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Corporate & M&A

Proxy Contests in Canada: Requisitions, Advance Notice, Settlements

Proxy contests in Canada give shareholders strong tools to challenge a board, from 5% requisitions to public broadcast solicitations. This guide explains requisitions under s. 143 CBCA, advance notice by-laws, solicitation exemptions, universal proxies, vote-against campaigns, court and regulatory challenges and typical settlement terms.

Shareholders voting at a meeting during proxy contests in Canada

Key takeaways

  • Holders of 5% of voting shares can requisition a meeting; directors have 21 days to call it.
  • Advance notice provisions are enforceable but cannot be used to unfairly block nominations.
  • Dissidents may solicit 15 or fewer holders, or by public broadcast, without a circular.
  • CBCA majority voting makes vote-against campaigns more consequential.
  • Most contests settle with board seats, standstills and capped expense reimbursement.

How proxy contests work in Canada

Proxy contests are campaigns in which a shareholder, usually an activist fund or a group of dissident holders, solicits proxies from other shareholders to replace some or all of the board, or to approve or defeat a resolution, against management's recommendation. In Canada they run under two overlapping regimes: corporate statutes, which give shareholders rights to requisition meetings, submit proposals and solicit proxies, and securities law, which governs the content of information circulars and the exemptions that allow early, public campaigning.

Shareholders voting at a meeting during proxy contests in Canada
Proxy contests in Canada combine statutory requisition rights, advance notice by-laws and solicitation rules under corporate and securities law.

Canadian law is generally seen as shareholder-friendly. A holder with 5% of the voting shares can force a meeting, dissidents can campaign publicly before filing a circular, and courts and securities commissions have been willing to step in when boards use procedural tactics to entrench themselves. At the same time, advance notice requirements and disclosure rules impose discipline on dissidents. This guide uses the Canada Business Corporations Act (CBCA) as its reference point; provincial statutes are broadly similar but differ in detail.

Requisitioning a meeting under s. 143 CBCA

Under s. 143(1) of the CBCA, holders of not less than 5% of the issued shares that carry the right to vote at the meeting sought may requisition the directors to call a meeting for the purposes stated in the requisition. The requisition must state the business to be transacted and be sent to each director and the registered office.

The directors must call the meeting unless a record date has already been fixed and notice given, they have already called a meeting, or the business falls within the grounds on which a shareholder proposal may be refused. If the directors do not call a meeting within 21 days after receiving the requisition, any shareholder who signed it may call the meeting (s. 143(4)), and unless shareholders resolve otherwise the corporation must reimburse the requisitioning holders' reasonable expenses (s. 143(6)).

Boards sometimes respond to a requisition by calling the meeting for a date months away, or by combining it with the annual meeting. Whether a delayed date is acceptable depends on the circumstances; dissidents have challenged unreasonable delays in court.

ToolThreshold or rule (CBCA)Use in a campaign
Requisition5% of voting shares, s. 143Forces a special meeting to replace directors
Shareholder proposal with nominations5% of voting shares, s. 137(4)Puts dissident nominees in management's circular
Solicitation to 15 or fewer holdersNo dissident circular needed, s. 150(1.1)Private outreach to a few large holders
Public broadcast solicitationNo dissident circular needed in prescribed circumstances, s. 150(1.2)Press releases, speeches and online campaigns
Majority votingMajority of votes cast "for" in uncontested elections, s. 106(3.4)"Vote against" campaigns

Advance notice by-laws and policies

Most Canadian listed companies have advance notice by-laws or policies that require shareholders to notify the corporation of director nominations within a set window before the meeting and to provide prescribed information about the nominees. Courts have accepted these provisions as legitimate tools to ensure orderly meetings and informed voting, but have refused to apply them in ways that unfairly frustrate a legitimate nomination, for example where the board changes the meeting date to shut out a dissident.

The TSX has also addressed advance notice policies. TSX Staff Notice 2017-0001 discusses majority voting, director election requirements and advance notice policies together, reflecting the exchange's interest in ensuring that governance tools do not undermine shareholders' ability to elect directors. Boards adopting or amending advance notice provisions should ensure they are shareholder-approved, reasonably drafted and applied consistently.

Solicitation rules and the public broadcast exemption

Anyone soliciting proxies other than management must generally send a dissident's proxy circular. Two exemptions matter most in practice. Under s. 150(1.1) CBCA, a dissident may solicit 15 or fewer shareholders without a circular, which allows confidential conversations with large holders. Under s. 150(1.2), a dissident may solicit by public broadcast, speech or publication in prescribed circumstances, which allows activists to announce a campaign, publish presentations and use social media before filing a circular. Securities law contains parallel exemptions, sometimes described as the "quiet solicitation" and "public broadcast" exemptions.

Once a formal circular is required, it must include prescribed information about the dissident, its holdings, its nominees and its interests. Proxy forms must comply with the statute and with National Instrument 51-102. Since the CBCA majority voting amendments came into effect on 31 August 2022, forms of proxy for uncontested elections of CBCA distributing corporations must allow holders to vote "for" or "against" each nominee; the June 2025 CSA notice of publication aligned NI 51-102 with that requirement.

Practical point

Dissidents that talk to other shareholders before going public should consider whether those discussions create an agreement or understanding that makes them joint actors for early warning reporting, and whether the 15-holder limit for exempt solicitation has been exceeded.

Universal proxies, withhold campaigns and "vote against" campaigns

A universal proxy lists both management and dissident nominees on a single form, allowing shareholders to mix and match. In Canada, universal proxies have been used in contests by agreement between the parties or on a board's initiative, and they are often discussed as part of a negotiated protocol for the meeting. Whether either side must use one depends on the governing statute, the issuer's by-laws and any agreement between the parties, so the point should be checked early in each campaign.

Not every campaign seeks to elect a dissident slate. In a "vote against" campaign (formerly called a withhold campaign), an activist urges shareholders to vote against specific incumbent directors. Under s. 106(3.4) CBCA, a candidate in an uncontested election of a distributing corporation is elected only if the votes cast in favour are a majority of the votes cast for and against. An incumbent who fails may continue in office only until the earlier of the 90th day after the election and the appointment or election of a successor (s. 106(6.1)), and may not be reappointed before the next meeting except in prescribed circumstances. For TSX issuers, the exchange's majority voting requirement adds a resignation policy.

Preparing for proxy contests: a board playbook

Boards that prepare before an activist appears are better placed to respond calmly. Preparation is not about entrenchment; it is about having the information, advisers and governance documents in order so that the board can engage on the merits. A practical playbook includes:

  • Shareholder mapping. Know who the largest holders are, how they voted at recent meetings and which proxy advisers influence them.
  • Governance documents. Review by-laws, advance notice provisions, any shareholder rights plan and quorum rules, and confirm they are current and shareholder-approved.
  • Vulnerability review. Identify issues an activist is likely to raise: capital allocation, underperforming segments, executive pay, board tenure and skills.
  • Response team. Agree in advance who speaks for the company, which advisers will be retained and how the board will be kept informed.
  • Disclosure discipline. Make sure that public statements during a campaign are accurate, because both sides' communications can be challenged before a court or securities commission.

When an approach comes, the board should consider whether early engagement, including private meetings with the activist, can resolve the issues without a public fight. Many proxy contests begin because one side believes the other will not listen.

A dissident's timeline in proxy contests

  1. Build a position and file any required early warning reports, deciding how to describe plans and intentions.
  2. Engage privately with the board and, within the 15-holder exemption, with a few large shareholders.
  3. Go public through a news release and presentation under the public broadcast exemption.
  4. Submit nominations in compliance with the advance notice provisions, or requisition a special meeting.
  5. File and mail a dissident's circular and form of proxy, and engage proxy advisers.
  6. Negotiate a settlement or proceed to the vote, with scrutineers and legal teams ready for disputes about proxies.

Court and securities commission challenges

Proxy contests frequently produce litigation. Common disputes include the timing of a requisitioned meeting, the application of advance notice provisions, the validity of proxies and the conduct of the chair, and disclosure deficiencies in either side's circular. Dissidents may seek court orders under the CBCA's compliance and oppression provisions; boards may seek directions on meeting procedure.

Securities commissions can also intervene under their public interest jurisdiction, for example where a party's disclosure is misleading or where a defensive tactic, such as a dilutive private placement to a friendly holder during a contest, deprives shareholders of a meaningful vote. In the May 2026 CSA Notice and Request for Comment, the CSA proposed requiring dissidents and bidders who send an information circular to disclose interests in equity equivalent derivatives and other arrangements that alter economic exposure, while expressly not extending the requirement to solicitations made under the quiet solicitation or public broadcast exemptions. The proposals were out for comment and not in force as of the latest version reviewed.

How proxy contests settle

Many Canadian proxy contests settle before the meeting. A settlement agreement typically covers:

  • appointment of one or more dissident nominees to the board, sometimes with a reduction in the number of management nominees;
  • committee seats, including on a strategic review or special committee;
  • a standstill limiting further stake-building, proposals or solicitations for a defined period;
  • voting commitments supporting the board's slate at the next meeting;
  • reimbursement of the dissident's expenses up to a cap;
  • a mutual non-disparagement clause and an agreed press release.

Settlement agreements are often material contracts that must be filed and disclosed. Boards should consider how a settlement interacts with existing shareholder rights plans, credit agreements with change-of-board provisions, and executive employment agreements with change-of-control triggers.

Directors approving a settlement should record why it serves the corporation, not merely why it ends the contest. A settlement that adds directors with relevant expertise, or launches a strategic review the board already thought worth considering, is easier to defend than one driven only by the cost of fighting. Standstill periods should be long enough to allow the reconstituted board to work, and the agreement should say what happens if a dissident nominee resigns.

Illustration (hypothetical): An activist with 6% of a CBCA mid-cap requisitions a meeting to replace four directors. The board calls the meeting for a date 90 days later; the activist runs a public broadcast campaign and files a circular; proxy advisers recommend two of the activist's nominees. Two weeks before the meeting, the parties agree that two dissident nominees will join the board, with a one-year standstill and capped expense reimbursement.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise boards, special committees and shareholders on proxy contests in Canada: requisitions and meeting logistics, advance notice by-laws, solicitation strategy and exemptions, circular disclosure, early warning and joint actor issues, and settlement agreements. Where court applications or securities commission hearings require a lawyer licensed in a Canadian province, we work with local counsel. See also corporate governance and boards and securities litigation, and our insights on early warning reporting and majority voting and say-on-pay. To discuss a campaign, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

How much stock do I need to requisition a meeting?

Under s. 143(1) of the CBCA, holders of not less than 5% of the issued shares carrying the right to vote at the meeting sought may requisition one. If the directors do not call the meeting within 21 days, a requisitioning shareholder may call it, generally with reimbursement of reasonable expenses.

Can a dissident campaign before filing a circular?

Yes, within limits. The CBCA permits solicitation of 15 or fewer shareholders without a dissident's circular, and solicitation by public broadcast, speech or publication in prescribed circumstances. Securities law has parallel exemptions. A formal circular is needed for broader solicitation of proxies.

Are advance notice by-laws enforceable?

Generally yes, as tools for orderly meetings and informed voting. Courts have declined to apply them where a board uses them to unfairly frustrate a legitimate nomination, for example by changing the meeting date. Provisions should be shareholder-approved and applied consistently.

What happens if a director loses a majority vote?

For CBCA distributing corporations in uncontested elections, a candidate who does not receive a majority of votes cast for and against is not elected. An incumbent may stay in office only until the earlier of the 90th day after the election and the appointment of a successor.

Sources

  1. Canada Business Corporations Act, ss. 106, 137, 143, 150
  2. TSX Staff Notice 2017-0001: majority voting, director elections and advance notice policies
  3. CSA Notice and Request for Comment (14 May 2026)
  4. CSA Notice of Publication including majority voting form of proxy amendments (19 June 2025)

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.