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Leading Court Decisions

The Rogers–Shaw Merger Ruling: Remedies and Litigation Lessons

The Rogers Shaw merger ruling is Canada's leading recent contested merger case. The Competition Tribunal assessed the deal as restructured with the sale of Freedom Mobile to Videotron, found no substantial lessening of competition, and the Federal Court of Appeal agreed. Parliament then rewrote key merger rules.

Rogers Shaw merger ruling explained: Competition Tribunal, Freedom Mobile divestiture and wireless competition

Key takeaways

  • 2023 Comp Trib 1 (31 December 2022) dismissed the Commissioner's challenge; 2023 FCA 16 upheld it.
  • The Tribunal assessed the transaction as restructured with the Freedom Mobile sale to Videotron.
  • The Commissioner kept the burden of proving a likely substantial lessening of competition.
  • The efficiencies defence has since been repealed and structural presumptions added to s. 92.
  • Remedies must now restore or preserve the competition that would prevail absent the merger.

What the Rogers Shaw merger ruling decided

In Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2023 Comp Trib 1, the Competition Tribunal dismissed the Commissioner of Competition's application to block the Rogers Shaw merger, as restructured to include the sale of Freedom Mobile to Videotron Ltd. The Federal Court of Appeal dismissed the Commissioner's appeal from the bench in 2023 FCA 16 on 24 January 2023. The core lesson: when parties restructure a deal to include a divestiture, the Tribunal assesses the transaction that will actually happen, not the one originally announced.

Rogers Shaw merger ruling explained: Competition Tribunal, Freedom Mobile divestiture and wireless competition
The Rogers Shaw merger litigation turned on whether the Tribunal should assess the deal as restructured with the Freedom Mobile divestiture.

The case is the most important contested merger litigation in Canada in years, and it sits at a turning point: Parliament amended the merger provisions of the Competition Act soon afterwards, adding a remedial standard, structural presumptions and other changes that would shape a similar case today. This note explains the facts, the Tribunal's and Court of Appeal's reasoning, the legislative response, and lessons for merging parties. It is general information, not legal advice.

The facts: a CAD 26 billion deal and a divestiture to Videotron

In 2021, Rogers Communications Inc. agreed to acquire Shaw Communications Inc. in a transaction the Tribunal described as valued at about CAD 26 billion. Shaw owned Freedom Mobile, a wireless carrier competing with the national incumbents in Ontario, Alberta and British Columbia. The Commissioner challenged the merger under s. 92 of the Competition Act, alleging that it would substantially lessen or prevent competition in wireless services.

To address the concerns, the parties restructured the deal so that Shaw would first sell Freedom Mobile to Videotron Ltd., a subsidiary of Quebecor, and Rogers would then acquire the rest of Shaw. The Minister of Innovation, Science and Industry had refused to approve the transfer of Freedom's spectrum licences to Rogers, so Rogers would never own Freedom. The Commissioner maintained that the Tribunal should assess the original merger and treat the Videotron sale as a proposed remedy, with the burden on the parties to show it was effective.

DateStep
2021Rogers and Shaw enter an arrangement agreement
2022Commissioner applies to the Tribunal; deal restructured to sell Freedom Mobile to Videotron
November–December 2022Tribunal hearing
31 December 2022Tribunal dismisses the application (2023 Comp Trib 1)
24 January 2023Federal Court of Appeal dismisses the appeal from the bench (2023 FCA 16)

How the Tribunal assessed the Rogers Shaw merger with a divestiture

The Tribunal's reasons, by a panel chaired by Chief Justice Crampton, made three key findings.

The merger to assess was the restructured transaction. The Tribunal rejected the Commissioner's position that the original Rogers–Shaw deal was the merger before it. The original deal was no longer being proposed; Rogers would never own Freedom, and the Tribunal had to reason from actual circumstances. The proposed merger under s. 92 was the three-way arrangement including the Videotron sale.

The burden stayed with the Commissioner. Because there was no completed merger from which a remedy was being carved out, the Commissioner bore the burden of showing a likely substantial lessening or prevention of competition. The Tribunal added that it would have reached the same result even if the parties had borne the burden.

No substantial lessening of competition. The markets were wireless services to consumers in British Columbia and Alberta; the Commissioner conceded no harm in Ontario. The Tribunal found that four strong competitors would remain in those provinces, that Rogers' post-merger shares would likely erode as Videotron grew, and that Videotron's offerings would likely be priced at least as competitively as Freedom's had been. Since there was no substantial lessening, the Tribunal did not need to decide the efficiencies defence then in s. 96.

The appeal: questions of law and deference

On appeal, the Federal Court of Appeal (Stratas, Boivin and Locke JJ.A., reasons by Justice Stratas) applied the appellate standard under s. 13 of the Competition Tribunal Act: no deference on questions of law, deference on factually suffused mixed questions, and leave required for appeals on pure questions of fact, which the Commissioner had not sought. The Court held that the case was not close and the Tribunal's findings were well supported.

On the central question, the Court agreed that the Tribunal had to assess the real transaction. Assessing a merger that could not proceed without the divestiture would be unrealistic, and the Court observed that the Competition Act "aims to address truth and reality, not fiction and fantasy". The burden of proof mattered only where evidence was missing or the case was close, and neither applied. The Court left open that a sufficiently late or significant change could make a hearing unfair, but found no unfairness here. The appeal was dismissed with costs.

Practical point

Parties can restructure a deal during litigation to include a fix, and the Tribunal will assess the deal as it will actually close. But timing matters: a late, substantial change may raise fairness issues, and under the amended Act a remedy must meet the statutory standard of preserving or restoring the competition that would have prevailed absent the merger.

How Parliament changed the merger rules after the Rogers Shaw merger case

Parliament amended the merger provisions in 2023 and 2024, through S.C. 2023, c. 31 (Bill C-56) and S.C. 2024, c. 15 (Bill C-59). The amendment list shows Bill C-59 received royal assent on 20 June 2024, with further changes in force later. Key changes relevant to a case like this include:

IssueAt the time of Rogers–ShawCompetition Act today
Efficiencies defenceAvailable under s. 96Repealed (2023, c. 31)
Structural presumptionNones. 92(2)-(3): presumed SLPC if HHI rises by more than 100 and post-merger HHI exceeds 1,800 or combined share exceeds 30%, rebuttable by the parties
Remedial standardNot expressed in s. 92s. 92(1)(e)-(f): restore, or preserve, the level of competition that would have prevailed but for the merger
Challenge period for notified mergersOne year after substantial completionOne year if notified; three years otherwise (s. 97)

For a restructured transaction like the one here, the new remedial standard and the structural presumption shift the analysis. If the merger, assessed with its fix, still crosses the concentration thresholds in a relevant market, the parties bear the burden of rebutting the presumption on a balance of probabilities, and any remedy must be shown to restore or preserve pre-merger levels of competition, not merely avoid a substantial lessening. See our notes on structural presumptions and merger remedies and divestitures.

Designing a remedy after the Rogers Shaw merger case

The Rogers Shaw merger litigation shows that the quality of a fix is often the whole case. The Tribunal's conclusion rested on findings about the buyer: that Videotron would be an effective, aggressive competitor with the business it acquired and its own resources, and that its offerings would likely be at least as competitive as Freedom's had been. Parties planning a divestiture today should assemble the same kind of evidence, and more, because the remedy must meet the statutory standard.

  • Buyer suitability. Show the buyer's financial strength, operating experience, incentives to compete and independence from the merging parties.
  • Scope of the package. Include everything the divested business needs to compete: assets, licences, contracts, customers, personnel and transitional services. Gaps invite the argument that the remedy will not restore or preserve competition, and the Commissioner will test each element against the business as it operated before the merger.
  • Ongoing dependence. Long-term supply, roaming, network access or service agreements with the merged firm can be necessary, but they create dependence; terms and pricing will be scrutinized.
  • Execution risk. An upfront buyer, signed before the merger closes, reduces uncertainty compared with a promise to sell after closing.
  • Consent agreements. Where the Commissioner accepts the remedy, a registered consent agreement under the Act is the usual vehicle, and it avoids contested proceedings altogether.

The Rogers Shaw merger was resolved through litigation because the Commissioner did not accept that the fix was sufficient. Most Canadian merger remedies are negotiated instead. The case therefore also illustrates the bargaining dynamic: parties with a strong remedy and a credible willingness to litigate may obtain clearance on better terms, while the Commissioner, after the 2023 and 2024 amendments, has stronger legal tools than in this case.

Litigation lessons for merging parties

  1. Build the fix early. A divestiture to a credible buyer with the scale and assets to compete was decisive. Evidence of the buyer's plans, pricing and financial capacity carried weight.
  2. Coordinate with sector regulators. The spectrum licence decision by the Minister shaped what transaction could actually proceed. In telecom, banking and transport, sectoral approvals interact with the competition review; see our note on sectoral merger reviews.
  3. Expect a fast but intensive process. The Tribunal heard the case within months, and the appeal was decided from the bench. Parties should prepare economic, documentary and witness evidence on a compressed timeline, as in the Rogers Shaw merger proceedings.
  4. Model the new presumptions. Calculate HHI and market shares in each plausible market, with and without remedies, before signing.
  5. Allocate regulatory risk. Outside dates, hell-or-high-water clauses, divestiture commitments and reverse break fees should reflect the current Act, not the pre-2023 law.

Illustration (hypothetical): two regional internet providers agree to merge, and the Commissioner objects. The parties propose selling one region's customers to a third provider. On the reasoning in the Rogers Shaw merger case, the Tribunal would assess the merger as restructured. But under today's Act, if the combined share in a remaining region exceeds 30% and the HHI rises by more than 100, the parties must rebut the presumption, and the divestiture must preserve the level of competition that would prevail absent the merger.

Why the case still matters

The Rogers Shaw merger decisions remain authoritative on several points that the amendments did not change: the Tribunal assesses real transactions; the Commissioner generally bears the burden of proving a likely substantial lessening or prevention of competition outside the presumption; and appellate review of Tribunal findings is deferential on facts and mixed questions. They also show the value of a credible fix for a contested merger. At the same time, merging parties should not treat the outcome as a template, since several of the legal assumptions on which the case was argued no longer hold.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise Canadian and international businesses on merger review under the Competition Act, including pre-merger notification, substantive assessment under the amended s. 92, remedy design, divestiture agreements and strategy for contested proceedings before the Competition Tribunal. We coordinate competition analysis with sectoral approvals and Investment Canada Act review, and work with economists and Canadian-licensed litigation counsel where a case proceeds. See our merger review page, or contact us.

Frequently asked questions

Why did the Commissioner lose the Rogers–Shaw case?

The Tribunal assessed the merger as restructured, with Freedom Mobile sold to Videotron, and found that four strong wireless competitors would remain in Alberta and British Columbia. It concluded the transaction was not likely to substantially lessen or prevent competition. The Federal Court of Appeal found no legal error and described the case as not close.

Who bears the burden when parties propose a divestiture?

In this case the Tribunal held that the Commissioner bore the burden, because the restructured deal was the proposed merger and there was no completed merger from which a remedy was being carved out. Under today's Act, however, the structural presumption in s. 92(2) can shift the burden to the parties where concentration thresholds are exceeded.

Was the efficiencies defence used?

No. The Tribunal found no substantial lessening of competition, so it did not need to decide the efficiencies defence then in s. 96. That defence was repealed by S.C. 2023, c. 31, and is no longer available.

What remedial standard applies now?

Under s. 92(1)(e) and (f) of the Competition Act, an order for a completed merger is made to restore competition to the level that would have prevailed but for the merger, and an order for a proposed merger is made to preserve the level of competition that would prevail but for the merger.

How long does the Commissioner have to challenge a merger?

Under s. 97, one year after substantial completion if the merger was notified or an advance ruling certificate was requested, and three years otherwise. Parties to non-notifiable deals should factor in the longer period.

Sources

  1. Canada (Commissioner of Competition) v Rogers Communications Inc and Shaw Communications Inc, 2023 Comp Trib 1
  2. Commissioner of Competition v. Rogers Communications Inc., 2023 FCA 16
  3. Competition Act, ss. 92, 96, 97 (consolidated text)
  4. Competition Act, amendment list (Justice Laws)

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.