Bid-Rigging in Public Procurement
Bid-rigging is a per se crime in Canada carrying up to 14 years in prison, and public procurement is where the Competition Bureau looks hardest. This note explains the s. 47 offence, why disclosure to the tendering authority matters, how to structure joint bids and subcontracts, and the debarment and civil recovery risks that follow a conviction.

Key takeaways
- Section 47 makes undisclosed bid suppression and coordinated bids an indictable offence.
- Penalties: a fine in the court’s discretion, up to 14 years’ imprisonment, or both.
- Disclosure to the tendering authority at or before submission takes conduct outside s. 47.
- Joint bids should be disclosed in writing; they may still be reviewed under ss. 45 or 90.1.
- Charges or convictions can trigger federal ineligibility under the integrity regime.
- Public bodies can sue under s. 36 within two years of the conduct or criminal disposition.
Bid-rigging: the short answer
Bid-rigging is one of the most serious crimes in Canadian competition law. Under s. 47 of the Competition Act, it is an indictable offence for bidders to agree that one or more of them will not bid, will withdraw a bid, or will submit bids arrived at by agreement, unless the agreement is disclosed to the person calling for tenders at or before the time the bid is submitted. The penalty is a fine in the court's discretion, imprisonment of up to 14 years, or both. No proof of harm to competition is required. Conviction can also bar a company from federal contracts and expose it to damages claims by the public bodies it overcharged.

Public procurement is particularly exposed. Infrastructure, construction, defence, IT services and health-care supplies involve repeated tenders, a small pool of qualified bidders and procurement officials who rely on bids being independent. The Competition Bureau treats procurement collusion as an enforcement priority and works with federal, provincial and municipal buyers to detect it. With federal, provincial and municipal infrastructure spending and buy-Canadian procurement policies expanding in 2026, the number of contracts at stake, and the risk, is growing.
The section 47 offence
Section 47(1) defines bid-rigging in two limbs:
- Bid suppression or withdrawal: an agreement or arrangement between two or more persons under which one or more of them agrees not to submit a bid, or to withdraw a bid, in response to a call for bids or tenders.
- Coordinated bids: the submission of bids arrived at by agreement or arrangement between or among two or more bidders.
In both cases the conduct is bid-rigging only if the agreement "is not made known to the person calling for or requesting the bids or tenders at or before the time when any bid or tender is submitted or withdrawn". That disclosure element is the heart of the offence. Agreements that are fully disclosed to the tendering authority fall outside s. 47, although they may still be reviewed under other provisions.
The offence is per se. The Crown does not need to prove that the agreement lessened competition, raised prices or harmed the buyer. It need only prove the agreement, the bid or withdrawal, and the absence of timely disclosure. Two exceptions apply: agreements solely among affiliates (s. 47(3)(a)), and certain authorized transportation arrangements under the Canada Transportation Act (s. 47(3)(b)).
| Conduct | Risk under s. 47 | Comment |
|---|---|---|
| Competitors agree who will "win" and others submit cover bids | Bid-rigging | Classic cover bidding; no disclosure possible in practice |
| A competitor agrees not to bid in exchange for a subcontract | Bid-rigging | Undisclosed bid suppression, even if the subcontract is real work |
| Bid rotation across a series of municipal tenders | Bid-rigging | Often detected through patterns in public tender data |
| Two firms submit a joint bid as a disclosed consortium | Not s. 47 if disclosed at or before submission | May still be reviewed under s. 45 or s. 90.1 depending on the facts |
| A bidder lines up a subcontractor that did not intend to bid | Usually low | Disclose the subcontract where the tender requires it |
| Affiliated companies coordinate their bids | Excluded (s. 47(3)(a)) | The tender terms may still prohibit related-party bids |
Joint bids and subcontracting
Legitimate cooperation between bidders is common. Smaller firms may need to combine capacity to qualify for a large project, and specialist subcontractors often price work for several general contractors. The question is how to cooperate without crossing into bid-rigging.
The safest approach is transparency. Where two or more potential competitors decide to bid together, the consortium or joint venture should be disclosed in the bid, in writing, before the deadline, and ideally confirmed with the procurement authority. The disclosure should identify the parties and the nature of the arrangement. Communication should be limited to what the joint bid needs, and competitively sensitive information about other tenders should be ring-fenced.
Disclosure removes the s. 47 offence but does not immunize the arrangement entirely. An agreement between competitors to fix prices or allocate markets may engage the per se conspiracy offence in s. 45, and other collaborations that substantially lessen competition can be challenged civilly under s. 90.1. The Bureau's Competitor Collaboration Guidelines discuss how it assesses joint bidding. Our note on information sharing between competitors covers the boundaries.
Many procurement documents require bidders to sign a certificate of independent bid determination confirming that the price was arrived at independently and that any arrangements with other bidders have been disclosed. Treat that certificate as a legal statement, not a formality. A false certificate is evidence of non-disclosure and can support fraud or misrepresentation claims in addition to the s. 47 offence. Keep a dated record of the analysis, the documents relied on and who approved each decision, so that the reasoning can be explained later if questions arise.
Consequences of bid-rigging
Criminal prosecution and immunity
Bid-rigging is prosecuted by the Public Prosecution Service of Canada on referral from the Competition Bureau. Investigations often begin with an immunity application, a complaint from a procurement official, a whistleblower, or analysis of tender data. The Bureau's Immunity and Leniency Programs (bulletin dated 19 June 2024) offer immunity to the first party to disclose an offence the Bureau is unaware of, or to come forward before the Bureau has enough evidence to refer the matter for prosecution, subject to full cooperation. Later applicants can earn a leniency cooperation credit of up to 50%, and qualifying current employees can be covered by the company's application. Individuals, including employees and officers, can be prosecuted personally. See our cartels and criminal enforcement page.
Sentencing and personal exposure
Because the fine for a s. 47 conviction is in the court's discretion, there is no statutory cap. Sentencing courts look at the volume of commerce affected, the duration of the agreement, the role of each participant, cooperation and prior convictions. Plea agreements negotiated with the prosecution after cooperation with the Bureau are the most common outcome. Individuals face imprisonment, conditional sentences and, in practice, the loss of their careers in regulated industries. Companies should also expect that a guilty plea will be public, which feeds directly into debarment decisions, lender and bonding-company reviews, and civil claims.
Directors and senior managers who did not take part can still face consequences. Shareholders may question oversight, insurers may dispute coverage for fines and defence costs, and procurement authorities increasingly ask about compliance programmes and leadership changes when deciding whether to keep contracting with a supplier. Early, documented remedial steps matter as much as the legal defence.
Federal integrity regime
The Government of Canada's Ineligibility and Suspension Policy, administered by Public Services and Procurement Canada's Office of Supplier Integrity and Compliance, allows the Registrar to declare suppliers ineligible or suspended on the basis of charges or convictions for listed offences, which include Competition Act offences such as bid-rigging. The policy is built into federal solicitations and contracts. Where the Registrar considers additional caution warranted, an administrative agreement imposing compliance conditions may be used to reduce the risk of contracting with the supplier. Many provinces and municipalities have their own debarment or vendor-performance rules.
Civil recovery by public bodies
Section 36 gives any person who suffered loss because of conduct contrary to Part VI, including bid-rigging, a statutory right to recover the loss proved plus investigation and litigation costs. A criminal conviction is proof of the conduct in the civil action unless there is evidence to the contrary (s. 36(2)). The limitation period is two years from the conduct or from the final disposition of related criminal proceedings, whichever is later (s. 36(4)). Public bodies may also sue in fraud, conspiracy or unjust enrichment, and Quebec adopted specific legislation after the Charbonneau Commission to recover amounts paid as a result of fraud in public contracts. Our note on competition class actions explains s. 36 claims.
Red flags of bid-rigging in public procurement
The Bureau trains procurement officials to look for patterns. The same signals should concern bidders' compliance teams:
- The same companies take turns winning, or each wins in a particular region or with a particular buyer.
- Losing bids are identical, contain the same errors, or are priced well above any plausible cost.
- A regular bidder unexpectedly withdraws or does not bid, then appears as a subcontractor to the winner.
- Bids are submitted from the same email address or IP address, or with the same formatting and calculations.
- Employees discuss upcoming tenders with competitors at industry events, or refer to "our turn" or "covering" a bid.
- Prices fall sharply when a new bidder enters a market.
Bid-rigging compliance for bidders
A credible compliance programme is the best protection against bid-rigging and, if something goes wrong, supports an immunity or leniency strategy and mitigation before the integrity regime. Core elements include:
- Clear policy. No discussion of bidding intentions, prices, margins or tender strategy with competitors, except within a disclosed joint bid and through counsel-approved channels.
- Approval process for joint bids and teaming. Legal review before any consortium or teaming agreement, with written disclosure to the buyer.
- Subcontracting controls. Document why each subcontractor was selected and confirm it was not a potential competitor induced not to bid.
- Training. Annual training for estimators, sales and business development staff, with practical examples from the sectors in which they bid.
- Monitoring and reporting. Periodic review of win-loss patterns and a confidential reporting line. See our note on whistleblower programs.
- Response plan. A protocol for search warrants and an escalation path to assess immunity quickly. See responding to search warrants.
Illustration: two hypothetical engineering firms each lack the capacity to bid alone on a provincial bridge contract. They form a joint venture, disclose it in their bid with a description of each party's role, limit information exchange to the project, and keep their separate bids on unrelated municipal work fully independent. That structure is lawful. If instead one firm had agreed not to bid in return for a subcontract from the other, without telling the province, both firms and the individuals involved would face bid-rigging charges.
How TRW & Co helps
We advise bidders, contractors and suppliers on bid-rigging risk in public and private procurement. We review joint bids, teaming and subcontracting arrangements before submission, draft disclosure language and certificates, build training and compliance programmes for estimating and sales teams, and lead privileged internal investigations when red flags appear. If the Competition Bureau opens an investigation, we advise on immunity and leniency strategy, coordinate with Canadian criminal counsel, and address integrity regime and civil recovery exposure. We work with our infrastructure and procurement team on project-specific issues. This note is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a tender, contact us.
Frequently asked questions
Is a joint bid with a competitor illegal in Canada?
Not if it is disclosed. Section 47 only applies where the agreement is not made known to the person calling for tenders at or before submission. A consortium or joint venture disclosed in writing in the bid falls outside the bid-rigging offence, though the arrangement may still be reviewed under the conspiracy or civil competitor collaboration provisions.
Does the Crown have to prove the buyer was overcharged?
No. Bid-rigging is a per se offence. The prosecution must prove the agreement, the resulting bid or withdrawal and the lack of timely disclosure, but not any effect on price or competition. Overcharge is relevant to sentencing and to civil damages, not to guilt.
Can a company be barred from federal contracts for bid-rigging?
Yes. The federal Ineligibility and Suspension Policy allows the Registrar to declare suppliers ineligible or suspended based on charges or convictions for listed offences, including Competition Act offences. An administrative agreement with compliance conditions may be used where the Registrar considers additional caution is required.
How long does a public body have to sue for bid-rigging losses?
Under s. 36(4) of the Competition Act, an action must be brought within two years of the day the conduct was engaged in or the day related criminal proceedings were finally disposed of, whichever is later. Claims in fraud or conspiracy may be subject to provincial limitation periods.
Sources
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.


