona fide prior offers, and the review and approval process adopted by the board and any special committee, including any materially contrary view or abstention by a director. Staff Notice 61-302 adds that staff expect disclosure of the committee's reasoning and analysis, not just a list of meetings.

Committees should treat the circular as the public account of their work. A well-drafted background section explains when the committee was formed, what it was asked to do, which alternatives it considered, how the price and terms changed through negotiation, and why it recommends the transaction. Generic statements that the committee "carefully considered" the deal carry little weight with regulators or courts.

Special committees in contested and evolving transactions

Staff consider that special committees play a particularly important role when a conflict transaction becomes contested, for example when a competing proposal emerges or minority holders campaign against the deal. The committee should evaluate competing proposals on their merits, ensure that the interested party does not receive preferential information, and avoid tactics that would coerce minority holders.

Committees should also revisit their recommendation if circumstances change before the meeting, such as a material change in the issuer's business or a significant move in market prices. Where a committee changes its view, its process for reaching the new decision should be as rigorous and well documented as the original one.

Finally, committees should remember that MI 61-101 supplements, and does not replace, corporate law duties and remedies. Compliance with the instrument does not immunize a transaction from an oppression application, and a well-run committee process will usually help in both forums.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise special committees and independent directors on Canadian conflict transactions: drafting mandates, assessing independence, selecting advisers and valuators, structuring negotiations and minority approval, and reviewing the disclosure that regulators will scrutinize. We also advise interested parties on designing a process that will withstand challenge, and work with Canadian counsel where a provincial licence is required. See also our pages on corporate governance and boards and public M&A and take-over bids, and our insights on going-private transactions and deal protection. To discuss a mandate, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

Is a special committee legally required?

MI 61-101 requires an independent committee only for insider bids, where it must select and supervise the formal valuator. However, CSA Staff Notice 61-302 states that staff consider a special committee advisable for all material conflict of interest transactions, and corporate law duties point the same way.

Can committee members be paid a success fee?

No. Under s. 7.1(3) of MI 61-101, members of an independent committee must not receive any payment or other benefit that is contingent on completion of the transaction. Committee fees should be fixed and payable regardless of the outcome.

Does the committee need its own financial adviser?

Usually yes for material transactions. Where a formal valuation is required, the valuator must be independent of interested parties. Fairness opinions are not required by MI 61-101, but staff expect committees to review them critically and to disclose how the adviser is paid, including any contingent fee.

What should the committee's minutes show?

Minutes should record the information the committee received, the alternatives it considered, its negotiations and counter-proposals, the advice it obtained and the reasons for its decisions. Regulators review the disclosure of the committee's process, and courts may examine the record if the transaction is challenged.

Sources

  1. Multilateral Instrument 61-101 (OSC unofficial consolidation)
  2. Multilateral CSA Staff Notice 61-302 (27 July 2017)
  3. BCE Inc. v. 1976 Debentureholders, 2008 SCC 69

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.