Skip to content
Competition & Foreign Investment

Digital Platforms and Competition Law in Canada

Canada addresses digital platforms competition through its general Competition Act rather than a dedicated digital markets law. Since 2023, abuse of dominance can be proved by effects alone, penalties can reach 3% of worldwide revenues and private parties can seek Tribunal leave. This note explains the theories, the penalties and practical compliance.

Online marketplace interface illustrating digital platforms competition issues in Canada

Key takeaways

  • Section 79 now allows orders based on substantial anti-competitive effects, not only anti-competitive acts.
  • The superior competitive performance defence is central to self-preferencing cases.
  • Network effects, entrenchment and privacy are express factors in merger review.
  • Abuse of dominance AMPs reach the greater of CAD 25M and 3x benefit or 3% of worldwide revenues.
  • Private parties can seek leave to bring abuse of dominance applications since June 2025.

How Canadian law approaches digital platforms competition

Canada does not have a dedicated digital markets regulation like the European Union's. Digital platforms competition issues are handled under the general provisions of the Competition Act, principally abuse of dominance in s. 79, the civil and criminal agreement provisions, the merger provisions and the deceptive marketing rules. What has changed is the strength of those tools. Amendments in 2022, 2023 and 2024 broadened the abuse of dominance test, raised penalties to levels that matter for the largest technology companies, added factors that reflect platform economics such as network effects and data, and opened the Competition Tribunal to private applicants.

Online marketplace interface illustrating digital platforms competition issues in Canada
Digital platforms competition issues in Canada are handled under the general abuse of dominance, merger and agreement provisions, now with higher penalties and private access.

The result is that digital platforms competition risk in Canada is now driven by a general law with much sharper teeth. Platforms cannot rely on the absence of sector-specific rules, and business users have new ways to challenge conduct they consider exclusionary. Both sides need to understand how the general provisions now operate in platform markets.

This note explains the abuse of dominance framework as it applies to online platforms and ad tech, theories such as self-preferencing and data as a barrier to entry, the role of the merger provisions in acquisitions of nascent rivals, the penalties and private access regime, and practical compliance steps for platforms and the businesses that depend on them.

The abuse of dominance framework after 2023

Section 79(1) now gives the Tribunal two routes to an order against a person or persons who substantially or completely control a class or species of business. The first is the traditional route: a practice of anti-competitive acts. The second, added by the 2023 amendments, allows an order where conduct has had, is having or is likely to have the effect of preventing or lessening competition substantially in a market in which the dominant firm has a plausible competitive interest, unless the effect results from superior competitive performance. According to the Bureau's guide to the December 2023 amendments, an anti-competitive act must be intended to have a predatory, exclusionary or disciplinary negative effect on a competitor, or to have an adverse effect on competition.

For platforms, this matters because many platform practices affect competition in adjacent markets where the platform also competes: a marketplace that also sells its own products, an app store that also distributes its own apps, an ad tech stack that operates on both buy and sell sides. The "plausible competitive interest" language allows the Tribunal to consider effects in markets where the platform is not yet a major player but has an interest in the outcome.

Platform practicePossible theory under the ActKey questions
Self-preferencing in rankings or searchAnti-competitive act; SLPC in adjacent market (s. 79)Dominance; effect on rivals; justification
Restrictive terms for business users (parity clauses, exclusivity)Abuse of dominance; exclusive dealing (s. 77)Foreclosure; duration; coverage
Tying or bundling servicesTied selling (s. 77); abuse of dominanceSeparate products; coercion; effects
Refusing access to data or interfacesRefusal to deal (s. 75); abuse of dominanceEssential input; substantial effect on part of a business
Acquisitions of nascent competitorsMerger review (s. 92); non-notified merger lookbackPotential competition; entrenchment; network effects
Misleading claims about prices, rankings or reviewsDeceptive marketing (ss. 52, 74.01)General impression; disclosure

Self-preferencing, data and network effects

Self-preferencing, where a platform favours its own products or services over those of business users that depend on it, is the theory most associated with digital platforms competition cases internationally. Under the Canadian framework, self-preferencing can be an anti-competitive act if it is intended to exclude rivals or harm competition, or it can be challenged under the effects-based route if it substantially lessens competition in a market where the platform has a plausible competitive interest. The defence that the effect results from "superior competitive performance" will be central: a platform that ranks its own product higher because it is genuinely better is in a different position from one that does so regardless of quality.

Data and network effects are now expressly relevant. In merger review, s. 93 lists network effects, the entrenchment of leading incumbents, and effects on non-price competition including consumer privacy as factors the Tribunal may consider. In abuse of dominance cases, s. 79 includes factors such as the effect of the conduct on barriers to entry, including network effects, and on non-price competition. Control over large data sets can make it harder for new entrants to compete, and conduct that preserves or extends that advantage can be part of a theory of harm.

Ad tech, marketplaces and app distribution

Online advertising technology, e-commerce marketplaces and app distribution are the areas where platform conduct most often raises questions in Canada and abroad. In ad tech, concerns include a single company operating tools on both sides of the market and the exchange in between, with the ability to favour its own tools or use information from one side to benefit the other.

In marketplaces, concerns include fees, parity clauses that prevent sellers from offering lower prices elsewhere, the use of seller data and the treatment of first-party products. In app distribution, concerns include payment system requirements and restrictions on steering users to alternative purchase channels. Each requires careful market definition and evidence, and outcomes in other jurisdictions do not automatically transfer to Canada. Canadian markets may be defined differently, Canadian users may have different alternatives, and the Tribunal will decide on the Canadian evidence, so global platforms should not assume that a commitment given elsewhere resolves Canadian exposure.

Penalties and private access raise the stakes

Penalties for abuse of dominance now reach the greater of CAD 25 million (CAD 35 million for subsequent orders) and three times the value of the benefit derived from the conduct, or, if that cannot be reasonably determined, 3% of the person's annual worldwide gross revenues (s. 79(3.1)). For a global platform, 3% of worldwide revenues is a very large number.

Since the June 2024 amendments came into force for private access on 20 June 2025, private parties can also seek leave from the Tribunal to bring abuse of dominance applications under s. 103.1, on the basis that they are directly and substantially affected in the whole or part of their business or that leave is in the public interest, as the Bureau's guide to the June 2024 amendments explains. The Tribunal can order payments to affected persons up to the value of the benefit derived from the conduct.

Practical point

Platforms with a significant Canadian presence should document the business and consumer-benefit rationale for ranking, access and fee decisions that affect rivals that also depend on the platform. Under the effects-based test, the ability to show superior competitive performance, supported by contemporaneous evidence, is the most important defence.

Digital platforms competition and consumer-facing rules

Platform conduct often raises consumer protection issues alongside competition concerns, and the Competition Act covers both. The deceptive marketing provisions apply to representations about prices, rankings, sponsored placements and reviews. Drip pricing, where mandatory fees are added late in the purchase process, is expressly deemed misleading in s. 74.01(1.1) and s. 52(1.3), unless the fees are imposed by government. Representations that a product is "most popular" or "top rated" need to reflect how rankings are actually generated, and paid placements must be disclosed clearly. The penalties for corporations that engage in deceptive marketing reach the greater of CAD 10 million (CAD 15 million for subsequent orders) and three times the benefit, or 3% of worldwide revenues.

Privacy law intersects too. The federal private-sector privacy regime and Quebec's Law 25 regulate how platforms collect and use personal information, and the competition factors in s. 93 now refer expressly to consumer privacy as a dimension of non-price competition. A platform that degrades privacy terms after achieving dominance, or uses data collected for one service to entrench another, may therefore face questions under both bodies of law. Coordinating competition, consumer protection and privacy compliance is increasingly part of the same governance exercise for large platforms operating in Canada.

Strategy for business users and complainants

For businesses that depend on a platform, the amendments create new options. A business affected by platform conduct can complain to the Bureau, which may open an inquiry, or seek leave to apply directly to the Tribunal. Before choosing, a business should gather evidence of the conduct and its effects on the business: changes in rankings, fees or access, lost sales, and communications with the platform.

Private applicants bear cost risk and must meet the leave test, but they control their own case and can seek monetary relief. Many complainants pursue both routes, recognizing that the Commissioner may decide not to act, and that the Tribunal cannot consider a leave application on a matter that is already under the Commissioner's inquiry or that the Commissioner has settled. Digital platforms competition disputes are likely to be among the first areas where the new private access regime is tested.

Mergers and acquisitions of nascent rivals

Acquisitions of start-ups by large platforms are a recurring concern because they may remove future competitors before they become significant. Many such deals fall below the notification thresholds. The Commissioner can review non-notified mergers for three years after closing, and the structural presumptions and new s. 93 factors give the Bureau more tools. For digital platforms competition analysis, the key questions are whether the target was a likely future competitor, whether the acquisition entrenches the platform's position, and whether network effects or data access make the effect durable. See our notes on non-notifiable mergers and algorithmic pricing.

Compliance for platforms and business users

  1. Assess whether the business could be considered dominant in any Canadian market, including narrow segments.
  2. Review self-preferencing, ranking and access policies for consistency and a clearly documented justification.
  3. Review contractual terms with business users for exclusivity, parity, data use and tying effects.
  4. Screen acquisitions of smaller rivals and nascent competitors, even below the notification thresholds.
  5. Review consumer-facing claims about prices, rankings and reviews under the deceptive marketing rules.
  6. For business users, keep records of how platform conduct affects your business in case private access becomes relevant.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise platforms, technology companies, advertisers, app developers and marketplace sellers on digital platforms competition issues in Canada. Our work includes dominance assessments, compliance reviews of platform terms and ranking practices, merger screening, responses to Bureau inquiries and strategies for private applications or their defence before the Competition Tribunal. See our pages on abuse of dominance and technology and AI, and our note on private access. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss your position, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

Does Canada have a digital markets act?

No. Digital platform conduct is addressed under the general Competition Act, mainly abuse of dominance in s. 79, the merger provisions, the agreement provisions and the deceptive marketing rules. Amendments since 2022 have made those provisions considerably stronger and more relevant to platform economics.

Can self-preferencing be an abuse of dominance in Canada?

It can. A dominant platform's self-preferencing may be an anti-competitive act if intended to exclude rivals, or may be challenged under the effects-based route if it substantially lessens competition in a market where the platform has a plausible competitive interest, unless the effect results from superior competitive performance.

What penalties apply to abuse of dominance?

Under s. 79(3.1), the Tribunal can impose an administrative monetary penalty of up to the greater of CAD 25 million (CAD 35 million for subsequent orders) and three times the benefit derived, or 3% of the person's annual worldwide gross revenues if the benefit cannot reasonably be determined.

Can a business user sue a dominant platform?

Since June 2025, a private party can apply to the Competition Tribunal for leave to bring an abuse of dominance application. Leave may be granted if the applicant is directly and substantially affected in the whole or part of its business, or if it is in the public interest. The Tribunal may order payments to affected persons.

Sources

  1. Competition Act, ss. 79, 93 and 103.1
  2. Competition Bureau: Guide to the December 2023 amendments
  3. Competition Bureau: Guide to the June 2024 amendments

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.