Non-Notifiable Mergers and the Three-Year Lookback
Non notifiable mergers fall below Canada's pre-merger notification thresholds but can still be challenged. Since June 2024, the Commissioner has three years after closing to challenge mergers that were not notified or the subject of an ARC request. This note explains the lookback, how the Bureau finds deals, voluntary contact and ARCs, and roll-up risk.

Key takeaways
- Section 92 applies to mergers of any size, notifiable or not.
- Non-notified mergers can be challenged up to three years after substantial completion (s. 97(b)).
- Notified mergers and ARC requests keep a one-year limitation (s. 97(a)).
- An ARC protects against a later challenge on the same information if closing occurs within a year.
- Roll-ups of small competitors can trigger the structural presumptions in local markets.
Why non notifiable mergers still face review
Non notifiable mergers are transactions that fall below the pre-merger notification thresholds in Part IX of the Competition Act. Many deal teams treat "not notifiable" as meaning "not reviewable", but that is wrong. The substantive merger provision, s. 92, applies to any merger regardless of size, and the Competition Bureau states plainly that the Commissioner may review any merger or acquisition to protect and promote competition. What changes below the thresholds is the procedure: there is no mandatory filing or waiting period, but the Commissioner can still investigate and apply to the Competition Tribunal to block or unwind the deal.

Since the June 2024 amendments, that risk lasts much longer. The limitation period for challenging a merger that was not notified and was not the subject of an advance ruling certificate request is now three years after substantial completion (s. 97(b)), up from one year. For notified mergers, the period remains one year (s. 97(a)). Combined with the structural presumptions and the expanded s. 93 factors, this makes post-closing review of non notifiable mergers a real consideration for buyers in concentrated or local markets, and for serial acquirers rolling up fragmented industries.
The three-year lookback
The Competition Bureau's guide to the June 2024 amendments describes the change as "extending from one year to three years the period the Competition Bureau has to challenge a merger for which it was not notified". The practical effect is that a buyer of a business below the thresholds may close, integrate the business, change prices or close facilities, and still face an application years later seeking dissolution or divestiture. The Tribunal can now also order remedies aimed at restoring competition "to the level that would have prevailed but for the merger" (s. 92(1)(e)), which can be difficult and costly to achieve after integration.
| Situation | Limitation for Commissioner's s. 92 application | Source |
|---|---|---|
| Merger notified under s. 114 | 1 year after substantial completion | s. 97(a) |
| Merger subject of an ARC request under s. 102 | 1 year after substantial completion | s. 97(a) |
| Any other merger (including non notifiable mergers) | 3 years after substantial completion | s. 97(b) |
| ARC issued and merger completed within one year | No application solely on the same information | s. 103 |
How the Bureau finds non notifiable mergers
The Bureau has a dedicated Merger Intelligence and Notification Unit that monitors transactions that are not notified. Sources include media and industry publications, trade press, financial databases, complaints from customers and competitors, other government agencies, and information obtained in unrelated investigations. Customers, suppliers and rivals affected by a deal in a local market often complain directly. According to the Bureau's merger review overview, parties to non-notifiable transactions that may raise concerns are encouraged to contact the Bureau voluntarily before closing, preferably at an early stage.
When the Bureau opens an inquiry into a non-notified merger, it can use its formal powers, including court orders under s. 11 to compel documents, data and testimony. Parties should assume that internal deal documents, integration plans and post-closing pricing data will be examined.
What a post-closing review looks like
A post-closing review usually starts quietly. The Bureau may send a voluntary information request or a letter asking the merged business to describe the transaction, its rationale and the markets involved. If concerns persist, the Commissioner can commence a formal inquiry under s. 10 and seek court orders under s. 11 requiring the production of records and data and the written or oral examination of officers. Third parties, including customers and competitors, are often interviewed or ordered to produce information as well.
The analysis then follows the same substantive framework as for a notified merger. The Bureau defines relevant markets, measures shares and concentration, considers whether the structural presumptions apply and examines the s. 93 factors, including barriers to entry, the removal of a vigorous competitor and effects on price, quality and choice. Post-closing evidence can be powerful in either direction. Price increases, reduced service levels or the closure of a competing location after closing will be read as evidence of harm; stable or falling prices and new entry may support the parties.
If the Bureau concludes that the merger is likely to substantially prevent or lessen competition, it will usually seek a negotiated resolution. That can mean selling assets or locations that were acquired, sometimes years after integration, or behavioural commitments. If no agreement is reached, the Commissioner may apply to the Tribunal for orders under s. 92, including dissolution of the merger or divestiture of assets or shares, and may also seek interim relief while the application is pending.
Screening checklist for transactions below the thresholds
A simple screening process can identify most transactions that deserve a closer look:
- Overlaps. Do the parties sell the same or substitutable products or services, or buy the same inputs, including labour?
- Local markets. For businesses that serve customers locally, map each location and its nearest alternatives; national shares can hide high local concentration.
- Shares and concentration. Estimate shares and the HHI change under the narrowest plausible market definition and compare them with the thresholds in s. 92(3).
- Vertical links. Would the merged firm control an input or channel that rivals need?
- History. Has the buyer made other acquisitions in the same area, or received complaints from customers or competitors?
- Documents. Do board papers, investment memos or banker materials describe the deal as removing a competitor or enabling price increases?
If the answers point to a meaningful overlap in a concentrated market, the parties should consider voluntary engagement or an ARC request before signing, and build the residual risk into the deal terms. If the answers are reassuring, a short internal memo recording the analysis can be useful later if questions arise.
Voluntary engagement and ARCs for small deals
Parties to non notifiable mergers have three main options:
- Close without engaging. Appropriate where there are no meaningful overlaps or vertical links, or where overlaps are clearly in competitive markets.
- Informal voluntary contact. Parties can approach the Merger Intelligence and Notification Unit with a short description of the deal and the markets. The Bureau may decide it has no concerns, ask questions or open a review. Informal contact does not change the three-year limitation, which applies to mergers that were not notified or the subject of an ARC request.
- Request an advance ruling certificate (s. 102). Even for a non-notifiable deal, parties may request an ARC. If the Commissioner is satisfied there are insufficient grounds to apply to the Tribunal and issues an ARC, the Commissioner cannot later challenge the merger solely on the same or substantially the same information if it is substantially completed within one year (s. 103). Requesting an ARC also brings the merger within the shorter one-year limitation in s. 97(a). A filing fee applies.
The ARC route offers the most certainty, but it requires disclosure and time. For transactions with modest overlaps in concentrated markets, it is often worth the cost.
For any deal below the thresholds that combines competitors with high local shares, run the structural presumption test on plausible markets. If it is triggered, weigh an ARC request against three years of exposure, and price that exposure into the deal through holdbacks, indemnities or a lower price.
Roll-up strategies in fragmented markets
Serial acquisitions, often called roll-ups, are common in veterinary clinics, dental practices, funeral homes, home services, waste collection, software and other fragmented sectors. Each acquisition may be small and non-notifiable, but together they can create significant local market power. The structural presumptions apply to concentration "in any relevant market", and the Tribunal may consider the change in concentration and the entrenchment of leading incumbents among the s. 93 factors. The anti-avoidance rule in s. 113.1 also applies where transactions are designed to avoid notification.
Private equity sponsors pursuing roll-ups should track cumulative local shares across acquisitions, maintain documents that describe the competitive rationale accurately, and consider whether particular add-ons in already concentrated local markets warrant voluntary engagement or an ARC. A challenge to one acquisition can affect the valuation of the whole platform.
Labour markets deserve separate attention. The June 2024 amendments confirmed that the Tribunal can consider competitive harm in labour markets when assessing a merger, and the concentration index is defined by reference to suppliers or customers, which can include employers as buyers of labour. A small acquisition that combines the only two employers of a specialized workforce in a region may therefore raise questions even if product markets are competitive. Buyers integrating workforces should also make sure that pre-closing coordination on wages or hiring does not stray into conduct prohibited by s. 45(1.1), which applies to agreements between unaffiliated employers.
Deal terms for non notifiable mergers
Because the risk arises after closing, contract terms for non notifiable mergers differ from those in notifiable deals. Buyers may seek:
- representations about the target's market position, recent pricing and any prior competition complaints;
- a specific indemnity or escrow for costs of a post-closing review;
- covenants by the seller to cooperate with any Bureau inquiry after closing;
- purchase price adjustment or earn-out terms that reflect the possibility of a forced divestiture; and
- in some cases, a condition that the Bureau confirm it has no concerns, which effectively converts the deal into a voluntary filing.
Sellers, for their part, will resist open-ended exposure and prefer clean exits. The negotiation often turns on how realistic the theory of harm is, which is why early market analysis matters. A credible screening memo prepared before signing helps both sides agree on how much risk exists and who should carry it, and it reduces the chance that an unexpected inquiry derails the post-closing integration plan.
Interaction with other provisions
Non notifiable mergers can also attract scrutiny under other parts of the Act. Agreements between the parties before closing, such as non-competes or information exchange, may raise issues under s. 45 (criminal conspiracy) or s. 90.1 (civil agreements), particularly if the deal does not close. Post-closing conduct by a dominant merged firm may be examined under the abuse of dominance provisions. Our notes on structural presumptions, gun jumping and notification thresholds address those issues.
How TRW & Co helps
We advise buyers, sellers and private equity sponsors on competition risk in non notifiable mergers. Our work includes early market and concentration screening, strategies for voluntary engagement and ARC requests, roll-up compliance programs, risk-allocation terms in purchase agreements and responses to post-closing Bureau inquiries, with economists where needed. See our pages on merger review and private equity. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a transaction, contact us.
Frequently asked questions
Can the Competition Bureau challenge a deal below the notification thresholds?
Yes. Section 92 applies to any merger that is likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially, regardless of size. Non-notifiable deals have no mandatory filing or waiting period, but the Commissioner can investigate and apply to the Competition Tribunal for orders, including dissolution or divestiture.
How long after closing can a non-notified merger be challenged?
Up to three years after the merger is substantially completed, under s. 97(b) of the Competition Act, following the June 2024 amendments. If the merger was notified or the subject of an advance ruling certificate request, the limitation is one year under s. 97(a).
Should parties to a small deal contact the Bureau voluntarily?
Where there are meaningful overlaps in concentrated markets, often yes. The Bureau encourages early voluntary contact for non-notifiable transactions that may raise concerns. An advance ruling certificate request gives the most certainty and brings the deal within the one-year limitation, but involves disclosure, time and a fee.
Are roll-up acquisitions treated differently?
Each acquisition is assessed under s. 92, but serial acquisitions can cumulatively raise concentration in local markets and trigger the structural presumptions. The anti-avoidance rule in s. 113.1 also applies to transactions designed to avoid notification. Sponsors should monitor cumulative local shares.
Sources
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.


