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Corporate & M&A

Unanimous Shareholder Agreements: Drafting Essentials

Unanimous shareholder agreements under s. 146 CBCA can restrict directors' powers, shift directors' liabilities to shareholders and bind every future holder. This guide explains how they differ from ordinary shareholders' agreements and how to draft reserved matters, ROFRs, tag and drag rights, shotguns, deadlock and valuation provisions.

Founders and investors signing unanimous shareholder agreements for a Canadian private company

Key takeaways

  • A USA among all shareholders can validly restrict the board's powers under s. 146(1) CBCA.
  • Shareholders who take over board powers assume directors' duties and liabilities (s. 146(5)).
  • Transferees are deemed parties; unnotified transferees may rescind within 30 days.
  • Quebec requires disclosure of a USA to the enterprise registrar and ends it on becoming a reporting issuer.
  • Exit clauses, deadlock and valuation formulas deserve as much care as governance.

What unanimous shareholder agreements can do

Unanimous shareholder agreements are a distinctively Canadian tool. Under s. 146(1) of the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA), an otherwise lawful written agreement among all the shareholders of a corporation (or among all of them and one or more non-shareholders) that restricts, in whole or in part, the powers of the directors to manage or supervise the management of the business and affairs of the corporation is valid. Ontario, Quebec and most other provinces have equivalent provisions. An ordinary shareholders' agreement binds only its parties as a contract; a unanimous shareholder agreement (USA) becomes part of the corporation's constitution.

Founders and investors signing unanimous shareholder agreements for a Canadian private company
Unanimous shareholder agreements can move board powers to shareholders and bind every future holder of the corporation's shares.

That status has three practical consequences. First, a USA can take decisions away from the board and give them to shareholders. Second, it binds future shareholders automatically. Third, it shifts directors' duties and liabilities to the shareholders who assume the directors' powers. These features make unanimous shareholder agreements the default governance document for closely held Canadian companies, joint ventures and venture-backed start-ups.

Unanimous shareholder agreements versus ordinary shareholders' agreements

FeatureUnanimous shareholder agreementOrdinary shareholders' agreement
PartiesAll shareholders (plus any non-shareholders)Some or all shareholders
Restricting directors' powersValid under s. 146(1) CBCADirectors cannot fetter their discretion by contract
Binding on transfereesYes, deemed party (s. 146(3) CBCA)Only if the transferee signs a joinder
Directors' liabilityShifts to shareholders who assume powers (s. 146(5))No shift
Corporate recordsCopy kept with articles and by-laws (s. 20(1)(a))Not a corporate record
Oppression remedyBreach may support oppression; court may amend the USAContract claims; may inform reasonable expectations

Many groups combine the two: a USA that restricts directors' powers on reserved matters, plus contractual provisions that bind only certain holders, such as investor rights or management lock-ups. Drafters should make clear which provisions are intended to operate as part of the USA and which are purely contractual.

Restricting directors' powers and shifting liability

The typical USA lists "reserved matters" that require shareholder approval, often by a special majority or by each significant holder: issuing shares, borrowing above a threshold, approving the annual budget, acquisitions and disposals, related-party transactions, changes to the business, appointment of key officers, dividends and any amalgamation, arrangement or winding-up. Some USAs go further and remove all powers from the board, leaving the shareholders to manage directly.

Under s. 146(5) CBCA, to the extent a USA restricts the directors' powers, the shareholders who are given those powers have all the rights, powers, duties and liabilities of a director, including any defences available to directors, and the directors are relieved of their rights, powers, duties and liabilities to the same extent. Shareholders who hold veto rights over, for example, the budget or borrowing may therefore become exposed to statutory director liabilities associated with those decisions. Investors should weigh the value of each veto against that exposure, and D&O insurance should be reviewed to confirm it covers shareholders acting as directors under a USA.

The Quebec Business Corporations Act takes a similar approach in ss. 213 and 214, with three notable differences: all shareholders "whether or not their shares carry voting rights" must agree; the corporation must declare the existence of a USA that restricts directors' powers to the enterprise registrar under s. 215; and a USA terminates when the corporation becomes a reporting issuer (s. 219).

Binding transferees and joinders

Under s. 146(3) CBCA, a purchaser or transferee of shares subject to a USA is deemed to be a party to it. The Ontario Business Corporations Act (OBCA) has a similar rule in s. 108(4), and Quebec in s. 218. The CBCA protects transferees who were not told: under s. 146(4), if notice of the USA was not given, the transferee may rescind the transaction within 30 days after becoming aware of the agreement. Share certificates should therefore carry a legend referring to the USA, and the corporation should require a joinder as a condition of registering any transfer.

Practical point

Add the USA to the corporate records and legend every certificate. A USA that no one can find, or that new shareholders never saw, invites rescission claims under s. 146(4) and arguments about whether it still binds the current shareholder group.

Drafting transfer and exit provisions

Most unanimous shareholder agreements spend more words on transfers and exits than on governance. Key provisions include:

  • Right of first refusal (ROFR) or first offer (ROFO). A selling holder must first offer shares to the others, either on the terms of a third-party offer (ROFR) or before seeking one (ROFO). Define the notice periods, the treatment of non-cash consideration and what happens if only some holders exercise.
  • Tag-along rights. Minority holders may sell on the same terms when a majority holder sells. Specify whether tags are pro rata and whether they apply to partial sales.
  • Drag-along rights. A majority (often a specified percentage, sometimes with a minimum price or an investor consent) can compel the others to sell. Address representations and indemnities the dragged holders must give, which should be several and capped.
  • Shotgun (buy-sell) clauses. One holder names a price at which it will buy or sell; the other must choose. Shotguns work best between two holders of similar financial capacity; they can be oppressive where one side cannot fund a purchase.
  • Put and call options on death, disability, insolvency, termination of employment or breach, with valuation and payment terms.
  • Pre-emptive rights on new issuances, with carve-outs for employee equity plans.

Deadlock and valuation formulas

Deadlock clauses matter most in 50/50 companies and joint ventures. A practical sequence escalates a deadlocked matter from the board to senior executives, then to mediation, and finally to an exit mechanism (shotgun, auction or put/call). For operational matters, a casting vote, an independent director or expert determination may be more proportionate than an exit.

Valuation formulas determine what holders receive on puts, calls and forced transfers. Options include fair market value determined by an independent valuator, a formula (a multiple of EBITDA or book value), or a fixed price updated annually. Drafters should specify whether minority and illiquidity discounts apply, the valuation date, and how disputes are resolved. Fair market value "without discount" is common for departing founders; "good leaver/bad leaver" provisions may apply a discount to holders terminated for cause.

Illustration (hypothetical): Two founders each hold 40% of a CBCA corporation and an investor holds 20%. The USA requires investor consent to any borrowing over CAD 2 million. When the founders disagree on a new facility, the investor's veto decides the matter, and because the USA gave the investor that power, the investor assumes the related director duties for that decision under s. 146(5). Careful drafting would have limited the veto to approval of the annual budget rather than individual borrowings.

Unanimous shareholder agreements in venture and joint venture companies

The structure of a USA should follow the business relationship it governs. In a venture-backed start-up, the agreement typically sits alongside the investors' preferred share terms in the articles. The USA deals with board composition (often founder, investor and independent seats), protective provisions requiring investor consent, information rights, pre-emptive rights, ROFRs and co-sale rights, and a drag-along tied to an approved sale. Because new investors join in each financing round, the agreement is usually amended and restated each time, and every option holder who exercises must sign a joinder.

In a corporate joint venture, by contrast, the parties are often two or three companies with strategic interests that may diverge. The USA will focus on reserved matters, funding obligations and the consequences of failing to fund, deadlock resolution, non-competition among the partners, transfer restrictions designed to keep competitors out, and exit on change of control of a partner. Competition law constraints on information sharing between partners that compete outside the venture also need attention.

Family companies sit somewhere in between. Their agreements often address employment of family members, dividend policy, buy-sell funding on death through life insurance, and how shares may be transferred to the next generation or to family trusts.

Common drafting mistakes

  • Not all shareholders sign. A holder of non-voting shares, a family trust or a departing employee is left out, and the agreement loses its unanimous status under the CBCA.
  • Inconsistent articles. Share conditions in the articles contradict transfer restrictions or approval thresholds in the agreement, creating uncertainty about which prevails.
  • Vetoes without thought for liability. Investors take broad consent rights over operational decisions, assuming directors' duties they did not intend to assume.
  • Undefined valuation. Put and call options refer to "fair value" without saying how it is determined, by whom, and whether discounts apply.
  • No dispute mechanism. The agreement does not say whether disputes go to arbitration or court, or whether interim relief is available while a deadlock persists.
  • No review after changes. The agreement is not updated after a financing, a share reorganization or an estate freeze, so its terms no longer match the capital structure.

Maintaining and amending unanimous shareholder agreements

A USA must remain unanimous. Every new shareholder, including employees exercising options, must be bound, either through the deeming rule or a joinder. Amendments generally require the consent specified in the agreement; where it says nothing, all parties must agree. Corporate counsel should review the USA whenever the share structure changes, the company raises capital or a holder exits, and should confirm that the articles and by-laws are consistent with it.

Dispute resolution provisions deserve attention at the same time. Many unanimous shareholder agreements send disputes to confidential arbitration, which suits family and joint venture relationships, but the clause should preserve access to the courts for urgent interim relief and should address whether oppression-type claims are arbitrable under the agreement. A short negotiation or mediation step before formal proceedings often resolves disputes that arise from misunderstanding rather than genuine conflict.

The oppression remedy applies to USAs too. Courts may enforce a USA, and in an oppression case may order its amendment or set aside a transaction made in breach of it. Holders should not treat a well-drafted USA as a complete code: the reasonable expectations of the parties, shaped by the agreement and by how the business has actually been run, will matter if a dispute reaches court.

How TRW & Co helps

We draft and negotiate unanimous shareholder agreements and shareholders' agreements for founders, family businesses, joint venture partners and investors in CBCA, OBCA, Quebec and other provincial corporations. We design reserved matters with an eye to liability shifting, draft ROFRs, tag and drag rights, shotgun and deadlock provisions and valuation formulas, and advise on disputes when relationships break down, working with Canadian counsel where a provincial licence is required. See also corporate governance and venture capital, and our insights on minority investor protections and the oppression remedy. To discuss an agreement, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

What makes a shareholders' agreement unanimous?

It must be a written agreement among all the shareholders (and possibly non-shareholders) that restricts, in whole or in part, the directors' powers to manage or supervise the business and affairs. If even one shareholder is not a party, the agreement operates only as a contract and cannot validly fetter the board.

Do new shareholders have to sign the USA?

Under the CBCA and OBCA, transferees are deemed parties, so they are bound even without signing. Best practice is still to require a joinder and legend the share certificates, because a transferee who was not told of the USA may rescind within 30 days under s. 146(4) CBCA.

Can a USA make shareholders liable as directors?

Yes. To the extent the USA transfers directors' powers to shareholders, those shareholders take on the directors' rights, duties and liabilities, including defences, and the directors are relieved to the same extent. Investors should limit vetoes to what they really need.

Are shotgun clauses enforceable in Canada?

Generally yes, as negotiated exit mechanisms. They work best between parties of similar financial means. Where one party cannot realistically fund a purchase, or the clause is triggered in bad faith, the outcome may be challenged, including through the oppression remedy.

Sources

  1. Canada Business Corporations Act, ss. 20, 146
  2. Business Corporations Act (Ontario), s. 108
  3. Business Corporations Act (Quebec), ss. 213-219

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.