Seller Restrictive Covenants in Canadian M&A
Seller restrictive covenants protect the goodwill a buyer pays for, and Canadian courts review them more generously than employee non-competes. This guide explains the Payette v. Guay sale-of-business standard, the stricter Shafron test, Ontario's ESA exception, drafting scope and duration, and the s. 56.4 ITA tax rules.

Key takeaways
- Payette v. Guay, 2013 SCC 45, presumes covenants linked to a business sale are lawful unless unreasonable.
- Shafron, 2009 SCC 6, makes ambiguous covenants unenforceable and rejects notional severance.
- Ontario's ESA bans employee non-competes but excepts sale-of-business covenants and executives.
- Section 56.4 ITA includes covenant amounts in income unless an exception and election apply.
- Define restricted business, territory and duration by reference to the goodwill actually sold.
Are seller restrictive covenants enforceable in Canada?
Seller restrictive covenants, the non-competition and non-solicitation promises a vendor gives a buyer when selling a business, are generally enforceable in Canada if they are clear and reasonable in scope, territory and duration. Courts treat them more generously than restrictions in ordinary employment contracts, because a buyer pays for goodwill and is entitled to protect it, and because vendor and purchaser usually bargain on a more equal footing. The Supreme Court of Canada set out that distinction in Payette v. Guay inc., 2013 SCC 45, contrasting it with the stricter employment standard in Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6.

Enforceability is not automatic. A covenant that is ambiguous, unlimited in territory or untethered from the business sold can still fail, and drafting choices about who gives the covenant, and in what capacity, can determine which standard applies. Tax treatment under s. 56.4 of the Income Tax Act (ITA) and statutory limits on employee non-competes, notably in Ontario, add further layers.
The sale-of-business standard in Payette v. Guay
In Payette v. Guay inc., 2013 SCC 45, decided on 12 September 2013 on appeal from the Quebec Court of Appeal, the vendors of a crane business agreed to non-competition and non-solicitation covenants as part of an asset sale and then stayed on as consultants and employees. When they left and joined a competitor, the buyer sought to enforce the covenants. The Supreme Court dismissed the vendors' appeal and upheld the covenants.
The key points for seller restrictive covenants are:
- Commercial context. Where a covenant is linked to the sale of a business, the parties are presumed to have negotiated on an equal footing and the covenant is presumed lawful unless shown to be unreasonable.
- Reasonableness factors. The court considers the covenant's duration, territory and the activities it restricts, in light of the business sold and the goodwill transferred.
- Which standard applies. Where the covenant is in a sale agreement but the vendor also becomes an employee, the court looks at the main reason the covenant was given. If it is linked to the sale, the commercial standard applies, even though employment follows.
- Quebec. The Civil Code's specific rules for employment non-competes did not govern covenants given in the sale context.
The decision arose under Quebec civil law, but the Court drew on common-law authority and it is widely applied across Canada.
The stricter employment standard in Shafron
Shafron v. KRG Insurance Brokers (Western) Inc., 2009 SCC 6, decided on 23 January 2009 on appeal from British Columbia, concerned a non-competition clause in an employment context. The covenant restricted the employee from working in the "Metropolitan City of Vancouver", a term with no legal meaning. The Supreme Court allowed the employee's appeal and held the covenant unenforceable.
Three principles from Shafron matter when drafting seller restrictive covenants that may be characterized as employment covenants:
- Restrictive covenants in employment contracts are presumptively unenforceable unless reasonable, given the imbalance of bargaining power.
- An ambiguous covenant cannot be reasonable, because its scope cannot be assessed.
- Courts will not rewrite a covenant through "notional severance" to make it reasonable; "blue-pencil" severance, striking out words, is used only rarely, where the deleted part is trivial and not part of the main purpose.
The practical lesson is that a court will not save a poorly drafted covenant. Territory, duration and restricted activities must be defined precisely.
The Ontario ESA and its sale-of-business exception
Since 25 October 2021, Ontario's Employment Standards Act, 2000 (ESA) has prohibited employers from entering into employment contracts or other agreements with employees that are, or include, a non-compete agreement (s. 67.2(1)); a non-compete made in breach is void (s. 67.2(2)). Two exceptions matter in M&A:
- Sale of business (s. 67.2(3)). Where there is a sale of a business or part of a business and, as part of the sale, the purchaser and seller agree that the seller will not compete, and the seller becomes an employee of the purchaser immediately after the sale, the prohibition does not apply. "Sale" includes a lease.
- Executives (s. 67.2(4)). The prohibition does not apply to executives, defined to include the chief executive officer, president, chief financial officer, chief operating officer and other chief-level positions.
The ESA prohibition does not affect non-solicitation or confidentiality covenants. But it means that non-competes given by managers who are not vendors, or by vendors in a capacity that is really employment, need careful structuring in Ontario. Our note on non-compete bans in Canada covers other provinces' approaches.
Put the vendor's non-compete in the purchase agreement, in the vendor's capacity as seller, with consideration expressly tied to the sale. Put any employment-related covenants in a separate employment agreement. Mixing the two in one document invites a court to apply the stricter employment standard to the whole package.
Drafting scope, territory and duration
Seller restrictive covenants should be drafted to match the business sold. Reasonableness is assessed at the time the covenant is given, by reference to the goodwill transferred.
| Element | Good practice | Common pitfalls |
|---|---|---|
| Restricted business | Defined by reference to products and services the target actually sold at closing | "Any business similar to" or businesses the buyer may enter later |
| Territory | Provinces, countries or defined regions where the target operated or sold | Undefined terms; worldwide scope for a regional business |
| Duration | Tied to the time needed to transfer goodwill; often two to five years after closing | Open-ended or tied to an uncertain future event |
| Non-solicitation | Customers and employees of the target at or near closing | All persons who were ever customers; no time limit |
| Who gives it | Vendors and their key principals, in their capacity as sellers | Minor shareholders or employees with no meaningful sale proceeds |
| Remedies | Injunction, accounting, liquidated damages where appropriate | Forfeiture provisions that operate as penalties |
Step-down or "cascading" clauses, which offer alternative durations or territories in case the broader version fails, are viewed sceptically by some Canadian courts as an attempt to have the court do the drafting. Where used, they should be limited and each alternative should be reasonable on its own.
Confidentiality covenants deserve equal attention. They are not caught by Ontario's non-compete ban, they are easier to enforce, and they protect the information that usually matters most to a buyer: pricing, customer lists, product roadmaps and know-how. A well-drafted confidentiality covenant, combined with a targeted non-solicit, often gives a buyer most of the protection it needs.
Tax treatment of seller restrictive covenants under s. 56.4 ITA
Under s. 56.4(2) of the Income Tax Act, amounts received for a restrictive covenant are included in income, unless an exception applies. For vendors, that default would turn part of the sale price into fully taxable income. Section 56.4(3) provides the main exceptions:
- Share sales (s. 56.4(3)(c)). Where the covenant amount directly relates to the vendor's disposition of an eligible interest in a corporation or partnership carrying on the business, the covenant preserves the value of that interest, the amount is added to the vendor's proceeds of disposition, and the vendor and purchaser elect in prescribed form, the amount is treated as proceeds of the shares.
- Asset sales (s. 56.4(3)(b)). Where the amount would otherwise be proceeds for goodwill or similar property, a joint election can treat it that way.
- Employees (s. 56.4(3)(a)). Amounts included in employment income are taxed as such.
Separately, s. 56.4(5) to (7) can prevent s. 68 from allocating part of the purchase price to the covenant where no separate consideration is paid, if the conditions are met, for example for covenants given by an arm's-length employee of the target where only the vendors receive consideration. Purchase agreements should state that no separate consideration is paid for the covenants, or include the parties' agreement to file the election where an amount is allocated. Tax advice is essential, because missing an election can be costly.
Competition Act considerations
Non-competes between parties that remain competitors after a deal can raise issues under the Competition Act. The criminal conspiracy provision in s. 45 includes a defence for restraints that are ancillary to a broader legitimate agreement and "directly related to, and reasonably necessary for giving effect to" its objective (s. 45(4)). Covenants that go beyond what is needed to protect the goodwill sold, for example by covering unrelated products or lasting much longer than the transfer of goodwill requires, are harder to defend. In notifiable mergers, the Competition Bureau may also look at non-competes as part of its review. Our page on cartels and criminal enforcement explains s. 45.
Who should give seller restrictive covenants?
Buyers often ask every selling shareholder to sign the same covenants. That can be counterproductive. The rationale for the generous sale-of-business standard is that the covenantor sold goodwill and received value for it. A minority shareholder who held a small stake, had no customer relationships and received modest proceeds is in a weaker position to be bound by a broad non-compete, and a court may view the covenant as an employment restraint in disguise. Better practice is to tailor covenants:
- full non-competition and non-solicitation covenants from founders and principal vendors who carried the goodwill;
- non-solicitation and confidentiality covenants only from smaller shareholders and employees, especially in Ontario;
- separate covenants from corporate vendors and from the individuals who control them, so that the restriction cannot be avoided by acting through a different entity.
Private equity sellers almost never give non-competes, because their funds invest across many businesses; buyers usually accept a limited non-solicit of key employees instead.
Enforcing seller restrictive covenants after closing
When a vendor breaches a covenant, the buyer's main remedy is usually an interlocutory injunction to stop the competing activity while the case proceeds. Canadian courts apply a three-part test: a serious issue to be tried (or, for many restrictive covenant cases, a strong prima facie case), irreparable harm, and the balance of convenience. Clear covenants, contemporaneous evidence of the goodwill transferred and prompt action all improve the odds. Delay is often fatal, because it undercuts the claim that harm is irreparable.
Agreements can help by including the vendor's acknowledgment that the covenants are reasonable and that breach would cause irreparable harm, although courts treat such clauses as relevant rather than decisive. Damages and an accounting of profits remain available after trial. Our note on interlocutory injunctions explains the test in more detail.
How TRW & Co helps with seller restrictive covenants
We draft and negotiate seller restrictive covenants for buyers and vendors in Canadian acquisitions, structure them so the sale-of-business standard applies, coordinate them with employment agreements and the Ontario ESA rules, and work with tax advisers on s. 56.4 elections. When covenants are breached, we advise on injunction strategy and damages with litigation counsel. See our mergers and acquisitions page. This note is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a covenant, contact us.
Frequently asked questions
Why are sale-of-business non-competes easier to enforce?
Because the buyer pays for goodwill and the parties usually negotiate on an equal footing. In Payette v. Guay, 2013 SCC 45, the Supreme Court held that covenants linked to a sale of business are presumed lawful unless shown to be unreasonable in duration, territory or activities, a more permissive approach than for employment covenants.
Can a court fix an overbroad non-compete?
Rarely. In Shafron, 2009 SCC 6, the Supreme Court rejected notional severance, refusing to rewrite a covenant to make it reasonable, and limited blue-pencil severance to trivial deletions. An ambiguous or overbroad covenant is likely to fail entirely, so precise drafting is essential.
Does Ontario's non-compete ban apply to vendors?
Not where s. 67.2(3) of the ESA applies: on a sale of a business or part of a business, a seller's covenant not to compete is permitted even if the seller becomes the purchaser's employee immediately after the sale. Executives are also excepted. Non-solicitation and confidentiality covenants are not affected by the ban.
How are payments for restrictive covenants taxed?
Under s. 56.4(2) ITA, amounts received for a restrictive covenant are included in income unless an exception applies. On a share sale, a joint election under s. 56.4(3)(c) can treat the amount as proceeds of disposition of the shares if the conditions are met. Specific tax advice is needed.
How long can a seller's non-compete last?
There is no fixed maximum. Courts assess whether the duration is reasonable to protect the goodwill sold. Periods of two to five years after closing are common, and longer periods need justification. Territory and restricted activities must also match the business actually transferred.
Sources
General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.


