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Capital Markets & Securities

Selective Disclosure and Investor Relations Under NP 51-201

Selective disclosure of material information to analysts or large investors is one of the most common ways listed companies get into trouble. This note explains the tipping prohibition, the necessary course of business exception in NP 51-201, best practices for calls and quiet periods, and new risks from social media and AI.

Investor relations team preparing an earnings call script to avoid selective disclosure

Key takeaways

  • Tipping provisions bar disclosing undisclosed material information except in the necessary course of business.
  • A confidentiality agreement with an analyst does not cure selective disclosure under NP 51-201.
  • Use open, pre-announced earnings calls with replays and limit analyst report reviews to public facts.
  • Quiet periods run from quarter end to the earnings release, with no current-quarter guidance.
  • CSA Staff Notice 11-348 warns against AI washing and unsubstantiated AI claims.

What is selective disclosure and why does it matter?

Selective disclosure happens when a listed company gives material information that has not been generally disclosed to some people, typically analysts, institutional investors or other market professionals, before the market as a whole. In Canada it is prohibited by the "tipping" provisions of provincial securities legislation, such as s. 76(2) and (3) of the Ontario Securities Act, which bar a reporting issuer and persons in a special relationship with it from informing anyone of a material fact or material change before it is generally disclosed, other than in the necessary course of business. National Policy 51-201 Disclosure Standards (NP 51-201) is the Canadian Securities Administrators' guidance on how to comply.

Investor relations team preparing an earnings call script to avoid selective disclosure
NP 51-201 asks issuers to share material information with the whole market at once, not first with analysts or large investors.

The stakes are high. Selective disclosure can lead to regulatory proceedings against the company and its officers, insider trading and tipping charges against recipients who trade, civil liability claims and reputational harm. It can also force a company to disclose information earlier than planned, once it realizes that a leak has occurred. The policy opens with the principle that everyone investing in securities should have equal access to information that may affect their investment decisions.

NP 51-201 has been in place since 12 July 2002 and has been updated since. It is a policy, not a rule: it explains how regulators interpret the statutory prohibitions and sets out best practices. Courts and tribunals nonetheless treat it as a reliable statement of what responsible disclosure looks like, so departing from it without a good reason is risky.

Material information and the tipping prohibition

Selective disclosure only matters if the information is material. Canadian securities law distinguishes a "material fact", which would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of securities, from a "material change", which is a change in the business, operations or capital of the issuer with that effect. The Supreme Court of Canada confirmed a broad reading of "material change" in Lundin Mining Corp. v. Markowich, 2025 SCC 39, which makes disciplined disclosure control even more important.

NP 51-201 lists examples of potentially material information, including changes in share ownership that may affect control, significant acquisitions or dispositions, changes in earnings expectations, financing transactions, and significant management changes. It warns that a company cannot make material information immaterial simply by breaking it into seemingly non-material pieces. At the same time, a company may disclose non-material information to analysts even if it helps them complete a "mosaic" that, taken together, is material.

Analysts are tippees

Under NP 51-201, analysts, institutional investors, dealers and other market professionals who receive material undisclosed information are "tippees". It is illegal for them to trade or pass the information on, other than in the necessary course of business. The policy also confirms that a confidentiality agreement does not cure the problem: disclosing material undisclosed information to an analyst under a non-disclosure agreement still breaches the tipping prohibition unless the disclosure is in the necessary course of business.

The necessary course of business exception

Section 3.3 of NP 51-201 explains the exception that allows selective disclosure when it is in the "necessary course of business". Whether a disclosure qualifies is a mixed question of law and fact, decided case by case in light of the purpose of the tipping provisions. The policy gives examples of communications that may qualify, including those with:

  • vendors, suppliers or strategic partners on research and development, sales and marketing, and supply contracts;
  • employees, officers and board members;
  • lenders, legal counsel, auditors, underwriters, and financial and other professional advisers;
  • parties to negotiations;
  • labour unions and industry associations;
  • government agencies and non-governmental regulators; and
  • credit rating agencies, provided the information is disclosed to help them formulate a rating and their ratings generally are or will be publicly available.

The exception does not extend to briefing analysts, institutional investors or the media to help them understand the business ahead of the market. Where information is shared under the exception, the company should make sure the recipient understands that it must be kept confidential and should consider whether the recipient may need to be placed on an insider list.

SettingSelective disclosure riskNP 51-201 approach
Earnings callAnswers to questions going beyond the releaseOpen call, advance notice by news release, replay available, scripted answers
One-on-one investor meetingOff-script comments on guidance or trendsTwo company representatives, prepared talking points, debrief afterwards
Analyst report reviewExpressing comfort with estimatesCorrect only factual errors by reference to public information
Industry conferenceBreak-out sessions and hallway conversationsUse the public presentation; webcast where feasible
Social media and websiteMaterial news posted before a news releaseDisseminate by news release first; date and archive content

Best practices: disclosure policies, calls and quiet periods

Part VI of NP 51-201 recommends that every issuer adopt a written disclosure policy, approved by the board, that covers who may speak for the company, how material information is identified and released, and how rumours and leaks are handled. Key recommendations include:

  1. Authorized spokespersons. Limit the number of people who may speak with analysts, investors and the media.
  2. The recommended disclosure model for planned disclosure: issue a news release through a widely circulated wire service, give advance public notice of the date, time and access details of the conference call, hold the call in an open manner, and make a replay or transcript available for a reasonable period.
  3. Analyst report reviews limited to identifying publicly disclosed factual information or pointing out inaccuracies by reference to public information. Expressing comfort with an analyst's model or earnings estimate carries a serious risk of tipping.
  4. Quarterly quiet periods, running between the end of the quarter and the earnings release, during which no earnings guidance or comments on the current quarter are given. The policy notes that companies need not stop all communications, but should limit them to publicly available or non-material information.
  5. Insider trading policies and blackout periods aligned with the disclosure calendar.
  6. Electronic communications management, including a responsible website team, dated postings, archiving and retention periods.

When information leaks

If material information is disclosed selectively by mistake, the usual remedy is to make it public promptly by news release, so that the whole market has it. NP 51-201 also addresses rumours: a company is not generally required to respond to market rumours, but if trading suggests that a rumour reflects a leak from inside the company, the exchange may ask for a statement and the company may need to make immediate disclosure. A "no comment" policy is acceptable only if applied consistently.

A practical leak protocol should identify who decides whether information is material, who contacts the exchange's market surveillance team, who drafts and approves the release, and who checks whether insiders traded. It should also address halting trading where the release cannot be finalized quickly. Companies that rehearse this process before a transaction or earnings release respond far more cleanly than those that improvise.

Recipients have their own obligations. A dealer or fund that realizes it has received material undisclosed information should restrict trading in the security, notify compliance and, where appropriate, ask the issuer to disclose. NP 51-201 recommends that market professionals adopt internal procedures for identifying and handling such information.

Practical point

Most selective disclosure incidents happen in unscripted moments: the CFO's answer in a conference hallway, a follow-up email to a portfolio manager or a comment at an investor day dinner. Train every spokesperson on what is already public, keep a log of investor meetings, and, if something material slips out, be ready to issue a news release promptly.

Selective disclosure at investor days, on social media and through AI

NP 51-201 notes that selective disclosure often occurs in one-on-one meetings and conference break-out sessions, but can happen anywhere. For example, a company should not disclose material non-public information at its annual meeting unless the public may attend and adequate notice has been given, or a news release is issued at or before the meeting. The same logic applies to investor days and site visits: material new targets or guidance should be released publicly before or at the event, and the presentation should be posted and webcast.

Social media raises the same issues at higher speed. A post by an executive on a professional network or a reply in an online forum can be selective disclosure if it reveals material information that has not been disseminated through a news release. Companies should treat social media as a secondary channel for information that is already public. A short social media policy should name who may post on the company's behalf, require pre-clearance of any post about results, guidance or transactions, and remind directors and employees that personal accounts are not a safe harbour.

AI-generated statements and "AI washing"

Artificial intelligence creates two new selective disclosure risks. First, investor relations teams increasingly use AI tools to draft answers, summarize calls or power chatbots on IR websites. A tool that draws on internal, non-public data could reveal material information to whoever asks the right question. Second, in CSA Staff Notice and Consultation 11-348 (5 December 2024), CSA staff described "AI washing": inaccurate, false, misleading or embellished claims about the use of AI systems to attract investors. Staff warned against vague and unsubstantiated statements that use jargon to attract investors and expect issuers to have a reasonable basis for AI-related claims.

Issuers should restrict AI tools used for IR to approved public information, review AI-drafted text before release, and apply the same materiality and verification controls to statements about their own AI capabilities as to any other forward-looking or promotional claim.

Illustration (hypothetical): during a closed-door session at a mining conference, a chief executive tells a small group of fund managers that a pending drill program has "exceeded our expectations". Several attendees buy shares. The company issues a news release with the results the next morning. Regulators would likely ask whether the comment disclosed a material fact before general disclosure, whether any necessary course of business exception applied, and what the company's disclosure policy and training required.

How TRW & Co helps with selective disclosure

We advise listed companies, boards and investor relations teams on selective disclosure and continuous disclosure obligations. We prepare and refresh disclosure policies and insider trading policies, train spokespersons, review investor day and conference materials, set controls for social media and AI tools, and help companies respond when information leaks. Where a Canadian-licensed lawyer must give advice or appear before a regulator, we work with licensed counsel. Our continuous disclosure compliance and securities litigation work covers related issues, and our notes on timely disclosure of material changes and insider trading and tipping rules explain the statutory background. To discuss your disclosure practices, contact us. This note is general information, not legal advice.

Frequently asked questions

Is NP 51-201 binding?

No. NP 51-201 is a national policy that explains how securities regulators interpret the statutory tipping and timely disclosure requirements and recommends best practices. The binding prohibitions are in provincial securities statutes, such as s. 76 of the Ontario Securities Act. Regulators and tribunals rely on the policy when assessing whether a company acted responsibly.

Can we share material information with an analyst under an NDA?

No. NP 51-201 states that there is no exception to the tipping prohibition for disclosure to an analyst under a confidentiality agreement. Unless the disclosure is in the necessary course of business, which briefing analysts is not, sharing material undisclosed information breaches the prohibition.

What qualifies as the necessary course of business?

It is decided case by case. NP 51-201 gives examples such as communications with lenders, auditors, legal and financial advisers, underwriters, parties to negotiations, employees, regulators, and credit rating agencies for the purpose of a published rating. It does not cover early briefings for analysts, investors or the media.

Should we stop talking to investors during a quiet period?

Not entirely. NP 51-201 recommends a quarterly quiet period between quarter end and the earnings release during which no earnings guidance or comments on the current quarter are given. Communications can continue if limited to publicly available or non-material information.

How does AI affect selective disclosure?

AI tools used for investor relations could reveal non-public information if they are trained on internal data, and CSA staff have warned against AI washing. Limit IR tools to approved public information, review AI-drafted text, and ensure any claims about your own AI use are accurate and substantiated.

Sources

  1. NP 51-201 Disclosure Standards (OSC unofficial consolidation)
  2. CSA Staff Notice and Consultation 11-348: AI Systems in Capital Markets (5 December 2024)
  3. Securities Act (Ontario), R.S.O. 1990, c. S.5
  4. BCSC: NP 51-201 original version (2002)

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.