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Competition & Foreign Investment

Structural Presumptions in Canadian Merger Review

Structural presumptions now apply to Canadian merger review: if the HHI rises by more than 100 and either exceeds 1,800 or the parties' share exceeds 30%, the Tribunal must presume a substantial lessening of competition unless the parties prove otherwise. This note explains the test, the repeal of the efficiencies defence, new s. 93 factors and deal planning.

Economist calculating HHI to test the structural presumptions in a Canadian merger review

Key takeaways

  • Section 92(3): HHI increase over 100 plus HHI over 1,800 or combined share over 30%.
  • Once triggered, merging parties must rebut a presumed substantial lessening of competition.
  • The efficiencies defence in s. 96 was repealed in 2023.
  • New s. 93 factors cover network effects, entrenchment, non-price effects and coordination.
  • The Bureau consulted on new Merger Enforcement Guidelines until 11 February 2026; they are not yet final.

What the structural presumptions say

Canada's merger law now includes structural presumptions. Under s. 92(2) and (3) of the Competition Act, if the Competition Tribunal finds on a balance of probabilities that a merger results or is likely to result in a "significant increase in concentration or market share", it must also find that the merger prevents or lessens competition substantially, unless the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities. A significant increase exists in any relevant market where the concentration index rises by more than 100 and either the post-merger concentration index exceeds 1,800 or the merging parties' combined market share exceeds 30%.

Economist calculating HHI to test the structural presumptions in a Canadian merger review
Structural presumptions apply where the HHI rises by more than 100 and either exceeds 1,800 or the parties' share exceeds 30%.

The concentration index is the Herfindahl-Hirschman Index (HHI): the sum of the squares of the market shares of the suppliers or customers in the market (s. 92(4)). The Governor in Council may prescribe different values by regulation (s. 92(5)). Together with the repeal of the efficiencies defence and new factors in s. 93, these structural presumptions represent the most significant change to Canadian merger review in decades, shifting practical leverage toward the Competition Bureau in concentrated markets.

How the presumptions shift the burden

Before the amendments, the Commissioner of Competition had to prove, on the evidence as a whole, that a merger was likely to prevent or lessen competition substantially, and the Act stated that the Tribunal could not find a substantial lessening on the basis of concentration or market share alone. The new provisions reverse that logic. Once the Commissioner proves that the thresholds are crossed in a properly defined relevant market, the burden moves to the merging parties to prove that competition will not be substantially prevented or lessened.

Two points limit the reach of the structural presumptions. First, the Commissioner must still prove the relevant market and the market shares or HHI on a balance of probabilities; market definition therefore becomes even more important, because a wider market dilutes shares. Second, the presumptions are rebuttable. Parties can lead evidence on entry and expansion, the strength of remaining competitors, buyer power, innovation dynamics or other factors to show that the merger will not harm competition despite the concentration figures.

Scenario (post-merger)HHI changePresumption triggered?
HHI 2,200; combined share 25%+150Yes: HHI over 1,800 and increase over 100
HHI 1,500; combined share 32%+180Yes: share over 30% and increase over 100
HHI 2,500; combined share 40%+80No: increase not over 100
HHI 1,400; combined share 22%+120No: neither HHI over 1,800 nor share over 30%

The examples above are illustrations only; actual analysis depends on market definition and data.

Market definition, buyer-side markets and labour

Because the structural presumptions turn on shares and HHI "in any relevant market", the fight in contested cases will often be about market definition. The Bureau's traditional approach asks whether a hypothetical monopolist of a candidate product in a candidate area could profitably impose a small but significant and non-transitory price increase; if customers would switch enough to defeat it, the market is broadened. The narrower the market, the higher the shares. Parties must therefore test product and geographic markets carefully, including local markets for retail, health care and services businesses where overlaps can be concentrated in a few towns.

The statutory definition of the concentration index refers to the market shares of "suppliers or customers" (s. 92(4)). That wording allows the presumption to apply in purchasing markets, where the merging parties are buyers, as well as in selling markets. Buyer-side concentration matters for agricultural inputs, raw materials, specialized services and labour. Employers combining workforces in a local labour market with few alternative employers for particular skills should consider whether their hiring shares could trigger concerns, particularly since the Act now also targets wage-fixing and no-poach agreements.

Evidence that can rebut the structural presumptions

Rebuttal evidence needs to be specific and contemporaneous. Useful categories include: entry or expansion that is timely, likely and sufficient, supported by examples of recent entrants; customer switching data and win-loss records showing strong rivals outside the narrow market; evidence that the target is not a significant competitive constraint, such as a declining business or a failing firm; buyer power that disciplines prices; and innovation dynamics that make current shares a poor guide to future competition. Third-party evidence from customers often carries more weight than the parties' own submissions, so parties should understand how key customers view the deal early. Economic analysis, such as diversion ratios and price-concentration studies, can also help show that high shares overstate the merged firm's power.

Parties should also anticipate how the Bureau will use their own records. Strategy documents, pricing analyses and synergy models often reveal which competitors the parties actually watch. If those documents identify the merging party as the main rival, rebutting the structural presumptions becomes much harder.

Repeal of the efficiencies defence

For decades, s. 96 of the Act allowed a merger that substantially lessened competition to proceed if the efficiency gains it produced were greater than and offset its anti-competitive effects. That defence was unique among major jurisdictions and was central to several contested cases. Section 96 now reads "[Repealed, 2023, c. 31, s. 10]": it was removed by the 2023 amendments. Efficiencies may still be relevant to the competitive effects analysis, for example where they lead to lower prices or new products that intensify competition, but they no longer justify a merger that is otherwise anti-competitive.

The Bureau's existing Merger Enforcement Guidelines, dated 2011, still contain a Part 12 on the efficiency exception, which no longer reflects the statute. The Bureau has stated that it held a public consultation on proposed new guidelines from 13 November 2025 to 11 February 2026, is reviewing them and will publish updated guidelines once finalized (page modified 9 July 2026). Until then, deal teams must read the 2011 guidelines alongside the amended Act and the Bureau's guides to the 2023 and 2024 amendments.

New section 93 factors

The 2024 amendments also expanded the factors the Tribunal may consider in assessing a merger. Alongside traditional factors such as foreign competition, failing firms, substitutes, barriers to entry, remaining competition, removal of a vigorous competitor and innovation, s. 93 now includes:

  • network effects within a market (s. 93(g.1));
  • whether the merger would contribute to the entrenchment of leading incumbents (s. 93(g.2));
  • effects on price or non-price competition, including quality, choice or consumer privacy (s. 93(g.3));
  • the change in concentration or market share (s. 93(g.4)); and
  • the likelihood of express or tacit coordination between competitors (s. 93(g.5)).

These factors give the Bureau more explicit hooks for theories of harm in digital, data-driven and concentrated markets, and they inform how parties attempt to rebut the structural presumptions.

The "restore competition" remedies standard

The amendments also changed what the Tribunal can order. For a completed merger, the Tribunal may now make orders "to restore competition to the level that would have prevailed but for the merger" (s. 92(1)(e)). This standard is more demanding than the former approach, which required only that a remedy eliminate the substantial lessening. In negotiated settlements, the Bureau can therefore press for broader divestitures. Our note on merger remedies explains the practical effect.

Practical point

Run HHI and share calculations on several plausible market definitions before signing, and assume the Bureau will test the narrowest credible one. If any version crosses the structural presumptions, budget for a supplementary information request and build rebuttal evidence, such as entry, switching and customer data, from day one.

Deal planning under the structural presumptions

For transactions in concentrated sectors, the structural presumptions affect both strategy and documentation:

  1. Risk allocation. Purchase agreements should allocate antitrust risk explicitly, through efforts covenants, remedy limits, reverse termination fees and outside dates that allow for a lengthy review.
  2. Documents. Internal documents describing market leadership, share gains or reduced price pressure will be read against the presumption. Deal teams should write accurately and avoid hyperbole.
  3. Data. Parties need reliable share data and evidence of competitive constraints from outside the narrow market.
  4. Remedies. Where overlaps are clear, consider upfront or fix-it-first divestitures that bring the remaining overlap below the thresholds.
  5. Timing. Engage with the Bureau early, and expect a supplementary information request where thresholds are crossed.

The presumptions also matter for mergers below the notification thresholds, because the Bureau can challenge non-notified mergers for up to three years after completion (s. 97). See our notes on pre-merger notification thresholds and non-notifiable mergers.

Minority interests, vertical deals and serial acquisitions

The presumptions are framed around concentration and shares, so they are most obviously relevant to horizontal mergers between competitors. But the definition of "merger" in the Act includes the acquisition of a significant interest in a business, which can capture minority investments that confer material influence. Where an investor holds stakes in competing firms, the Bureau may consider whether the combined interest affects competition, even if no single acquisition changes control.

Vertical and conglomerate transactions do not usually increase concentration in a single market, so the presumptions rarely apply to them directly. They remain subject to review under the general test and the expanded s. 93 factors, including entrenchment and network effects. Serial acquisitions, such as roll-ups of small competitors in a fragmented market, can cumulatively push shares above the thresholds. Roll-up strategies are therefore a recognized area of risk, particularly because the Bureau can review non-notifiable transactions for up to three years after completion and can look at a series of acquisitions together when assessing their effect on a market.

Litigation outlook

Contested merger litigation is rare in Canada, and most concerns are resolved through consent agreements registered with the Competition Tribunal. The structural presumptions increase the Bureau's leverage in those negotiations, because parties facing the presumption in litigation would carry the burden of rebuttal. As the Tribunal interprets the new provisions, key questions will include how it approaches market definition when shares are close to the thresholds, what evidence suffices to rebut, and how the presumption interacts with the restore-competition remedies standard. Parties planning significant horizontal deals should treat these as live, unresolved issues in their risk planning.

How TRW & Co helps

We advise buyers, sellers and investors on Canadian merger review under the amended Competition Act. Our work includes early concentration and market definition analysis, risk allocation in purchase agreements, Bureau engagement and supplementary information request strategy, rebuttal evidence, remedy design and coordination with foreign merger reviews. We work with economists and Canadian litigation counsel where needed. See our pages on merger review and competition and foreign investment. This is general information, not legal advice. To discuss a transaction, contact us.

Frequently asked questions

When do the structural presumptions apply?

Under s. 92(3) of the Competition Act, in any relevant market where the merger increases the concentration index (HHI) by more than 100 and either the HHI exceeds 1,800 or the merging parties' market share exceeds 30%. The Commissioner must prove these facts on a balance of probabilities in a properly defined market.

Can merging parties rebut the presumption?

Yes. The presumption applies unless the contrary is proved on a balance of probabilities. Parties can rely on evidence of entry and expansion, remaining competitors, buyer power, innovation and other factors in s. 93 to show the merger will not substantially prevent or lessen competition.

Is the efficiencies defence still available?

No. Section 96, which allowed efficiency gains to offset anti-competitive effects, was repealed by the 2023 amendments. Efficiencies may still bear on competitive effects analysis, but they cannot justify a merger that substantially lessens competition.

Has the Bureau issued new Merger Enforcement Guidelines?

Not in final form as of the Bureau's page dated 9 July 2026. The Bureau consulted on proposed guidelines from 13 November 2025 to 11 February 2026 and says it will publish updated guidelines once finalized. The 2011 guidelines remain posted but predate the amendments.

Sources

  1. Competition Act, ss. 92, 93, 96, 97
  2. Competition Bureau: Merger Enforcement Guidelines (status page)
  3. Competition Bureau: Overview of the merger review process

General information only, not legal advice. References to statutes, courts and authorities describe published law and practice at the date shown.